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
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THE
BEAUTIES
OF THE
BRITISH SENATE.

X

Not Brit. Parl. ment.

THE
B E A U T I E S
OF THE
BRITISH SENATE:

TAKEN FROM THE
DEBATES OF THE LORDS AND COMMONS,
FROM THE
BEGINNING OF THE ADMINISTRATION
OF SIR ROBERT WALPOLE,
TO THE
END OF THE SECOND SESSION OF THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE RIGHT HON.
WILLIAM PITT:

BEING


AN IMPARTIAL SELECTION OF, OR FAITHFUL EXTRACTS
FROM, THE MOST EMINENT SPEECHES, DELIVERED IN THE
COURSE OF A MOST IMPORTANT AND TRULY INTERESTING
PERIOD, OF MORE THAN FIFTY YEARS; SEVERALLY AR-
RANGED UNDER THEIR RESPECTIVE HEADS, WITH THE
NAMES OF THE MEMBERS, TO WHOM THEY ARE ASCRIBED,
ANNEXED THERETO.

TO WHICH IS PREFIXED,
THE LIFE OF SIR ROBERT WALPOLE

L O N D O N,

PRINTED FOR JOHN STOCKDALE, OPPOSITE BURLING-
TON-HOUSE, PICCADILLY.

M DCC LXXXVI.



A D V E R T I S E M E N T.

THE extreme utility, as well as intrinsic merit of the following Work, is so obvious, that the Editor has little more to observe, than that it will be found equally candid and impartial.

While, however, he experiences every satisfaction in the confidence he has, that it will have its admirers for some of the finest reading to be met with, he suffers much in the fear he has, of being exposed to the censure of others, who may probably think he has either neglected them, or failed in the attempt he has made to do them justice.

In his defence, he thinks it necessary to represent, that the Debates of Parliament, for the last fifty years, were found to produce so many beauties, that it would have been altogether impracticable, however desirous he might have been of doing it, to have selected them all, at least, without running into a very expensive and voluminous work indeed. He was, therefore, under the painful necessity of passing by a number of beauties deserving notice, and could only make choice of those that were the most striking; determining, at the same time, to give as much variety, and to include as many speakers as possible.

Notwithstanding these difficulties in the way of rendering that complete and general satisfaction he wished to afford, he trusts the Work will, nevertheless, be found worthy universal patronage and support.

To the Public in general it will furnish much useful and entertaining matter, while the Politician, and

Member of Parliament in particular, will find it a source of the most necessary information and instruction. It will be found to contain the Speeches of the first Speakers that ever ornamented the British Senate, and their opinions on the most important and interesting topics.

The whole is so arranged, as to exhibit, in one point of view, all the Eloquence, the Wit, or Satire, &c. that has been in the Lords and Commons, from the Administration of SIR ROBERT WALPOLE, down to the present time, with the name of each Member annexed to the Beauty ascribed to him.

Those Beauties that would, from the nature of them, admit of it, will be found short and concise; others more at large, either as meriting it from their excellence, or to prevent their being disjointed or unintelligible; whilst some are selected entirely from the vast mass of matter they contain, or the great fund of knowledge they possess.

Upon the whole—the Editor flatters himself, that the BEAUTIES of the BRITISH SENATE will prove particularly acceptable to those who have not the Debates of Parliament, and serve as a valuable companion to those who have; nor be thought unworthy, either as an elegant or useful work, a place in the LIBRARY of every GENTLEMAN in the British Empire.

January 26, 1786.

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L I F E

L I F E

O F

SIR ROBERT WALPOLE.

THE commencement of the Administration of Sir Robert Walpole, having been judged a proper period for beginning the Beauties of the British Senate, it may naturally be expected that the work should be preceded by some account of his life.

Sir Robert Walpole, whose political history forms as important an æra as any to be met with in the annals of the British empire, was born on the 6th of September, 1674, at Houghton, in Norfolk, and appears to have been educated on the foundation of Eton School. He was elected to King's College, in Cambridge, and admitted in the year 1681; but succeeding to the family estate by the death of his elder brother, he resigned his Fellowship.

This great political character first took his seat in the House of Commons in the year 1700, for King's Lynn, which Borough he represented in several succeeding Parliaments; and in the year 1705 he had the honour of being nominated one of the Council to Prince George of Denmark, Lord High Admiral of England. In 1707 he was appointed Secretary at War, and in 1709 was made Treasurer to the Navy. In the year following, however, upon a change of the Ministry, he was removed from all his posts, and continued out of office during the whole of the Queen's reign.

In the year 1711, he was voted by the House of Commons guilty of an high breach of trust, and notorious corruption in
his

his office of Secretary at War; and it was resolved, that he should be committed to the Tower, and expelled the House. Upon a cool and dispassionate review of this affair, it has not been thought that there was sufficient proof to justify the severity used towards him; and, perhaps, his attachment to the Marlborough Ministry, and his great influence in the House, owing to his popular eloquence, were the true causes of his censure and imprisonment, as they had been before of his advancement. All the Whigs, however, on this occasion, considered him as a kind of martyr in their cause.

He was re-elected for the borough of Lynn, and though the House declared his election void, yet they persisted in the choice. On the death of the Queen a revolution of politics took place, and the Whig Party prevailed both at Court and in the Senate, and in a few days Sir Robert Walpole was appointed Receiver and Paymaster General of all the Guards and Garrisons, and likewise a Privy Counsellor. These promotions, it is probable, he owed to his having recommended himself to the House of Hanover, by his zeal for its cause, when the Commons considered the state of the nation with regard to the Protestant succession, and the assurance he procured of the House to the new King, upon its Address of condolence and congratulation, "*That the Commons would make good all Parliamentary funds.*"

On the opening of a new Parliament, a Committee of Secrecy was chosen, to enquire into the conduct of the late Ministry, of which Sir Robert Walpole was the Chairman; and, by his management, articles of impeachment were read against the Earl of Oxford; Lord Bolingbroke, the Duke of Ormond, and the Earl of Strafford. The eminent service he was thought to have done the Crown and the nation, by the vigorous prosecution of those Ministers, who were deemed the chief instruments of the Peace, was soon rewarded by the extraordinary promotions of First Commissioner of the Treasury, and Chancellor and Under Treasurer of the Exchequer.

In two years time, a misunderstanding appeared amongst his Majesty's servants, and it became evident, that the interest of Secretary Stanhope and his adherents, began to outweigh that of the Exchequer, and that Sir Robert Walpole's power was visibly on the decline. King George had purchased of the King of Denmark the duchies of Bremen and Verden, which his Danish Majesty had gained by conquest from Charles XII. of Sweden. The Swedish Hero, enraged to see his dominions publicly set to sale, conceived a resentment against the purchaser, and formed a design to gratify his revenge on the electorate of Hanover. Upon a message, sent to the House of Commons by the King, Secretary Stanhope moved for a supply, to enable his Majesty to concert such measures with foreign Princes and States, as might prevent any change or apprehensions from the designs of Sweden for the future. This occasioned a warm debate, in which it is to be remarked, that Walpole kept a profound silence. The Country-party insisted, that such a proceeding was contrary to the Act of Settlement. They insinuated, that the peace of the empire was only a pretence, but that the security of the new acquisitions was the real object of this unprecedented supply; and they took occasion to observe too, that his Majesty's own Ministers seemed to be divided. But Walpole thought proper on this surmise to speak in favour of the supply, which was carried by a majority of four voices only.

In a day or two he resigned all his places to the King. Various have been the motives said to have induced Sir Robert Walpole to take this step. If the true cause, however, of his defection from the Court had been his disapprobation of the measures then pursuing, his conduct must be acknowledged to have been, in this instance, truly noble and praise-worthy. But they who consider the intrigues of party, and that he spoke in favour of those measures, will find little room to suppose, that his resignation proceeded from any attachment to liberty or love of his country. He resigned, most probably, with a view of being restored with greater power; and the number of his friends,
who

who accompanied him in his resignation, prove it to have been, or at least to have very much the appearance, of its having been a mere factious movement.

On the day of his resignation he brought in the Sinking Fund Bill, which he presented as a country Gentleman, and which, he said, he hoped would not fare the worse for having two fathers, and that his successor (Mr. Stanhope) would bring it to perfection. His being called the father of a project, which hath since been employed so often to other purposes than were at first declared, gave his enemies frequent opportunities for satire and ridicule; and it hath been sarcastically observed, that the father of this fund appeared in a very bad light, when viewed in the capacity of a nurse.

In the course of the debates on this Bill, a very sharp contest took place between Walpole and Stanhope. On some severe reflections thrown upon him, the former lost his usual serenity of temper, and replied with great warmth and impetuosity. The acrimony on both sides produced very unbecoming expressions, the betraying of private conversation, and the revealing a piece of secret history, viz. "*The scandalous practice of selling places and reversions,*" which occasioned a Member to say on the occasion—"I am sorry to see these two great men fall foul of one another: however, in my opinion, we must still look on them as patriots and fathers of their country: and since they have by mischance discovered their nakedness, we ought, according to the custom, to cover it, by turning our backs upon it."

Sir Robert Walpole, in the next Session of Parliament, opposed the Ministry in every thing, and even exceeded Wyndham or Shippen in patriotism. Upon a motion in the House for continuing the army, he made a speech of above an hour long, and pointed out the danger of a standing army in a free country, with all the powers of eloquence. Early in 1720, the rigour of the Patriot began to soften, and the complaisance of the Courtier to appear, and he was again appointed Paymaster of

of

of the Forces, and several of his friends were found soon after in the list of promotions. No doubt now remained of his entire conversion to Court measures; for before the end of the year, we find him pleading as strongly for the forces required by the War-office, as he had before declared against them, even though at this time the same pretences for keeping them on foot did not exist.

He was soon after again appointed First Lord of the Treasury, and Chancellor of the Exchequer; and when the King went abroad in 1723, he was nominated one of the Lords Justices for the Administration of Government, and was sworn sole Secretary of State. About this time he received another distinguished mark of the Royal favour; his eldest son, then on his travels, being created a Peer, by the title of Baron Walpole, of Walpole. In 1725 he was made Knight of the Bath, and the year after Knight of the Garter.

Sir Robert Walpole, however, resigned all his places on the 18th of February, in the year 1741, after having been First Lord of the Treasury, and Under Treasurer of the Exchequer, ever since the 4th of April, 1721, a course of nearly twenty years. He had succeeded the Earl of Sunderland in the former situation, and Mr. Aislaby in the latter. Three days after his resignation, his Majesty was pleased to create him Earl of Orford, Viscount Walpole, and Baron of Houghton, and to allow him a pension of 4000 l. though upon his removal, and the alterations made in the Ministry, there were public rejoicings in London and Westminster; but posterity will be the best Judges of the advantages the nation derived from the change.

The measures of his Administration, during the long time he remained *prime*, or rather *sole* Minister, have been often canvassed with all the severity of critical inquiry. It is difficult to discern the truth through the exaggerations and misrepresentations of party; and it must be left to the impartial Historian to set it in a proper light. The Reader need not be informed, that he was long called "*The Father of Corruption*," though, perhaps,

perhaps, he had only been an improver of it ; but notwithstanding this, and that he boasted that he knew every man's price, he found himself, at length, unable any longer to procure a majority in the House of Commons.

There is an instinctive propensity in mankind to think reverently of the mysteries of Government ; and a person who is able, in whatever manner, to preside over the affairs of a nation for a considerable period, is infallibly exalted into a great man. In pursuance of this propensity, we have heard much of the abilities of Sir Robert Walpole. He had a great fluency and readiness of language ; and though what he uttered was neither nervous nor elegant, yet it had its weight with those, who estimate the value of a speech by its length, and think him the best Orator, who can harangue upon all occasions without hesitation. He was well skilled in parliamentary business, and possessed a certain easiness of soul, and callousness of sensation, which made him proof against all attacks, and raised him superior to every embarrassment. By an unwearied attention to figures and calculations, he had acquired a knowledge of the subject of finance, which his system of Government did not always allow him to turn to the greatest advantage. That system was founded on the narrowest and most detestable principles. As he had never known what it was to be concerned in a popular Administration, he was acquainted with no means of preserving his power but that of corruption. The maxim which he pursued and avowed is well known. He ridiculed the very ideas of patriotism and public spirit, thought self-interest the wisest principle by which a man could be actuated, and bribery the most elevated and comprehensive system that ever entered into the human mind.

After this, it is but fair to add, that in the well-known debate relating to *Steele*, for publishing the "*Crisis*," he greatly distinguished himself in behalf of liberty ; and the *Schism Bill* soon after gave him a fine opportunity of exerting his powers, and
 appearing

appearing in the character of the champion of civil and religious liberty.

But whatever objections his ministerial conduct may be liable to, in his *private* character, he is universally allowed to have possessed very amiable and benevolent qualities. That he was a tender parent, a kind master, a beneficent patron, a firm friend, an agreeable companion, are points that have seldom been disputed him; and POPE, who was no friend to Courts and Courtiers, hath paid him *gratis*, an handsomer compliment on the last of these heads, than any liberality could ever purchase. In answer to his friend, who persuades him to go and see Sir Robert, he says——

“ Seen him I have, but in his happier hour,
 “ Of social pleasure ill-exchang’d for power;
 “ Seen him, uncumber’d with the venal tribe,
 “ Smile without art, and win without a bribe.”

No Minister, perhaps, ever distinguished himself more by his writing than Sir Robert Walpole. About the end of Queen Anne’s reign, and the beginning of George the First, he wrote the following pamphlets.—1. “ The Sovereign’s Answer to the Gloucestershire Address.” The Sovereign meant Charles Duke of Somerset, so nick-named by the Whigs. 2. “ Answer to the Representation of the Lords on the State of the Navy.” 3. “ The Debts of the Nation stated and considered in four pages, 1710.” 4. “ The thirty-five millions accounted for, 1710.” 5. “ A Letter from a Foreign Minister in England to Monsieur Pittecum, 1710.” 6. “ Four Letters to a Friend in Scotland upon Sacheverell’s Trial.” 7. “ A Short History of the Parliament.” 8. “ The South-Sea Scheme considered.” 9. “ A Pamphlet against the Peerage Bill, 1719.” 10. “ The Report of the Secret Committee, June 9, 1715.”

Upon the whole, the first remarkable concussion that the Government of Walpole occasioned in the minds of the governed,

was

was owing to a scheme he had formed for extending the Laws of Excise, by which, under specious pretences, he hoped to swell the number of dependents, and add to the means of corruption. But what filled up the measure of his unpopularity, was his inglorious system with relation to foreign affairs. As he was the Minister of the King, and not the Man of the People, he had long sacrificed the interests, and lavished the treasures of Great-Britain, in subserviency to a system of continental measures, to which his Master was invincibly attached.

After his resignation, Sir Robert Walpole spent the remainder of his life in tranquillity and retirement, and died in the year 1745, in the 71st year of his age.

BEAU.

B E A U T I E S
OF THE
BRITISH SENATE.

ADDRESS TO THE THRONE.

I Rise not only to offer my sentiments against the terms of the Address proposed, but likewise to make a Motion. It has, Sir, upon such an occasion, been the ancient custom of this House, to present an Address of Thanks to his Majesty, for his most gracious Speech from the Throne; but such Addresses were in former days always in general terms; there were in them no flattering paragraphs, no long compliments made to the Throne, for transactions and successes which had never been laid before the House, and of which, by a necessary consequence, the House must have been supposed to have been entirely ignorant: it is true, Sir, we have of late years, fallen into a custom of complimenting the Throne upon every such occasion with long Addresses; and this custom has been followed so long, that I am afraid it may at last become a Vote of course, to vote an Address to his Majesty, in such terms as shall be concerted by those very men, whose measures are approved of by the compliment made to the Throne. I confess, Sir, that I am so little of a courtier, that I cannot return thanks for what I know nothing of; nor can I applaud before I know a

VOL. I. B reason

reason for such applause. I am not at all against an Address of Thanks in the ancient usual style : but tho' I should happen to be single and alone in my opposition, which I hope I shall not, yet I am resolved to oppose addressing in those terms ; for, if it were for no other reason than this, that such a Motion may not stand upon the Journals of the House, as agreed to *nem. con.* for if not taken notice of in time, such humble Addresses to the Throne may at last come to pass as matters of course, and be as little regarded or opposed, as some affairs now are, which at first stood a long contest before they could be introduced.

It is no new thing in me to oppose such Addresses ; I always have opposed them ; and though I do not thereby appear to be a good courtier, yet it shews that I have some respect for the honour and dignity of this House : besides, when such Addresses have been proposed, it has been promised, and we have been assured, that no advantage should afterwards be taken of any words contained in any complimentary part of such Address : but every Member in this House knows, that when the House had an opportunity of examining things more particularly, and Debates ensued thereupon, they have been told, that they could not censure any of the past transactions, because they had approved of them all by their Address of Thanks to his Majesty for his most gracious Speech from the Throne. I hope, for the sake of my country, that all things are well ; that our affairs both at home and abroad are in that prosperous condition in which they have been represented to us ; but as we cannot yet judge from the effects, and as the treaties, from which this great prosperity and lasting tranquillity is to arise, have not yet been laid before us, I cannot but look upon it as an anticipation of the Resolutions of this House, to thank his Majesty for those Treaties, which we have not as yet had an opportunity either to peruse or consider ; and therefore I move, that the first part only of the Motion already made should stand, and that all the other complimentary paragraphs should be left out.

Mr. Shippen, Jan. 13, 1732.

I CAN-

I CANNOT agree to the terms for addressing his Majesty, because though every thing may now be well settled upon a solid and lasting foundation, yet I cannot think that our conduct has in every respect been right ; or that the interest of this nation has been, by his Majesty's Ministers, principally and steadily pursued. At one time we were frightened out of our wits with apprehensions that the Pretender was to be put upon us, and that without any reason, for all that I have yet seen or heard upon the subject. Then Don Carlos was made such a giant of, that he, that Infant, was to swallow up and destroy all the powers of Europe ; and at that time we fled to France for an alliance, and besought their assistance, by which we put it in their power to commence a war whenever they pleased : and if they had not been more taken up with whims and disputes about religion, than any wise nation ought to be, they would certainly have involved us in a war, in conjunction with them, and thereby would have made us assist them in recovering all that they had lost in the two last wars, the taking of which from them had cost us so much blood and treasure. Some time after we shook off all fears of the Pretender, Don Carlos was again diminished to an ordinary size, and then we began to bully France as much as we had courted it before : such conduct cannot appear to me to be right, at least it does not appear to be steady and uniform. Upon the other hand, it must be said of the Imperial Court, that they have acted with steadiness and prudence ; they have properly adhered to the natural interests of their native country, and have steadily pursued the plan they had in view, through all the different shapes in which the affairs of Europe have been put within these few years ; and by this firmness and resolution they have at last brought us to their own terms, and have accomplished their designs, notwithstanding the conjunction and alliance of so many formidable powers against them : whereas we have been obliged, in some manner, to comply with the demands of almost every power we have treated with ; and if by such means we

have at last got off by any tolerable conditions, it must be said, that we have been like a man in a room, who wants to get out, and though the door be open, and a clear way to it, yet he stalks round the room, breaks his shins over a stool, tumbles over a chair, and at last, rumbling over every thing in his way, by chance finds the door and gets out, after abundance of needless trouble and unnecessary danger.

Sir William Wyndham, Jan. 13, 1732.

I HAVE always been against long Addresses; I am ready enough to agree to an Address of Thanks to his Majesty for his most gracious speech from the Throne; but such Address ought to be in the most concise terms, and the most general words: this was the antient usage of Parliament, and I find but few of our old customs that are altered for the better: however, if we must go on with the custom of making long-winded Addresses, I think we ought to take some notice of the spirit that is at present amongst the people. It is very certain, that there are great fears, jealousies, and suspicions, out doors; that something is to be attempted this Session of Parliament, which is generally thought to be destructive to the liberties, and to the trade of this nation. There is at present a most general and remarkable spirit amongst the people, for protecting and defending their liberties and their trade, in opposition to those attempts which they expect are to be made against both.

Mr. Shippen, Jan. 16, 1733.

As this is a new Parliament, I hope we shall begin with shewing a little more regard to the ancient custom and dignity of Parliaments, than has been shewn of late years. In former times, the Addresses of this House, in return to his Majesty's Speech from the Throne, were always conceived in the most general terms. Our ancestors would never condescend upon that occasion, to enter into the particulars of his Majesty's Speech: when they were to approach the King, and to declare their

their affection and their fidelity to him, they thought it was inconsistent with that fidelity they were to declare, to approve, upon that occasion, of any ministerial measures, and much more so, to declare their satisfaction with measures they knew nothing about. This House is the grand inquest of the nation, appointed to inquire diligently, and to represent faithfully to the King, all the grievances of his people, and all the crimes and mismanagement of his servants; and therefore it must always be a breach of our fidelity to our Sovereign, as well as a breach of our duty to the people, to approve blindly the conduct of his servants. When we have examined diligently, and considered deliberately the conduct of any Minister, and are at last fully convinced that he has acted prudently and wisely for the public good, it is then our duty to return him the thanks of the public, and to represent him as a faithful Minister to his Master; but to make panegyrics upon the conduct of any of the King's servants, before we have examined into it, is more like the language of slaves and sycophants to a Prime Minister, than that of loyal and faithful subjects to their Sovereign.

I must acknowledge, Sir, that the Motion now made for addressing his Majesty is more general, and more adapted to the ancient custom of Parliament, than most I have heard since I have had the honour to be a Member of this House. I hope we shall not find that this extraordinary modesty proceeds from a consciousness of misconduct. For the sake of the public, I heartily wish we may find that it proceeds from superior merit; which is, indeed, generally attended with superior modesty: but as I have always been, upon such occasions, against general encomiums upon Ministers, and as the proposition now before us, or at least a great part of it, implies a general approbation of all our late measures, particularly those relating to the present war, which the majority of this House are, in my opinion, entirely ignorant of, I cannot agree to it; because I have not yet learned complaisance enough to approve of what I know

nothing about, much less to approve of what I suspect to be violently wrong.

I had the honour, Sir, to be a Member of this House, in the last Parliament, and I remember several Motions were then made, for getting some insight into the state of our foreign affairs, and our late transactions: Motions which appeared to me highly reasonable, and even absolutely necessary to be complied with, before the House could reasonably comply with the demands that were then made upon them: but every one of these Motions had a negative put upon them. I have always had a suspicion of the works of darkness; I do not like any conduct that cannot stand the light at noon-day; and therefore I am afraid, some of our late transactions are such as no man could approve of, if they were exposed to public view. We have long been amused, with hopes of some extraordinary benefits that were to accrue to the nation from our many tedious and expensive negotiations: we have been long in expectation; but when one negotiation was over, we have been always told, to have patience, the next was to accomplish all our desires; we accordingly have had a great deal of patience, but, so far, as I apprehend, I can observe no benefits that have accrued, or are like to accrue; but on the contrary, many dangers and disadvantages: so that the whole train of our late negotiations really seem to me, to be calculated for no other end, but to extricate a set of puzzled, perplexed negotiators, from some former blunder, by which they have generally been led into a second of worse consequence than the first; every subsequent negotiation seems to me to have had no other view or design, but to get rid of some dilemma we were thrown into by the former; and happy have we thought ourselves, after a great deal of money spent, if we could but recover our former condition. In short, Sir, if any Gentleman will rise up and shew me any addition, or any new advantage, with respect either to our trade or our possessions, that this nation has acquired by any of our late transactions, I shall agree to the Motion: but con-

sidering

sidering the great expence the nation has been put to, and the great losses many of our merchants have, 'without any redress or satisfaction sustained, I cannot agree to pass compliments upon, or declare my satisfaction with, our late management in general, till it be made appear to me, that these public and private losses, have been some way balanced by national advantages.

The second paragraph of the Motion I am, indeed, surprised at upon another account, to make our acknowledgments to his Majesty, for not involving the nation too precipitately in a bloody war, is, in my opinion, very far from being a compliment to his Majesty; it is impossible, it is not to be presumed that his Majesty can do any such thing: but if it were possible, and if any such thing had been done, to be sure it would have been doing the nation a very notable mischief; and according to the idiom of our language, at least in private life, to thank a man, or to make our acknowledgments to a man, for his not doing us a notable mischief, is a contemptuous way of expressing ourselves, and is always an insinuation, that from such a man's malice, or his weakness, or imprudence, we expected some notable mischief; and therefore when we are disappointed, when the mischief is not so great as we expected, we say, by way of contempt, that we are obliged to him. If none but Ministers were concerned in this part of the Motion, I should have let it pass without any remark, nay, I should readily have agreed to it; but as his Majesty is concerned, I hope the Gentlemen who made the Motion will take care to have it some way altered, if they are resolved to have it stand part of the Address. This shews, Sir, how apt people are to fall into blunders, when they attempt to make extravagant or forced compliments; and therefore I wish we would avoid such dangers, by confining our Address to a general acknowledgment of Thanks to his Majesty, for his most gracious Speech from the Throne, and a declaration of our affections towards him, of our attachment to his family, and our zeal for his service.

However, Sir, as it has been granted on all hands, that nothing contained in our Address can prevent the future inquiries of this House, or can be a bar to our censuring what we shall, upon inquiry, find to be amiss, therefore I shall propose no Amendment to the former part of the Motion: but I must take notice of one thing which is apparent, without any inquiry, to every man in this House, to every man who knows any thing of public affairs, and that is, the great charge this nation has already been put to on account of the war, while the other powers of Europe, not yet engaged in the war, have not put themselves to one shilling expence: nay, even our allies, the Dutch, who, as his Majesty has been pleased to tell us, are under the same engagements with us, have not put themselves to the least charge on account of the present war. Now, Sir, as his Majesty has told us, that we had no concern with the causes or motives of the war, we cannot, therefore, be involved in it, unless it be for the preservation of the balance of power: and as all our allies are as much interested in this respect as we are, it is reasonable they should bear their proportionable share of the expence: and as they have yet done nothing like it, I think it is become necessary for us to take some notice of this matter in our Address to his Majesty; for which reason, I shall move this Amendment to the latter part of the Address, viz. “ That this House will cheerfully and
 “ effectually raise such supplies, as shall be necessary for the
 “ honour and security of his Majesty and his kingdoms; and
 “ *in proportion to the expences to be incurred by the other powers*
 “ *who were under the same engagements with this nation, and*
 “ *not then involved in the war:* and whatever shall be the success
 “ of his Majesty’s gracious endeavours to procure the blessings
 “ of peace and general tranquillity, will enable his Majesty to
 “ act that part, which honour and justice, and the true interest
 “ of his people shall call upon him to undertake.”

Mr. William Pulteney, Jan. 27, 1735.

It has always been the custom of this House, at the beginning of every Session of Parliament, to return his Majesty our Thanks for his Speech from the Throne; but the severe stroke, which not only his Majesty and the Royal Family, but all the nation have received since our last meeting, in the death of the Queen, requires, that on this occasion our Thanks to his Majesty, for his most gracious assurances, should be attended with our condolence for his inexpressible loss. A loss, Sir, which, I flatter myself, I read in the eyes of every Gentleman who hears me, and which must be regretted by every subject in the kingdom, who retains in his breast one spark of loyalty and gratitude.

Gentlemen cannot miss to observe, that if his Majesty has expressed himself with more brevity than usual, it is owing to the remembrance of a Princess*, who endeared herself in every relation of life, either as a consort, a mother, or a Queen. And though her death, Sir, is an afflicting dispensation to all the nation, yet we cannot suppose, that any of us can feel it so deeply as the royal breast; which, while she was alive, she so much eased of the toils of government by her counsels, which never had any other tendency than to promote his honour, by promoting the happiness of the people. Of this, Sir, we had many late instances, especially when the sovereign power, in the absence of her royal consort, was delegated into her hands. On that occasion, Sir, we may all remember with what moderation she governed, with what cheerfulness she rewarded, and with what reluctance she punished; though the prudence of her measures rendered the exercise of this last and most ungrateful branch of the royal prerogative but seldom necessary. Therefore, Sir, however some amongst us may differ in particular views and interests, I hope we shall unite in paying a debt of gratitude to the memory of the best of Princesses, as well as of duty to the best of Kings.

Henry Fox, Esq; Jan. 24, 1738.

* The consort of George the Second.

As speeches from the Throne have been taken for the sense of the Ministry, too lavish Addresses from this House have been regarded rather as incense to the Minister, than a just acknowledgment to the Sovereign. But, Sir, I hope we shall always look upon ourselves as the trustees of the people, and endeavour to speak their sense in our Addresses, as well as act for their interests in our proceedings. Though the expression, Sir, proposed to be inserted in this Address, *that we will carefully avoid all heats and animosities*, is, to be sure, a very proper part of a Resolution of this nature, and what I am persuaded every Gentleman will willingly agree to; yet there have been instances, Sir, when from as well-guarded expressions Ministers have taken occasion to attempt the subversion of that liberty of debate, and freedom of speech, which ought to distinguish the Representatives of a free people. Amongst such a people, Sir, an opposition always must, and, perhaps, it is their happiness that it does exist. And, Sir, though it is to be wished that heats and animosities were banished from all opposition, yet, I am afraid, while men have different passions, different interests, and different views, this can scarcely be effected.

The granting necessary supplies for the current year, Sir, is what seems very reasonable and indispensable in a House of Commons: but, Sir, I believe there are instances when, in former reigns, the Commons have refused to grant a shilling for the services of the current year, till they were sure the money granted for the services of the preceding had been properly applied. Besides, Sir, the true old parliamentary method of proceeding, was not immediately to grant a Vote of Address for every thing the Minister had done during the intermediate time, right or wrong, but to appoint a day for examining the grievances of the nation; and redress of these, was always insisted on before any supplies were granted.

No House of Commons ever had greater reason than we have to be frugal of the public money, and to inquire in what manner it has been applied. We have already granted to his
Majesty

Majesty sums sufficient to have enabled his Majesty to have put the nation in such a situation, that she might have nothing to fear from any enemies, either at home or abroad; and, consequently, to have diminished the taxes, and eased the people of some part of the unsupportable load of debt they now lie under. If, upon inquiry, it shall appear that they have acted in this manner; if it shall appear that the people have so much as a prospect of relief from their present pressures, I shall think the sums we have already granted, not only well bestowed, but shall concur in any Motion that may be made, for our granting the like in time to come; but, Sir, notwithstanding the sums we have already granted, if the public debt, instead of being diminished, is daily increasing; if it shall appear that any part of it has been applied in promoting the arts of corruption and betraying the nation, I think it is our duty to put a stop to any such grants in future. In the mean time, Sir, I am as forward as any Gentleman here, that we should condole on the irreparable loss of our late Queen; and that we testify our resolution of losing no opportunity of showing our zeal for the support of his government, and the preservation of our excellent constitution; nay, of our going the greatest lengths in securing the Crown to his Majesty's person and family. But, Sir, give me leave to say, that the readiest way to make these engagements good, is by reserving to ourselves a right for inquiry into any application that may have been made of the public money and credit; and, by determining, let the world see, that we are resolved to do as much as lies in our power for making his Majesty the Sovereign of a great, a happy, and an uncorrupted people.

Watkin Williams-Wynne, Jan. 24, 1738.

I KNOW, my Lords, it has been of late years a custom, to make the Address of this House a sort of *echo* to his Majesty's Speech from the Throne; and as *echoes* never fail to repeat the last words of a sentence, so, it seems, we must never fail *echoing* back

back the last paragraph of his Majesty's Speech. This, I say, has been a custom of this House for some years past; but I cannot think, that a religious observance of this custom is either consistent with the character we ought to preserve, or necessary for our shewing our respect to our Sovereign.

Earl of Chesterfield, Oct. 23, 1739.

My Lords, I have a Motion to make to your Lordships, which, as a friend to our present happy establishment, as a friend to his most gracious Majesty now upon the Throne, as a friend to my country, and as a Member of this House, I think I am in duty bound to make; but as it is a Motion of an extraordinary, though not an unprecedented nature, I must first beg leave to show you my reasons for making it; and I hope to show such reasons, as will induce every Lord of this House to think, that it is now absolutely necessary to comply with it.

My Lords, it is the duty of Parliament, and especially of this House, to give our Sovereign the most sincere advice, not only when it is asked, but often when it is not desired by the Crown. As Members of this House, we are in duty bound to have a watchful eye over the public measures his Majesty is advised to pursue, and over the chief Ministers he is pleased to employ in the administration of public affairs; and when we are of opinion, that the measures he is advised to pursue are wrong, or that the Ministers he is pleased to employ are weak or wicked, it is our duty and our business, while we sit here, to warn our Sovereign of his danger, and to remove weak or wicked Counsellors from about his Throne. As to the parliamentary methods of removing a Minister, I need not acquaint your Lordships that they are of several kinds, and that all but one tend to punish as well as remove. When we proceed by impeachment, by bill of attainder, or bill of pains and penalties, the design is to punish as well as remove: but there is another way of proceeding in parliament, which tends only to remove the Minister from the King's Councils, without inflicting any
real

real punishment upon him; and that is, by an humble Address to our Sovereign, that he would be graciously pleased to remove such a one from his Councils. I therefore move your Lordships, "Whether an humble Address should be presented to his Majesty, that he would be graciously pleased to remove *the Right Honourable Sir Robert Walpole*, Knight of the Most Noble Order of the Garter, First Commissioner for executing the office of Treasurer of the Exchequer, Chancellor and Under-Treasurer of the Exchequer, and one of his Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council, from his Majesty's presence and councils for ever?"

I believe, my Lords, it will not be questioned, that either House of Parliament may offer such advice to the Crown, by way of humble Address; I believe it will not be said, that it is unusual, or unprecedented; and therefore I shall not trouble your Lordships with calling to your remembrance, any of the precedents that may be found in the Journals of Parliament. I shall only take notice of the difference between the methods of proceeding by Impeachment, by Bill of Attainder, or Bill of Pains and Penalties; and this method of proceeding, by way of humble Address to the Crown. When we proceed by way of Impeachment, by Bill of Attainder, or by Bill of Pains and Penalties, some particular criminal tests must be alledged, and there must be some sort of proofs of these facts. But when we proceed by way of Address to the King, that he would be graciously pleased to remove such a Minister from his Councils, a general view of that Minister's conduct, a general view of public affairs, may afford just cause for such an Address, and common fame is a sufficient proof; for when no particular fact is insisted on, it is impossible to bring any particular proof. This, my Lords, is the difference; and the reason of this difference is very plain. When a man is to be punished, either in his person, his freedom, or estate, some crime or criminal neglect, ought to be not only alledged, but proved by a legal proof, or by strong presumptions: but as his not being employed in the King's Councils . . .

Councils neither affects his person, his freedom, nor his estate, therefore weakness alone, or a general bad character, may be a good cause for removing him. A weak man is certainly, in any country, very unfit for being in the King's Councils; and, in a popular government, a man who has incurred the general odium of the people, ought not to be continued in the King's Councils; because the unpopularity of the Minister may, at least, affect the Throne itself, and render the people disaffected to their Sovereign.

I must, therefore, desire your Lordships to take particular care to distinguish between the method of proceeding against a Minister by Impeachment, by Bill of Attainder, a Bill of Pains and Penalties, and the method of proceeding against a Minister by Address only; because, if you do not take care to fix this distinction in your minds, you may expect from me what I do not intend to give, and what the nature of the motion I have made, renders it not only unnecessary, but unfit for me to give. I am to move only for an humble Address to his Majesty, that he would be graciously pleased to remove a Minister, I may say, the Minister, from his Councils; and therefore, it is both unnecessary and unfit for me, to charge that Minister with any particular crime, or to acquaint your Lordships that I have, or I am ready to produce particular proofs against him: if this were my intention, I should think it below my dignity, as a Member of this House, to content myself with moving for an humble Address; I should think it incumbent upon me directly to impeach, let the consequence be what it would. Therefore your Lordships are not to expect, that I am to accuse any Minister of a particular crime, or that I am to tell you, that I am ready to bring proofs of what I alledge against him. If I can shew, that the affairs of Europe have been brought into the unlucky situation in which they are at present, by the conduct of this nation; or if I can shew, that the distressed condition in which our people now are, is wholly owing to our own conduct; either of these will be an argument that must, that ought at least,

least, to prevail with every Lord who is convinced, that this Minister has been the principal, if not the sole adviser of that conduct. If the people be generally dissatisfied with the conduct of our public affairs, and if that general dissatisfaction be wholly directed against any one man now in administration, as our government is still, I hope, a popular government, it is a sufficient cause for this House to let his Majesty know the character of his Minister, by an Address to remove him from his Councils. If there be any one of his Majesty's Ministers that has usurped, or that even is generally thought to have usurped the sole power of directing all public affairs, and recommending to all public posts, honours, and employments, it is our duty, at least, to address his Majesty to remove such a Minister, because such a one is inconsistent with the constitution of our government.

Upon this question, my Lords, it signifies nothing whether the general character the Minister has gained, or the misconduct he has been guilty of, has been owing to his weakness or his wickedness; for either is a sufficient cause for having him removed. But I must observe, that till he is removed, it cannot be made manifest by proper proofs, whether his misconduct, or his general bad character, be owing to his weakness or wickedness; for artful Ministers always act by tools, and under agents, who, whilst their patron is in power, will never reveal the flagitious secrets committed by him to their charge: but as such men are seldom faithful any longer than it is their interest to be so, remove the Minister once from the King's Councils, put it out of his power to reward the wicked fidelity of his associates and tools, and the secret history of his dirty jobs will then begin to unfold itself, and may be made manifest by a legal proof. Suppose the King should be advised, by a favourite Minister, to keep up a constant friendship and alliance with the greatest rivals and most inveterate enemies of his country; and that he should, for this purpose, sacrifice the interest, and forfeit the friendship of the most natural allies; whilst the Minister is in power, this may seem to proceed from his weakness, or from the ignorance he has

has of the true interest of his country : but remove him from the person and councils of his Sovereign, and then it may appear to have proceeded from his wickedness : it may appear that he was corrupted by the enemies of his country, or that he knowingly and wickedly sacrificed the interest of his country to some private view of his own. If he employed any one in transacting or receiving the bribe, if he was ever so free in conversation with his friends as to unfold the motives of his misconduct, or the reasons why he gave such wicked advice to his Sovereign, some of them, either from conscience or interest, may be induced to discover the secret, when it is safe for them to do so ; but whilst he continues solely to enjoy the ear of the Sovereign, it can never be any man's interest to accuse him, it will always be unsafe for a private man to do so ; because the power of the Crown will be employed in blasting the credit, or preventing the effect of his evidence ; and probably in making the punishment fall, not upon the guilty Minister, but upon the brave and honest accuser.

Earl of Carteret, Feb. 13, 1740.

I CAN by no means think that the complicated question now before us, is the proper, is the direct manner of taking the sense of the Committee. We have here the soft name of an humble Address to the Crown proposed, and for no other end but to lead Gentlemen into an approbation of the convention. But is this that full deliberate examination, which we were with assurances called upon to give ? Is this cursory blended disquisition of matters of such variety and extent, all we owe to ourselves and our country ? When trade is at stake, it is your last intrenchment ; you must defend it or perish : and whatever is to decide, that deserves the most distinct consideration, and the most direct and undisguised sense of Parliament. But how are we now proceeding ? Upon an artificial ministerial question ? Here is all the confidence, here is the conscious sense of the greatest service that ever was done to this country ; to be complicating

complicating questions, to be lumping sanction and approbation, like a Commissary's account, to be covering and taking sanctuary in the royal Name, instead of meeting openly, and standing fairly the direct judgment and sentence of Parliament upon the several articles of this Convention.

Sir, you have been moved to vote an humble Address of Thanks to his Majesty for a measure, which (I will appeal to Gentlemen's conversation in the world) is odious throughout the kingdom: Such Thanks are only due to the fatal influence that framed it, as are due for that low, unallied condition abroad, which is now made a plea for this Convention. To what are Gentlemen reduced in support of it? First try a little to defend it upon its own merits; if that is not tenable, throw out general terrors; the House of Bourbon is united, who knows the consequence of a war? Sir, Spain knows the consequence of a war in America; whoever gains, it must prove fatal to her: She knows it, and must therefore avoid it; but she knows England does not dare to make it. And what is a delay, which is all this magnified Convention is sometimes called to produce? Can it produce such conjunctures as those you lost, while you were giving kingdoms to Spain, and all to bring her back again to that great branch of the House of Bourbon, which is now thrown out to you with so much terror? If this union be formidable, are we to delay only till it becomes more formidable, by being carried farther into execution, and more strongly cemented? But be it what it will, is this any longer a nation, or what is an English Parliament, if with more ships in your harbours than in all the navies of Europe, with above two millions of people in your American colonies, you will bear to hear of the expediency of receiving from Spain, an insecure, unsatisfactory, dishonourable Convention? Sir, I call it no more than it has been proved in this Debate; it carries fallacy or downright subjection in almost every line: It has been laid open and exposed in so many strong

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and glaring lights, that I can pretend to add nothing to the conviction and indignation it has raised.

Sir, as to the great national objection, the searching your ships, that favorite word, as it is called, is not omitted, indeed, in the Preamble to the Convention, but it stands there as the reproach of the whole, as the strongest evidence of the fatal submission that follows : On the part of Spain, an usurpation, an inhuman tyranny claimed and exercised over the American seas ; on the part of England, an undoubted right by Treaties and from God and Nature, declared and asserted in the Resolutions of Parliament, are referred to the discussion of Plenipotentiaries upon one and the same equal foot. Sir, I say this undoubted right is to be discussed, and to be regulated, and if to regulate be to prescribe rules (as in all constructions it is) this right is, by the express words of this Convention, to be given up and sacrificed ; for it must cease to be any thing, from the moment it is submitted to limits.

The Court of Spain has plainly told you, (as appears by papers laid on the table) you shall steer a due course, you shall navigate by a line to and from your plantations in America ; if you draw near to her coasts (though from the circumstances of that navigation you are under a necessity of doing it) you shall be seized and confiscated : if then upon these terms only, she has consented to refer, what becomes at once of all the security we are flattered with in consequence of this reference ? Plenipotentiaries are to regulate finally the respective pretensions of the two Crowns, with regard to trade and navigation in America ; but does a man in Spain reason, that these pretensions must be regulated to the satisfaction and honor of England ? No, Sir ; they conclude, and with reason, from the high spirit of their Administration, from the superiority with which they have so long trusted you, that this reference must end, as it has begun, to their honor and advantage.

But Gentlemen say, the Treaties subsisting are to be the measure of this regulation.~ Sir, as to Treaties, I will take
part

part of the words of *Sir William Temple*, quoted by the Honorable Gentleman near me, *It is in vain to negotiate and make Treaties*, if there is not dignity and rigor to enforce the observance of them; for under the misconstruction and misinterpretation of these very Treaties subsisting, this intolerable grievance has arisen; it has been growing upon you Treaty after Treaty, through twenty years of negotiation, and even under the discussion of Commissaries to whom it was referred. You have heard from Captain Vaughan at your bar, at what time these injuries and indignities were continued; as a kind of explanatory comment upon the Convention Spain has thought fit to grant you, as another insolent protest, under the validity and force of which she has suffered this Convention to be proceeded on. We will treat with you, but we will search and take your ships; we will sign a Convention, but we will keep your subjects prisoners, prisoners in Old Spain; the West-Indies are remote, Europe shall be witness how we use you.

Sir, as to the interference of an admission of our right not to be searched, drawn from a reparation made for ships unduly seized and confiscated, I think that argument is very inconclusive. The right claimed by Spain, to search our ships, is one thing, and the excesses admitted to have been committed, in consequence of this pretended right, is another: but surely, Sir, reasoning from inferences and implication only, is below the dignity of your proceedings, upon a right of this vast importance. What this reparation is, what sort of composition for your losses, forced upon you by Spain in an instance that has come to light, where your own Commissaries could not in conscience decide against your claim, has fully appeared upon examination: and as for the payment of the sum stipulated, (all but seven and twenty thousand pounds) it is evidently a fallacious, nominal payment only. I will not attempt to enter into a detail of a dark, confused, and scarcely intelligible account; I will only beg leave to conclude with one word upon it in the light of a submission, as well as of an adequate reparation.

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Spain

Spain stipulates to pay to the Crown of England, 95,000*l.* by a preliminary protest of the King of Spain, the South Sea Company is at once to pay 68,000*l.* of it: If they refuse, Spain, I admit, is still to pay the 95,000*l.* but how does it stand then? The *Asiento* Contract is to be suspended: you are to purchase this sum at the price of an exclusive trade, pursuant to a national treaty, and at an immense debt of God knows how many hundred thousand pounds, due from Spain to the South Sea Company. Here, Sir, is the submission of Spain by the payment of a stipulated sum; a tax laid upon subjects of England, under the severest penalties, with the reciprocal accord of an English Minister, as a preliminary that the Convention may be signed: a condition imposed by Spain in the most absolute imperious manner, and received by the Ministers of England in the most tame and abject. Can any verbal distinctions, any evasions whatever, possibly explain away this public infamy? To whom would we disguise it? To ourselves and to the nation: I wish we could hide it from the eyes of every Court in Europe: They see Spain has talked to you like your Master, they see this arbitrary fundamental condition, and it must stand with distinction, with a pre-eminence of shame, as a part even of this Convention.

This Convention, Sir, I think from my soul is nothing but a stipulation for national ignominy, an illusory expedient to baffle the resentment of the nation; a truce without a suspension of hostilities, on the part of Spain; on the part of England, a suspension; as to Georgia, of the first law of nature, self-preservation and self-defence; a surrender of the trade and rights of England to the mercy of Plenipotentiaries, and in this infinitely highest and sacred point, future security, not only inadequate, but directly repugnant to the Resolutions of Parliament, and the gracious Promise from the Throne. The complaints of your despairing Merchants, the voice of England has condemned it; be the guilt of it upon the head of the adviser;

vise; God forbid that this Committee should share the guilt by approving it!

William Pitt, Esq; March 6, 1739.

AMONG the many advantages arising from our happy Constitution, there is one that is reciprocal to King and People, which is a legal and regular method by which the People may lay their grievances, complaints, and opinions, before their Sovereign; not only with regard to the measures he pursues, but also with regard to the persons he employs. In absolute monarchies, the People may suffer, they may complain; but though their sufferings be public, their complaints must be private; they must not so much as murmur against their King's Measures or Ministers; if they do, it is certain perdition to the few that are guilty of so much indiscretion. This is a most terrible misfortune to the People in all absolute monarchies, and occasions those severe punishments and cruel tortures, which are so frequent in all such; but it is a misfortune to the absolute Monarch, as well as to the people under his despotic sway, for as he has no way of coming at the knowledge of the unpopularity of his Ministers or Measures, he often goes on pursuing the same Measures, or employing the same Ministers, till the discontents of his People become quite universal and furious; and then by a general insurrection, he and his Ministers are involved in one common ruin. However upright his intentions may have been, however much he may have been imposed on by his Ministers, an impetuous domineering mob can seldom make any difference: The despotic Monarch himself, and sometimes his whole family, are borne down by the impetuosity of the torrent, and become a sacrifice to the resentment of an injured populace.

In this kingdom, Sir, it can never be so, as long as the King allows Parliaments to sit regularly and freely, and the Members of this House perform faithfully the duty they owe to their King, their Constituents, and their Country. As

Members of this House, Sir, we are obliged to represent to his Majesty, not only the grievances, but the sentiments of the People, with regard to the measures he pursues, and the persons he advises with or employs in the executive part of our Government; and therefore whilst we sit here and do our duty, no general discontent can arise, without his Majesty's being informed of its causes, and of the methods for allaying it: If we neglect to do so, or from selfish motives abstain, or delay giving his Majesty a proper information and advice upon any such occasion, we neglect or betray, not only our duty to our Country and Constituents, but also our duty to our Sovereign.

This, Sir, is my opinion; this must be the opinion of every man who has a true notion of our Constitution; and therefore, I can no longer delay making you the Motion, with which I shall conclude what I have to say upon this occasion. I believe there is not a Gentleman of this House, who is not sensible, that both the foreign and domestic measures of our Government, for several years past, have been dissatisfactory to a great majority of the nation; I may say to almost every man in the nation, who has not been concerned in advising or carrying them on. I believe there is not a Gentleman in this House, if he will freely declare his sentiments, who is not sensible, that one single person in Administration has not only been thought to be, but has actually been the chief, if not the sole adviser and promoter of all those measures. This is known without doors, as well as it is within; and therefore the discontents, the reproaches, and even the curses of the people, are all directed against that single person. They complain of our present measures; they have suffered by past measures; they expect no redress; they expect no alteration, or amendment, whilst he has a share in advising or directing our future. These, Sir, are the sentiments of the People with regard to that Minister: These sentiments we are in honour and duty bound to represent to his Majesty, and the proper method for

for doing this, as established by the Constitution, is to address his Majesty to remove him from his councils.

Sir, if the general discontent which hath arisen against the Minister, were but of yesterday, or without any just or solid foundation, I should expect it would soon blow over, and therefore should not think it worthy the notice of Parliament; but it has lasted for so many years, was at first so well founded, and has every year since been gathering, from his conduct, so much additional strength, that I have for several Sessions expected such a Motion, as I am now to make, from some other Gentleman, more capable than I am to enforce what he proposes: but as no Gentleman has hitherto attempted it, and as this is the last Session of this Parliament, I was unwilling it should expire without answering the People's expectations, which in this respect are so just, so well founded, and so agreeable to our Constitution; therefore I hope I shall be excused for attempting what I think my duty, as a Member of this House, and as a friend to our present happy Establishment.

After what I have said, Sir, I believe no Gentleman can mistake the person I mean: I am convinced every one supposes I mean the Honorable Gentleman, who sits upon the floor, over against me; and the whole House may see, he takes it to himself. Against him, there is, I believe, as general a popular discontent, as ever was against any Minister in this kingdom; and this discontent has lasted so long, that I must say, his having withstood it for so many years, is no great sign of the freedom of our Government; for a free People neither will, nor can be governed by a Minister they hate and despise. As I am only to propose an Address to remove him from his Majesty's Councils, I have no occasion to accuse him of any crime: The People's being generally dissatisfied with him, and suspicious of his conduct, is a sufficient foundation for such an Address, and a sufficient cause for his Majesty's removing him from his councils; because, no Sovereign of these kingdoms ought to employ a Minister, who is become disagreeable to the
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generality

generality of the People ; and when any Minister happens to become so, it is our duty to inform his Majesty of it, that he may give satisfaction to his People, by the removal of such a Minister.

However, Sir, though I shall not at present charge this Minister with any particular crime, I must beg leave to examine a little into his conduct, in order to shew, that the discontents of the People are not without foundation ; and if it be true, what was, and is still generally supposed, it must be allowed, that the methods by which he first advanced himself to the high offices he has ever since enjoyed, were such as could not but be offensive to every honest man in the nation. The making and unmaking the famous Bank contract ; the screening from condign punishment those who, by their wicked and avaricious execution of the trust reposed in them by the South-Sea scheme, which had ruined many thousands ; the lumping of public justice, and the subjecting the less guilty to a punishment too severe, in order that the most heinous offenders might escape the punishment they deserved ; and the giving up to the South-Sea Company the sum of seven millions sterling, which they had obliged themselves to pay to the Public, a great part of which sum was given to old stockholders, and consequently to those who had never suffered by the scheme, were the steps by which he was supposed to have risen to power, and such steps could not but raise a general distaste at his advancement, and a dread of his administration.

Thus, Sir, he entered into administration with the general disapprobation of the People ; and I am sure, his measures since have been far from restoring him to their love or esteem. As he began, so has he gone on, oppressing the innocent, imposing upon the credulous, screening the guilty, wasting the public treasure, and endangering the liberties of the People. All this I could evince from every step of his administration, from the beginning to this very day, but I shall confine myself to some of the most remarkable instances. In general, I shall observe,

that

that by his advice and influence, a much greater army has all along been kept up than was necessary for the support of our Government, or consistent with our Constitution, and even that army often augmented without any real cause; that many squadrons have been fitted out, to the great expence of the nation, and general disturbance of our trade, without any just cause, and, I believe, without so much as a design to employ them effectually, either against our enemies, or for the assistance of our allies; that every method proposed of late years, for securing our Constitution against our most dangerous enemy, Corruption, has been, by his means, rejected, or rendered ineffectual; whilst, on the other hand, many penal laws have been passed, which have reduced a great number of his Majesty's subjects under the arbitrary power of a Minister and his creatures.

That almost every article of public expence has been increased by the addition of new and useless Officers; and all enquiries into the management of any public money, either prevented or defeated; that votes of credit at the end of a Session of Parliament, which always have been thought of dangerous consequences to our Constitution, have by him been made so frequent, that few Sessions have passed without one; that the expence of the Civil List has been vastly increased since the beginning of his Administration, though it was then much greater than it had ever amounted to in former times; to these, Sir, which are all of a domestic nature, I shall add, with regard to our foreign affairs, that ever since his advice began to be prevalent in our foreign affairs, the trade and particular interest of this nation, have in all treaties and negociations been neglected, the confidence of our most natural allies disregarded, and the favour of our most dangerous enemies courted; and that to this most unaccountable conduct, the present melancholy situation of the affairs of Europe is principally to be ascribed.

I know, Sir, it will be objected, that as every material step in the late conduct of our public affairs, either at home or abroad,

abroad, has been authorized or approved of by Parliament, what I have said must be looked on as a general charge against his Majesty's Councils and our Parliament, rather than a personal charge against any one Minister; but this, upon a due consideration, becomes the most heavy, and the most evident charge against the Minister I aim at. According to our Constitution, we can have no sole and prime Minister; we ought always to have several prime Ministers or Officers of State; every such Officer has his own proper department, and no Officer ought to meddle in the affairs belonging to the department of another: but it is publicly known, that this Minister, having obtained a sole influence over all our public councils, has not only assumed the sole direction of all public affairs, but has got every Officer of State removed that would not follow his directions, even in the affairs belonging to his own proper department. By this means he hath monopolized all the favours of the Crown, and engrossed the sole disposal of all Places, Pensions, Titles, and Ribbons, as well as of all Preferments, Civil, Military, or Ecclesiastical.

This, Sir, is of itself a most heinous offence against our Constitution; but he has greatly aggravated the heinousness of his crime; for, having thus monopolized all the favours of the Crown, he has made a blind submission to his direction at elections and in Parliament, the only ground to hope for any honours or Preferment, and the only tenure by which any Gentleman would preserve what he had. This is so notoriously known, that it can stand in need of no proof. Have not many deserving Gentlemen been disappointed in the preferment they had a just title to, upon the bare suspicion of not being blindly devoted to his personal interest? Have not some persons of the highest rank and most illustrious characters been displaced, for no other reason, than because they disdained to sacrifice their honour and conscience to his direction in Parliament? As no crime, no neglect, no misbehaviour could ever be objected to them, as no other reasons could ever be assigned for depriving the

the Crown of their service, this only could be the reason, Nay, has not this Minister himself not only confessed it, but boasted of it? Has he not said, and in this House too, that he would be a pitiful fellow of a Minister, who did not displace any Officer that opposed his measures in Parliament?

Can any Gentleman who heard this declaration desire a proof of the Minister's misconduct, or of his crimes? Was not this openly avowing one of the most heinous crimes that can be committed by a Minister in this kingdom? Was it not avowing, that he had made use of the favours of the Crown for obtaining a corrupt Majority in both Houses of Parliament, and keeping that Majority in a slavish dependance upon himself alone? Do not we all know, that even the King himself is not, by our Constitution, to take notice of any man's behaviour in Parliament, far less to make that behaviour a means by which he is to obtain, or a tenure by which he is to hold, the favour of the Crown? And shall we allow a Minister not only to do, but openly to avow, what he ought to be hanged for, should he advise his Sovereign to do so? It is by means of this crime, Sir, that the Minister I am speaking of has obtained the authority or approbation of Parliament in every step of his conduct, and therefore that authority or approbation is so far from being an alleviation, that it is a most heavy aggravation of every wrong step which he has thus got authorized or approved by Parliament. For this reason, in considering any particular step of his conduct, its being authorized or approved by Parliament can have no weight in his favour, whatever it may have against him. If the step was in itself weak or wicked, or if it now appears from its consequences to have been so, its having been approved of or authorized by Parliament, must be supposed to have proceeded either from his having misled the Parliament by false glosses and asseverations, or from his having overawed a Majority by means of that crime which he has since openly avowed.

Mr. Sands, April 16, 1740.

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As our duty to our Sovereign makes it necessary for us to return some sort of Address by way of answer to his Majesty's Speech from the Throne, at the opening of a Session, and as this practice has been established by immemorial custom, I shall be excused if I introduce my Motion with my sentiments upon that surprizing turn which has been lately given to the affairs of Europe, by his Majesty's wisdom and conduct.

In order to do this, Sir, I must begin with observing, the dismal prospect we had of the affairs of Europe about eighteen or nineteen months ago. I think there is no maxim in politics more certain than this, that it is inconsistent with the liberties of Europe, to allow France to increase her own power, or to divide the power of Europe into so many branches, as to make it impossible for any one Prince or State, to think of opposing her in any of her ambitious schemes; for it is very certain, that, as soon as the thoughts of Opposition end, those of Dependence begin; and consequently, if France could once effect this purpose, all the Princes and States of Europe would become dependent upon her; and most of them would, at all times, think of preserving their insignificant shadow of sovereignty only by being obedient to her commands, and assisting her against those who should bravely dare to rebel. We should then be in the same circumstance as Europe, or, I may say, the world was, when the grandeur of the Romans was at its greatest height. Some of the Princes and States of Europe, might be dignified with the deceitful title of *Socii Gallici Imperii*; but if ever any one of them should ever dare to behave otherwise than as the most abject slaves, even that empty title they would be stript of, and their territory would be converted into a province of the French empire. Our Royal Family, like that of *Macedon*, might, for some time, be left in possession of their throne; but if any one of our future princes should endeavour to shake off his dependency, a powerful invasion would be the certain consequence; and if France were the sole mistress of the Continent of Europe, or had

had it entirely at her command, our natural barrier would prove ineffectual: she would then come up against us with such a power as we could not oppose either by sea or land: our Royal Family would be cut off; our noble and great families would be all carried captives into France, and Britain would, from thenceforth, be divided and governed by French Intendants or Lieutenants, as *Macedonia* was by Roman Prætors or Proconsuls.

This consequence was foreseen, Sir: this consequence all Europe was sensible of in the last age: I wish I could say the same of the present: but, by what fatality I know not, the present age seemed, a few months ago, to be struck with such a blindness as prevented their seeing this danger, though it was never more apparent. Several of the Princes of Europe, governed by a selfish private interest, had actually joined with France in pulling down the House of Austria, though that was the only power, on the Continent of Europe, that could, by itself, pretend to limit or set bounds to the ambitious Court of France. By this means the Queen of Hungary was environed by such numerous hostile armies, that it was impossible for her to resist for any long time; and the confederacy against her was so powerful, that no counter-confederacy equal to it could be formed. This, I shall grant, was, in some measure, owing to her own unreasonable obstinacy, as well as to the selfish views of some of her enemies; for however unjust she might think her pretensions, in common prudence she should, upon the death of her father, have yielded to those that were the most moderate, in order to enable her to resist those who were so immoderate as to aim at the total overthrow of her House.

This was, Sir, from the beginning of the present troubles, his Majesty's advice to her; but this prudent advice she would not, for a long time, give the least ear to; and this not only united her enemies amongst themselves, but increased the views and demands of each; which reduced his Majesty to the fatal necessity

necessity of waiting till her obstinacy should be softened, and the eyes of some of her enemies be opened, by time and future accidents. This he was obliged to do before he could openly declare in her favour, or assist her in any other shape than by granting her sums of money ; but this he did with a steady design to take advantage of every accident that should happen : and the behaviour of the French in Germany, especially about the time of the battle of *Crotzka*, was such as furnished him with an opportunity which he wisely took care to lay hold of, and to make the best use of it he could, whereby he prevailed upon both the kings of Prussia and Poland to withdraw themselves from the French alliance, and to make peace with the Queen of Hungary, upon terms which she readily agreed to.

By this prudent conduct of his Majesty, it became now possible to form such a confederacy in Europe as might, with some hopes of success, endeavour to oppose the ambitious designs of the Court of France ; and to give courage to the other Powers of Europe to enter into such a confederacy, he resolved to send a body of his British troops to Flanders, in order to have a numerous army formed there ; which, before the end of the campaign, raised such terrors in France, as prevented their sending sufficient reinforcements to their troops already in Germany, and likewise prevented their joining the Spaniards with such armies as might have overwhelmed the king of Sardinia, or compelled him to desert the alliance he had before, by his Majesty's interposition, entered into with the Queen of Hungary. At the same time, proper orders were given to his Majesty's Admirals in the Mediterranean, to prevent the Spaniards from sending any reinforcements or provisions by sea to their army in Italy ; and our squadron there was reinforced and instructed, so as to enable it to execute these orders, against whosoever should dare to abet the Spaniards in any such attempt.

By these means, Sir, the Queen of Hungary was, before the end of the campaign, restored to the possession of Bohemia,
Westphalia

Westphalia was freed from the burden and terror of a French army, and the Spaniards were, during the whole campaign, defeated in every attempt they made against Italy: but there were two things still remaining to be done; which were to drive the French entirely out of Germany; and to establish, upon a more solid basis, the alliance of the King of Sardinia, in order to drive the Spaniards entirely out of Italy, for which purpose it was requisite to obtain the hearty concurrence of the Dutch. These things were to be the work of the next campaign, and therefore as early as the season would permit, the army which had been formed in Flanders marched into Germany; and his Majesty not only joined it with a considerable body of his electoral troops, but went in person to command the army; and by his valour and conduct, chiefly, the glorious battle of Dettingen was obtained, which compelled the French to evacuate Germany, and not only put the Queen of Hungary in possession of all Bavaria, but opened a free passage for her armies to the Rhine; so that France, from being the invader of the dominions of others, had now enough to do to defend her own.

Whilst his Majesty was thus triumphing over the arms of France in the field, he equally triumphed over her councils in the Cabinet; for, notwithstanding the utmost efforts of France to the contrary, he prevailed with the Dutch to send a body of 20,000 men to the assistance of the Queen of Hungary; and a definitive treaty of alliance was concluded at Worms, between his Majesty, the Queen of Hungary, and the King of Sardinia, by which, alliance, and assistance of that Prince was established upon a firm basis: and experience has already shewn the great use it may be of to us, in defeating the designs of our enemies the Spaniards in Italy; which will convince that haughty nation of its being necessary for them to cultivate a good correspondence with Great-Britain, if they have a mind to be quiet in their own possessions, or to disturb the possessions of any of their neighbours.

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These great and unexpected events, Sir, have been all brought about by the wisdom and vigour of his Majesty's Councils, and therefore we cannot in gratitude omit taking notice of them upon this occasion. I was very sensible, that there were many Gentlemen in this House, who could have set them in a clearer light, and recommended them to your consideration with greater energy than I can; but I knew your affection and duty to your Sovereign, and the lustre of those events, was in itself so resplendent, that I thought it required no high degree of eloquence to excite your grateful acknowledgements; therefore I ventured to undertake the task, and hope I shall be forgiven my arrogating to myself the honour.

Honourable Edward Coke, Dec. 1, 1743.

A N E C D O T E.

IN the Grecian and Roman Commonwealths, their tradesmen and labourers gained laurels in the field of battle by their courage, and returned to gain a subsistence for themselves and families by their industry; but when they began to keep standing armies, their soldiers, it is true, for some time gained laurels in the field, but they returned to plunder, and at last to subdue their country; which put an end to their freedom, and of course to every thing that was praise-worthy amongst them. God forbid our fate should be the same! It is a mistake to imagine, that our tradesmen would be drawn away from their labour by breeding them up to military discipline; on the contrary, they might be brought to use it as their diversion, and then they would return with more alacrity to their usual labour. In former times, our holidays, and even Sundays, were employed in the exercise of the *long bow*, and other warlike diversions; and I must think, that such days would be better employed in that way, than in sitting at an alehouse, or loitering in a skittle, or nine-pin ground: but such a change of manners is not to be introduced without the assistance of Government.

Mr. Sandys, Feb. 3, 1737.

OLIVER CROMWELL, when he turned every Member of this House out of doors; when he bid one of his soldiers take away our *mace*, that *fool's bauble*, as he called it, had not a much more numerous regular army than we have at present on foot; and though the army under King James the Second behaved in a more honourable way, yet such a behaviour is not much to be depended on; for I am convinced, even that an army would not have behaved as they did, if the discontented had not had an army to repair to; or if proper measures had been taken to garble them a little before hand.

Mr. Shippen, Feb. 3, 1737.

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BEFORE

BEFORE I make my Motion for settling on his Royal Highnesses the Prince of Wales, one hundred thousand pounds a year, give me leave, Sir, to inquire into these several foundations: and to begin with the last, I shall shew, from many undoubted authorities, that the Prince of Wales has always had, and ought to have, a sufficient provision settled upon him, in such a manner, as to render him as independent of the Crown as any other subject can be. To recount all the precedents that occur in our histories and records, would take up too much of your time, and therefore I shall take notice of only the most remarkable. King Henry the III^d granted to his eldest son Edward, afterwards King Edward the Ist, the Duchy of Guienne, before he was fourteen years of age; and the moment the Prince was married, he not only confirmed his former Grant by a new Patent, but likewise granted him, and put him in possession of, the Earldom of Chester, the cities and towns of Bristol, Stamford, and Grantham, with several other castles and manors; created him Prince of Wales, to which he annexed all the conquered lands in that Principality, and appropriated him Lieutenant-Governor of Ireland, though he was then but just turned of *fourteen*; all which was done, as the historians express it, *ut maturus ad res graviore gerendas expertus redderetur*. By this generosity and benevolence of the King towards his eldest son, that Prince was early in his youth established in a state of independence and grandeur; and those paternal favours were afterwards fully repaid by that illustrious and heroic Prince, for he afterwards proved his father's chief and only support. Every one knows how by his conduct and courage, at the battle of *Evesham*, he relieved his father out of the hands of his enemies, and restored his affairs after they were brought into a most dangerous and desperate state. Nay, not only the King himself, but the nation reaped signal services from the free and independent circumstances in which the King had so early placed his son. A state of independency naturally ennobles and exalts the mind of man; and the effects

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of it were most conspicuous in this wise and brave *Prince*, for he afterwards became the glory of England, and the terror of Europe.

The next precedent I shall take notice of is, that of Edward the Black Prince, upon whom Edward the III^d his father, settled at different times the Earldom of Chester, the Duchy of Cornwall, the Principality of Wales, the Duchy of Guienne, and the Principality of Aquitain. That wise and grave Prince, Sir, was so sensible of the reasonableness of the ancient maxim of England, with regard to the King's eldest son, that he took care every future Prince of Wales should have something to depend on, independent of his father, from the very moment of his birth : for which purpose he settled, by Act of Parliament, the Duchy of Cornwall in such a manner, that the King's eldest son, and Heir Apparent to the Crown, has ever since been Duke of Cornwall as soon as born, and without any new Grant from the King ; from whence has arisen the common proverb, *natus est, non datus, dux Cornubiæ*. Some of the latter Grants of that King might, indeed, proceed from the great personal merit of the son, but the first Grants could not proceed from any such consideration ; they could proceed only from his own wisdom, and from the general maxim I have mentioned ; for the Prince was not then *three* years old, when his father settled upon him by Patent the Earldom of Chester ; he was but seven years old, when Cornwall was erected into a Duchy, and settled upon him by Act of Parliament as before-mentioned ; and he was but thirteen when the Principality of Wales was settled upon him. Soon after that time, indeed, his personal merit began to appear : But how came it to appear ? Its early appearance did appear, and could only proceed from his father's having employed him in, and inured him to the study of weighty affairs, at an age when most Princes are industriously taught to think of nothing but baubles and toys.

The same conduct, Sir, that wise King observed during that brave *Prince's* life : he was continually heaping favours upon

the Prince his son, and the Prince was continually repaying them with glorious acts of gratitude and filial duty. When he was seventeen, he fully repaid all former favours, by having the chief share of the victory obtained over the French at the famous battle of Cressy. In the twenty-fourth, or twenty-fifth year of this Prince's age, the King invested him with the Duchy of Guienne, which new favour he soon afterwards repaid by sending the *French* King home prisoner to his father, after having taken him at the ever-memorable battle of *Poitiers*. And in the two and thirtieth year of that Prince's age, a great part of France having been conquered and subdued by his valour, the King his father erected *Guienne*, *Gascony*, and several other provinces of France, into a Principality, under the name of the Principality of Aquitain, with which he invested the Prince his son: this new favour the Prince likewise soon repaid, by carrying the glory of the British arms into Spain, and replacing Peter upon the Throne of Castile, after having defeated the usurper Henry at the battle of *Nejara* in that kingdom: for all which glorious victories, and many other great services done to his native country, the nation was so grateful to his memory, that immediately after his death, or at least as soon as their grief for the loss of so brave a Prince would give them leave, the House of Commons addressed the King to create his son Prince of Wales, and Duke of Cornwall, which that wise King immediately agreed to; for his grandson being then Heir Apparent to the Crown, he became entitled, by the maxim I have mentioned, to an independent settlement: but as he was not the King's eldest son, he had no pretence, from any former precedent, to the Principality of Wales; and his right by the late Act to the Duchy of Cornwall, was thought to be doubtful by the Lawyers of that age; the Lawyers being then, it seems, as dexterous at starting doubts and scruples, as the Lawyers of the age we now live in.

Give me leave, Sir, to mention one other precedent; that of Prince Henry, afterwards the glorious King Henry the Vth, whom

whom his father Henry IV. in the very first year of his reign created Prince of Wales, Duke of Cornwall, and Earl of Chester, though the Prince was then but twelve years of age; all which grants were recorded upon the Parliament's request, in order to prevent any possibility of a revocation: and though that King was naturally of a jealous and a suspicious temper, yet we find, during his whole reign, he was every now and then making new grants to the Prince his son, even tho' he was sometimes maliciously made to believe the Prince was conspiring against him. This Prince, it is true, fell into some excesses incident to youth and idleness; but, from the first part of his life, and from his conduct after he became King, we may judge that those excesses were rather owing to his father's jealousy than to his own natural temper: for when he was but about sixteen, he by his valour contributed greatly to his father's victory over the rebels at Shrewsbury; and the very next year, having been entrusted with the command of his father's army against the rebels in Wales, by his conduct and courage, he gave them two signal defeats; by which he gained so much esteem, that the King, his father, from his own natural and unhappy temper, and not from any undutiful behaviour in his son, began to grow jealous of him, and therefore never afterwards employed him in any public affairs; so that the excesses he fell into, probably proceeded from the idleness of his life, and the activity of his genius; or, perhaps, rather from a design of removing from his father all future occasions of jealousy. This, indeed, seems to be confirmed, or at least rendered the most probable conjecture, by his conduct after he became King; for immediately upon his accession, he banished from his presence all the companions and sycophant upholders of his former debaucheries, and became one of the greatest, and one of the most glorious Princes that ever sat upon the English Throne.

The late King James the II^d, when Duke of York, and the late Queen Anne, when Princess of Denmark, were both provided

for. The Duke of York had a great settlement made upon him by Parliament, soon after the Restoration, though he was but Presumptive Heir to the Crown, his brother King Charles being then in a capacity of having children, who would have given him a more effectual exclusion than could ever be attained by Parliament, till his own ridiculous measures put it in their power : and the late Queen Anne, when Princess of Denmark, had also a great settlement made upon her by authority of Parliament, tho' King William and Queen Mary were both then alive, and in a capacity of having children ; so that the Princess Anne, when that settlement was made, was but the Presumptive Heir to the Crown.

From these precedents it appears, that the maxim of having an independent provision settled upon the Presumptive or Apparent Heir of the Crown, is a maxim that has ever been observed in this nation.

Mr. Pulteney, Feb. 23, 1737.

Julius Cæsar had as great reason as any man can ever have, to discourage virtue, and reward the vicious : *Julius Cæsar* did sometimes threaten men for doing their duty ; but *Julius Cæsar* was always extremely shy of putting such threats in execution. We are told, that when he went to seize upon the sacred treasure of Rome, and was opposed by *Metellus*, the Tribune, he threatened to kill *Metellus* ; and at the same time told him, *Istud nonne scis adolescentule, longe mihi difficilius dicere, quam facere.* This was threatening a man for doing his duty ; but *Julius Cæsar* took care not to put his threat in execution.

Mr. Lyttelton, Jan. 28, 1738.

I REMEMBER a story that was told of a great favourite of Charles the II^d. This Gentleman, who was a true cavalier, fought for the father, and was banished with the son, whom he attended all the time of his exile. Upon the restoration of the Royal Family he continued still to follow his master's fortune, but

but never minded his own; till his continual attendance at Court, his giving into all the fashionable expences of the times, and the figure which his intimacy with his Majesty obliged him to support, at last exhausted every shilling of his estate. But such was this Gentleman's modesty, (a virtue you'll say very rarely to be met with in the favourite of a Monarch) that he never made one solicitation in his own behalf, though he had many opportunities of doing it. At last the King, being informed of his circumstances, took occasion one day, as the Gentleman was soliciting a post for one of his friends, to tell him, "Sir, you have been a very faithful and a very constant servant to me; I have had very great satisfaction in your company, without your being a shilling the better for me, though I am persuaded your estate has suffered considerably in my service. As you are a man of sense, and fit for business, why do you not ask for something for yourself?" The Gentleman made no other return to his Majesty at that time, but a profound acknowledgment of the honour he had received, by his Majesty's being so mindful of him; but some time after, being all alone with the King, "Pray, Sir," says he to his Majesty, "be so good as to lend me half a crown." "Half a crown!" answers the King, "what do you mean? if you have occasion for a larger sum you may have it." "No, no," replies the Gentleman, "this small piece does very well to begin with; for I have often observed, that once put you in the way of giving, it is easy to keep you in it, and then you do not care how much you give."

There is something in this pretty applicable to our granting money for the public service. The sum, Sir, originally asked for, and granted, is but small, and makes no great figure, perhaps, in the public accounts; but an accumulation of that sum from time to time, obtained when we were in a giving humour, makes at length, a most enormous article.

Sir Thomas Aston, Jan. 28, 1738.

It was a maxim with *Julius Cæsar*, never to venture even a battle, if the disadvantages that might ensue from a defeat appeared to be greater than any advantages he could expect from a victory; and in Africa, we are told, that he bore with many insults and indignities, from the adverse army, only because by a little patience, he had reason to expect being able to obtain a victory with less blood-shed; and in resolving upon peace or war, the same maxim ought to be observed.

Horace Walpole, Esq; Jan. 28, 1738.

BOTH the circumstances of Europe, and the circumstances of Spain, are now, my Lords, very different from what they were in the reign of Queen Elizabeth, or in the time of Oliver Cromwell. In Queen Elizabeth's reign, Spain was the only formidable power in Europe, and we had as much reason as any other of her neighbours to endeavour to reduce her power. For this purpose, Queen Elizabeth took the wisest course that could be taken, by encouraging and supporting the Civil War in the Netherlands; by which means, she at last enabled the *Seven United Provinces* to throw off the yoke of Spain; and the whole power of Spain being applied towards supporting their dominion over the Netherlands, they could neither spare money for fortifying their settlements in America, nor could they send any regular troops thither for defending them; so that even our private adventurers had great success, and often got rich booties by privateering, and by incursions upon those settlements; for, as there was no good correspondence between France and Spain, and an open war between Spain and Holland, the Spaniards could not make use of either French or Dutch vessels, for carrying on their trade with their settlements in America; and besides, as the French were then involved in civil wars, they durst not venture to disoblige England, by assisting Spain, either openly or by underhand dealings.

In Oliver Cromwell's time, my Lords, we know that the Spaniards were engaged in a heavy war with France, which rendered

rendered them unable to provide for the security of their trade and possessions in America; and though, by our taking part with France in that war, we got the island of Jamaica, which was a valuable acquisition, yet I must think, it would have been lucky for this nation, if Oliver had joined with France against Spain; for it was his fatal union with France, that laid the foundation of the excessive power of that kingdom, which has since cost this nation so much blood, and so many millions of money. And now, my Lords, with regard to both these wars, I must observe, that notwithstanding our great successes against Spain, in Oliver's time, that nation was not easily, or soon reduced to comply with such terms as we thought reasonable, for both Queen Elizabeth and Oliver Cromwell left the war to be put an end to by their successors.

Lord Hervey, Feb. 22, 1738.

EVERY nation in Europe is proud of seeing the younger children of their Royal Family make a figure in the world. The provision which his Majesty has been pleased to make, is but very moderate. Twenty-four thousand pounds a year, can never be thought too much to the four Princesses; and 15,000l. per annum is less, I believe, than any second son of the Royal Family ever had before: the younger brother of Charles the II^d had 10,000l. settled upon him; and the small allowance to the Duke, mentioned in this Bill, is a proof of his Majesty's moderation, and that he has the good of his kingdom, and the ease of his subjects, always first in his thoughts.

Lord Delawar, Feb. 22, 1739.

At the time of the Revolution, the Dutch provided a squadron of fifty men of war, and transports for 14,000 men, of which a great number was cavalry, in three months time, for accompanying the Prince of Orange to England. I say, my Lords, in three months time; for it was in July that the first Resolution was taken to assist the Prince of Orange, and the

the States-General prepared such an expedition, that soon after the beginning of October, a fleet of 50 men of war, 25 frigates, 25 fire-ships, and near 400 transports, with an army of 10,000 foot, and 4000 horse, were ready to sail, and actually did sail upon the 19th of that month.

Lord Carteret, Nov. 18, 1740.

IF then we should return to the country, my Lords, and tell the people, that our government durst not send forces out to invade the enemy, for fear of their invading us, will not every man of common sense laugh us to scorn? Does not every one know, that the best way to prevent an invasion is to invade? Did not the Romans send *Scipio* to invade the Carthaginians, at the very time that Hannibal was in Italy, and almost at their gates? But the case with us is still stronger; we could easily have invaded the enemy when and where we pleased; whereas it was difficult and dangerous, if not impossible for them to invade us at any time, or in any place. To pretend that we must always keep a mercenary army of 30,000 men in Britain and Ireland, for supporting our government against an invasion with 4 or 5000, must be ridiculous; or it must be a very bad compliment upon the illustrious family now upon the Throne; because, it is supposing that they have few or no friends in the nation, but those they keep in daily pay. And to say that a common soldier, who has no property, who has neither *ars* nor *focus*, will fight against a foreign invader with more courage and resolution than those that fight *pro aris & focus*, is, I am sure, a very unjust reflection upon all the Gentlemen and all the men of substance in the kingdom.

Lord Carteret, Nov. 18, 1740.

I KNOW, my Lords, I do not speak properly, when in talking of what happened in King Charles the 1st's time, I make use of the term *Cabinet Council*, because it is a term of much later date; for in those days, besides this House, the King had no other

other Council, but that which we still call the Privy Council, and of that Council there was always a Committee appointed to consider and take care of foreign affairs; but the Resolutions of that Committee were not carried into execution; till they were approved of by the Privy Council: In that Council there then sat several great Officers, such as the Lord High Treasurer, the Lord High Admiral, and others, who by their birth and quality, as well as by the importance of the posts they enjoyed, added weight and dignity to the Council of which they were Members; but these high offices are now split into Commissions, and sometimes granted to men who have neither birth, quality, nor character; which is not done for the sake of dispatching business (for every one knows, the whole business of the nation, or office, is now chiefly directed by one, in the same manner it was formerly) but for the sake of multiplying salaries and gaining votes. This has very much derogated from the honor of that Assembly, and is, I believe, the chief cause of their power being now almost entirely usurped and exercised by what is called the Cabinet Council; but even what we now call the Cabinet Council, has not always the power and influence they seem to have; for when any one Minister happens to get the sole direction of all public affairs, the other Members of the Cabinet Council, or at least the majority of them, serve only to give a sort of authority to what the Minister has been pleased to resolve on.

Duke of Argyle, Dec. 8, 1740.

In Queen Elizabeth's time, though the war against Spain began in 1585, and lasted till that Queen's death in 1603, which was seventeen years, yet in all that time there were but three or four expeditions of consequence undertaken against the enemy, either in Spain, or in the Indies; and though the private adventurers got sometimes a rich booty, yet the nation never reaped an advantage, nor kept possession of any one place they had the good fortune to take. Again, in Oliver Cromwell's time,

time, though the war against Spain began in 1654, and continued till his death in 1658, yet no one expedition was undertaken, or, I believe, so much as thought of, against any one of the dominions of Spain, except that one expedition by which the war begun, and by which we got and kept the Island of Jamaica.

The Lord Chancellor, Dec. 8, 1740.

MY LORDS, I must think it very unlucky in any one, that argues in favor of our conduct in the present war, to mention Queen *Elizabeth* or *Oliver Cromwell*; both of them began war against *Spain* in a very different manner from what we have now done. Queen *Elizabeth* began the war, by sending an army into the *Low Countries*, to assist them in throwing off the yoke of *Spain*; at the same time she sent a squadron, with land forces on board, to the *West-Indies*, not with simple or ambiguous orders for making reprisals, but express orders to attack the *Spanish* settlements; and accordingly they took and plundered *St. Jago*, one of the *Cape Verd* islands, and also most part of the island of *St. Domingo*, the town of *Carthagena*, and the towns of *St. Antonio* and *St. Helena* in *Florida*. The very next year after the return of this fleet, she sent another under the same Admiral, *Drake*, to the coast of *Spain*, which did not lie to be stared at off of any of their ports, but entered the harbour of *Cadiz* and the river of *Lisbon*, and burnt a great number of ships: and though the Admiral had no land forces on board, yet he landed at several places upon the coast of *Spain*, and ravaged the whole country round. At the same time she sent *Cavendish* to the *South-Seas*, where he ravaged the whole coast of *Chili* and *Peru*, and returned to England with a booty vastly rich. The year following was the year of the *Spanish Armada*, the fate of which I need not relate. The next year, with the assistance of some private adventurers, she sent a fleet and army against *Spain* itself, where they landed at several places, beat an army that was sent against them, and might have got a great booty,

booty, if they had not amused themselves with restoring the dethroned King of Portugal. The four or five years next following, that great Queen was chiefly employed in assisting Henry the IVth of France against the Spaniards and his own rebellious subjects; and in the year 1596, a new fleet and army was sent against Spain under the Earl of Essex, who took the city of Cadiz, burnt or took all the ships in the harbour, and after having done the Spaniards an infinite deal of service, returned to England with a most inconsiderable booty.

Besides these, my Lord, there were several other expeditions of less note undertaken against Spain in that reign; and if we did not, in that time, keep possession of any of the places we took from the enemy in the West-Indies, it was because we did not then so much know the value of settlements in that part of the world. But if Queen Elizabeth did not push the war against Spain with so much vigor as she might have done, there were two reasons for it, which do not now subsist. In the first place, our trade, which was then in its infancy, suffered but very little by the war, and we were yearly getting great riches by plundering the enemy at sea or land; and in the next place, that gracious Queen was extremely shy of loading her subjects with any new taxes, or putting the public to any expence. When she found herself under no necessity to send out forces to attack the enemy, or assist her allies, she kept no army or squadron at home, to be a burden and oppression upon her own subjects. She raised no armies, nor fitted out any squadrons, but when she had immediate occasion for them, or was in imminent danger; and as soon as the service, or the danger was over, she dismissed her armies, and paid off her squadrons: I wish I could say, we had held the same conduct ever since, or that we now held such a conduct.

With regard to Oliver Cromwell, it is well known he began his war with Spain by the conquest of Jamaica, which has since brought in so many millions sterling to England; and if it had not been for a mistake in his General, he would probably have begun

begun it with the conquest of St. Domingo, which would have been an acquisition of much greater consequence to this kingdom. If he did not second his blow in the West-Indies, it was because he engaged with the French in their war against the Spaniards in the Netherlands, by which he got possession of the important city and port of Dunkirk; and he died in little more than two months after he had made this new and important acquisition, which we might to this day have had in our possession, if the Parliament, upon the Restoration, had done their duty, and annexed it to the Crown of England.

Earl of Chesterfield, Dec. 8, 1740.

THE case of the Earl of Bristol, in King Charles the First's time, may show how dangerous it is to accuse a favorite Minister, whilst he is in the zenith of his power and interest at Court. Nothing could be more just than the accusation brought by that Earl against the Duke of Buckingham, yet it produced an accusation against that Earl, in which the King himself was the accuser, and his Attorney General the prosecutor. - This was a most terrible situation which that noble Earl was brought into by his fidelity to his country, and his own honor; and if the power of the Crown had been in the same condition it is now, notwithstanding the heinousness of his charge against the Minister, notwithstanding his full and well-vouched defence as to the charge exhibited against him, he might, probably, have fallen a sacrifice to the resentment of that favorite Minister.

Earl of Carteret, Feb. 13, 1740.

IT is with regret I observe, that almost every Session introduces something new, in diminution of the Liberties, or derogatory to the Constitution of this kingdom. In former times, the Grant of a Supply often stood a long Debate in this House, and was sometimes absolutely refused; now it is always granted *nemine contradicente*. The Malt-Tax was never introduced till towards the latter end of King William's reign, and was at first

first most strenuously opposed: Nay, even during the war in Queen Anne's time, it was often opposed, and was looked on as a tax so burdensome upon the poor labourers and manufacturers of this kingdom, that no man imagined any Minister would have the assurance to propose renewing or continuing it, after the war was over. The Mutiny Bill was at first thought to be a most dangerous innovation, and was therefore most violently opposed, especially in time of peace; but it is now become so familiar to us, that we pass it regularly every year, without the least opposition, as if a Standing Army and a Mutiny Act were two things absolutely necessary for the subsistence of our Constitution. Not many years ago, the Members of this House, when assembled, looked upon themselves as the grand Inquest of the Nation, and therefore thought themselves in duty bound to inquire into every grievance and complaint, without any other foundation than a public rumour; but now every Motion, that tends to an inquiry into any complaint, is rejected; or if any such inquiry be set on foot, it is committed to those who are themselves suspected of being the original and chief cause of the complaint.

Thus, Sir, we have for several years gone on approaching, I am afraid, to the confines of slavery; and in this Session, we have made a new and a very extraordinary step. Till this Session we have always thought, that every Member of this House had a right to vote for a Call of the House. We are fellow-labourers for the public good: we are all joint-guardians of the Liberties of our Country, and every Member has a right to insist upon it, that his companion should attend and bear an equal share of the burden, or at least a share proportionable to his strength and capacity. But in this Session, Sir, we have seen a Motion for a Call rejected, though that Motion was the first of the kind that had been made, though it was supported by strong reasons, and though it was desired by near one half of those that were then present. This I must look on as a most dangerous innovation; for when we begin to encroach upon,

or derogate from our own Rights, no man can tell how far it may go. I do not know, but I may live to see the Question put upon a Gentleman's rising up to speak, *whether he shall have leave to speak?* And if ever such a Question should be put, I shall not in the least doubt of its being carried in the negative, in case there should be a suspicion of the Gentleman's intending to utter things disagreeable to those that may then have the direction of the Majorities of this House.

William Pulteney, Esq; Jan. 29, 1739.

I MUST be against compelling the attendance of such Gentlemen in this House; I am far from finding fault with any of those Gentlemen that have returned; I think they have done their duty in doing so; but I cannot help comparing them to the present King of Spain. He, some years ago, resigned his Crown, out of a pet, and, I think, it was a religious or conscientious pet too. I wish they had held him at his word, and never allowed him to resume, as they might and ought to have done; for his second son, now Prince of Asturias, was the natural successor to his eldest, who died King of Spain. But they allowed him to resume his Crown, and we know what disturbances he has since bred in Europe. If the Gentlemen who left their Seats last Session, had been taken at their word; if we had ordered their Seats to be filled up by new Elections, they could have complained of no injustice: but we have this Session allowed such of them as have returned, to resume their Seats. In this, we have shewn ourselves to be as indulgent as the subjects of the King of Spain; and I hope they will take care not to make such an use of the indulgence they have met with, as his Catholic Majesty has done. They have hitherto shewn, that they do not incline to do; but, if we should call in those that, for aught we know, are still in a bad humour, I do not know what may happen. Evil company, they say, corrupts good manners. It is a dangerous experiment,

ment, to mingle the infected with those that are but just recovered. For this reason I was against the Call.

Robert Tracey, Esq; Jan. 25, 1735.

No Legislator ever founded a free Government, but avoided a standing army, that *Charybdis*, as a rock against which his Commonwealth must certainly be shipwrecked, as the Israelites, Athenians, Corinthians, Achaians, Lacedemonians, Thebans, Samnites, and Romans; none of which nations, whilst they kept their liberty, were ever known to maintain any soldier in constant pay within their cities, or ever suffered any of their subjects to make war their profession; well knowing, that the sword and sovereignty always march hand in hand; and therefore they trained their own citizens, and territories about them, perpetually in arms; and their whole Commonwealths, by this means, became so many formed militias: a general exercise of the best of their people in the use of arms, was the only bulwark of their liberties, and was reckoned the surest way to preserve them both at home and abroad, the people being secured thereby as well against the domestic affronts of any of their own citizens, as against the foreign invasions of ambitious and unruly neighbours. Their arms were never lodged in the hands of any who had not an interest in preserving the public peace, who fought *pro aris & focis*, and thought themselves sufficiently paid by repelling invaders, that they might with freedom return to their own affairs. In those days there was no difference between the citizen, the soldier, and the husbandman; for all promiscuously took arms when the public safety required it, and afterwards laid them down with more alacrity than they took them up: so that we find among the Romans, the bravest and greatest of their Generals came from the plough, contentedly returning when the work was over, and never demanding their triumphs, till they had laid down their commands, and reduced themselves to the state of private men. Nor do we find this famous Commonwealth ever

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permitted

permitted a disposition of their arms in any other hands, till their Empire increasing, necessity constrained them to erect a constant stipendiary soldiery abroad in foreign parts, either for the holding or winning of provinces. Then luxury increasing with dominion, the strict rule and discipline of freedom soon abated, and forces were kept up at home; which soon proved of such dangerous consequence, that the people were forced to make a law to employ them at a convenient distance: which was, that if any General marched over the river *Rubicon*, he should be declared a public enemy. And in the passage of that river, the following inscription was erected, *Imperator frve miles, frve tyrannus armatus quisquis sistito; vexillum armaque deponito, nec citra hunc amnem trajicito*. And this made *Cæsar*, when he had presumed to pass this river, to think of nothing but the pressing on to the total oppression of that glorious Empire.

Mr. Hutcheson, Feb. 12, 1740.

SIR, it is a new doctrine in this nation, and absolutely inconsistent with our Constitution, to tell us, that his Majesty may, and ought, in the disposal of offices and favours, to consider Gentlemen's behaviour in this House. Let his Majesty be never so well convinced of the wisdom and uprightness of his measures, he ought not to take the least notice of what is said or done by any particular man in this House. He is a traitor to our Constitution that advises his Majesty to do so; and if reports are carried to his Majesty, with regard to the behaviour of any particular Member of Parliament in this House, or at any Election, he ought to do with them, as it is said King William did with the Papers of a Plot he had discovered. By perusing one of them, he found reason to suspect some of his Courtiers had been concerned; whereupon he threw them all into the flames, that they might not furnish him with suspicions against those he took to be his friends.

The same Monarch shewed another instance of his generosity, and of his regard for our Constitution. A post in the army having fallen vacant, the Gentleman who had the next right to it, happened to be a Member of this House, and one that had opposed the Court, which few Officers do now-a-days; the Ministers, as usual, were against his preferment, because he had opposed the King's Measures in Parliament; but the King told them, he had always behaved well as an Officer, and he had nothing to do with his behaviour in Parliament.

Honourable Edward Digby, March 23, 1741.

WHATEVER notion some Gentlemen may have of absolute power, Sir, it has been thought necessary in all countries for preserving subordination and discipline in an army. In the Roman Commonwealth, from its very first original, the Generals of their armies had a most absolute and unlimited power over every Officer and Soldier in the army. They could not only prefer and reduce, but punish even with death itself, by their sole authority, and without the sentence of any Court Martial. The story of *Manlius*, who put his own son to death, for fighting the enemy against his orders, is so well known, that I need not put Gentlemen in mind of it. Not only particular men, but whole armies, were among the *Romans* subject to be punished by the sole and absolute power of their General; for we read that *Appius*, in the very infancy of that Commonwealth, caused every tenth man in the army to be whipped for flying from the enemy; besides punishing some of the Officers with death. And, I believe, there is now no country in the world, where their armies enjoy so much freedom, or so much security against being oppressed by their Commanders, as both the Officers and Soldiers of our British armies enjoy.

Colonel Conway, Feb. 7, 1750.

THE old Nabob *Meer Jaffer*, if ever Mussulman had a friendship for a Christian, had a friendship for me. When the news of my appointment reached Bengal, he immediately quitted *Muxadavad*; came down to Calcutta; impatiently waited my arrival six weeks; fell ill; returned to his Capital, and died! Two or three days before his death, in the presence of his wife, and in the presence of his Minister, he said to his son and successor, "Whatever you think proper to give to Lord Clive on your own account, the means are in your power: But as a testimony of my affection for him, I desire you will pay to him, as a legacy from me, five lacks of rupees." I must observe, that the Nabob's death happened whilst I was on my voyage, and some months before my arrival in Bengal. The principal and interest amounted to near seventy thousand pounds. The whole of the money, added to about forty thousand pounds more, which I prevailed on the Nabob to bestow, is established for a Military Fund, in support of Officers, and Soldiers who may be invalided in any part of India, and also in support of their widows.

Lord Clive, March 30, 1772.

IF Gentlemen will search the Records in the Tower, they will find that the town of *Calais* in France, when it belonged to the Imperial Crown of these Realms, was not taxed till it sent Representatives to Parliament. Two Burgesses from *Calais* actually sat and voted in this House. Then, and not till then, was *Calais* taxed. The Writ out of Chancery, and the Return to it, in the reign of Edward the VIth, with the names of the Burgesses, are still extant. I faithfully gave them to the Public from attested copies.

Mr. Wilkes, Feb. 1775.

THE adopting of the measures of supporting large standing armies, to enforce the sovereignty over their provinces, (an alluring motive) has subjugated them all in their turns, and extinguished

tinguished their constitutional provisions and barriers against tyranny.

To pass over the lesser States, not only Marius, and Sylla, and *Cæsar*, but Augustus and Tiberius, those able tyrants, who systematically ruined the Roman Empire and her liberties, achieved it by troops raised to maintain the Roman Sovereignty over their provinces. They did, indeed, subdue those provinces; and their project reached still farther than they expected; for it stopped not till the Military Power, established by them for that end, overturned the Imperial Power itself.—In less than fifty years from the death of *Augustus*, those armies raised to keep the provinces in awe, had no less than three Emperors on foot at the same time; and thenceforward the Military Power dispose of the Empire, and gave to whom it pleased the throne of the *Cæsars*. Whoever will calmly examine those precedents, it is impossible but they must be convinced, that the like causes must have similar effects. Oppressed by an overgrown army, the Liberty of America, and *Ireland*, (for that stands next in the ministerial plan) and afterwards that of Great-Britain, will follow of course;—the Monster of Despotism will only grant even to the *latter* the favour intended for *Ulysses*, that of being last devoured.

Lord Irnham, Feb. 6, 1775.

THE cruel and persecuting means devised for enforcing our measures against America, exactly resemble the mode adopted by *Marshal Rozen*, King James the Second's French General in Ireland, in order to reduce the rebellious citizens, and other defenders of Londonderry. They, brave men, as the Americans are now, were styled traitors and rebels; and they, as well as our rebellious subjects in America, were to be starved into compliance; that is, the means employed were to be justified by the goodness of the cause. An order was sent by Rozen, obliging the garrison of Derry to submit; which was to collect the wives, children, and aged parents of the garrison,

rison, to drive them under the walls of the town, there to perish in the presence of their parents, husbands, and other relations; and if they offered to return, to fire on them, and *massacre them*. But weak, infatuated, and bigoted as that Prince was, his heart revolted at such a horrid expedient of subduing his enemies; for as soon as it reached his knowledge, he immediately countermanded the barbarous order, and left the innocent and unoffending to their liberty.

Marquis of Rockingham, March 16, 1775.

OF thirty-three Sovereigns of England, since William the Conqueror, thirteen only have ascended the Throne by *divine hereditary Right*; the rest owe their Royalty to the zeal and vigour of the People of England, in the maintenance of Constitutional Freedom.

The Will of the People, superseding an hereditary Claim to Succession, at the commencement of the twelfth century, placed Henry the Ist on the Throne of this Kingdom, with condition that he would abrogate the vigorous laws made since the Norman Invasion, restore the Government as in the days of Edward the Confessor, and abolish all unjust and arbitrary Taxes.

King Stephen obtained the Crown, and Henry the II kept it, on the same express terms: yet, Sir, in the days of King John, it was judged expedient, no longer to trust to mere oral declarations, which State chicane and sophistry had of late years occasionally explained away, but to compel that Prince solemnly to register an affirmance of the antient Rights of the People in a formal manner; and this necessary work was accomplished by the Congress at *Runnemede*, in the year 1115: an Assembly which ought never to be spoken of by the Representatives of the Commons of England, but with the profoundest veneration.

An honourable and learned Member over the way mentioned, a few evenings ago, the introduction of foreign troops
into

into this Island in the Reign of Henry the III^d, as a precedent to warrant the present stretch of Regal Prerogative in the case of the Hanoverian Mercenaries: as that Member is not now in the House, I shall be more concise in treating of the events he alluded to, than I otherwise intended. Sir, in the Reign of Henry the III^d, (about the year 1233) the Barons, Clergy, and Freeholders, refused two distinct Summonses to Parliament; and understanding that the King, as Earl of *Poitou*, had landed some of his Continental Troops in the western ports of England, with a design to strengthen a most odious and arbitrary set of Ministers, they assembled in a *Convention*, or *Congress*, from whence they dispatched Deputies to King Henry; declaring, that if he did not immediately send back those *Poitouvians*, and remove from his Person and Councils evil advisers, they would place on the Throne a Prince who should better observe the Laws of the Land.—Sir, the King not only hearkened to that Congress, but shortly after complied with every article of their demands, and publicly notified his reformation. Now, Sir, what are we to call that Assembly which dethroned Edward the III^d, when the Archbishop of Canterbury preached a sermon on this text, *The voice of the People is the voice of God*. And when a learned Judge, in the character of Procurator for the mass of the Freemen, surrendered the homage and fealty of the People of England, alledging that the original compact, through which they were bound to Allegiance, was dissolved, by the use and aggrandizement of ill Counsellors; by the Administration of Government, which agreed not with the ancient Laws of the Land, and by a total disregard to the advice and supplications of his Majesty's faithful but afflicted subjects. Richard the III^d (like the unhappy Edward) fell a victim to despotic obstinacy and favouritism: and to this King, in the same manner, was surrendered, by Commissioners (or Proctors) the allegiance of his subjects; and a Prince of the House of Lancaster (founder of our present Most Gracious Majesty's royal

line) was invited over from banishment, and elected by the People to the Throne. But, Sir, before I dismiss this Reign, it may be proper to observe, that Richard entirely subverted the Constitution of the Upper House of Parliament; for he made it an appendage to the Crown, introducing Peers by Creation in prejudice to the territorial Baronies: and with respect to the other House, he sent orders to the Sheriffs of the several Counties throughout England, to return only such Representatives to Parliament, as should, on every occasion, implicitly obey the royal mandate. Nay, Sir, both Houses conjointly went at last so far, as to commit their whole parliamentary power into the hands of a Cabinet Junto of Ministers, having, however, first obtained the Pope's leave for so doing. I wish Gentlemen, who contend for supreme Sovereignty in the Crown and Parliament, denying any Rights of the People in pre-eminence to their joint authority, would apply such argument to the State of King, Lords, and Commons at that æra. I shall next proceed to the general Convention and Congress, which, in 1461, enthroned the Earl of March in Westminster-Hall, by the name of Edward the IVth, the Primate of all England collecting the Suffrages of the People; and at that period, even the *Lancastrian* Historians date the commencement of his Reign.

But to come to modern occurrences: in 1659, a *Convention*, or *Congress*, restored legal Monarchy in the person of King Charles the II^d, who was then no farther distant from this Island than the town of *Breda*; and being pressed by many of the Royal Partizans to issue his Writs for a lawful Parliament, he made answer, that he would rather be indebted for his Restoration to the uninfluenced sense of the People of England, taken in a free Assembly.

On the 26th of December, 1688, was held a *Convention*, or *Congress*, at St. James's, where the Prince of Orange presided; and there were present most of the surviving Members who had served in any one of the Parliaments of King Charles the

the Second, the Lord Mayor, the Aldermen, and about fifty of the Common-Council, &c. and on the 22d of January following, by virtue of notices issued on the aforesaid 26th of December, at St. James's, the memorable Convention Parliament assembled in this House, and perfected the glorious work of the Revolution.

I mean, Sir, from these examples and arguments, to deduce for an uncontrovertible truth, that all the subjects of the British empire have a right to be governed according to the spirit of our ancient constitution, by which no freeman could be taxed without his consent, either in person, or by his substitute: and notwithstanding the infringement of this right under some of our Norman Kings and their successors, yet we find William the Conqueror himself confirming it in his code of laws, the year before his decease. And the same explicit declaration in its favour from our English *Justinian*, King Edward the First, in the charter of the 25th, and statutes of the 34th of his reign, admitted to be among the earliest authentic records of Parliament extant, according to the present mode of summons.

I have, I think, shewn, that our Kings, in former days, have not scrupled to treat with a Congress; that many of the best of them owe their Crowns to such national meetings; and that this nation has, on the one hand, been saved from despotism, and, on the other hand, from anarchy, by a *Convention* or *Congress*; which surely possesses some advantages over a Parliament: for being free from ministerial management, having neither placemen, pensioners, nor dependent retainers on their list, are more likely to hear the sincere dictates of conscience, and the unpoluted sense of those they represent. But, Sir, however inadmissible the voice of a Congress might be deemed as acts of legislation, yet I conceive that their plea, in the character of *Advocates* for the constituent body by whom they are commissioned, ought in justice, as well as sound policy, to be listened to. A punctilious delicacy now in fashion, which we style the dignity of the Crown and Parliament, will, if madly persisted in, cost

cost at least half the blood and substance of Great-Britain. The most haughty and powerful Monarch of his time, Lewis the XIVth, when there was a formidable commotion in the *Cevennes*, condescended to depute two Marshals of France to enter into a treaty with the male-contents. Peace was accordingly made, and the terms of it were afterwards faithfully fulfilled.

Look, Sir, into the history of the proudest, as well as most renowned people that ever existed, the Romans; observe the conclusion of *their Social War*, and you will see they were not above negotiating a peace with these very insurgents, whom they had before, individually by name, proscribed as rebels. Rome found herself at that day reduced to the same critical predicament which, I apprehend, we now stand in; there was no other possible means of restoring concord, or saving the commonwealth from ruin. But, Sir, above all, I would wish the House to give due weight to a conclusive remark of the excellent author of the *Commentaries on the Laws of England*, where he is descanting on the Revolution of 1688, which placed the sceptre in the hands of King William, and eventually brought in the illustrious House of Hanover to be guardians of the Protestant religion, and assertors of the antient constitutional rights of all the subjects throughout the British monarchy. “No practical system of law (says he) are so perfect, as to point out before-hand those *eccentric remedies*, which national emergency will dictate and will justify.”

Honourable Temple Luttrell, Nov. 7, 1775.

WHEN news was brought to Agelilaus, King of Sparta, during a war in Greece, that a bloody fight had happened near the city of Corinth, but that the Spartans were victorious, and the number of their troops killed was but inconsiderable, compared with the loss of the enemy; instead of exultations of joy, that wise and humane Monarch, with a deep sigh, cried out, “Oh, unhappy Greece! to have slain so many warriors with
thine

thine own hand, who, had they lived, might have proved a match for all the barbarians in the world !”

Honourable Temple Luttrell, Oct. 31, 1776.

BEFORE the Revolution there were but few disqualifications affecting the elected. I know but of two Acts of Parliament, one in the first year of Henry the Vth, confining their residence to the counties, cities, and boroughs, for which they served; the other, the twenty-third of Henry the VIth, respecting Knights of shires. There were, indeed, certain disqualifications, by the *lex et consuetudo Parliamenti*, as that neither aliens nor minors should be elected; that the Clergy should not be chosen, because they sit in Convocation; persons attainted of treason or felony could not sit, because they are unfit to sit any where: the Judges, my Lord Coke says, cannot sit, because of their attendance in the House of Lords. In my poor opinion there may be another, and as good a reason assigned; and that is, that it is highly improper to blend the legislative and judicial capacities together.

Here let me remark, by the way, that at a time when the Judges of England are prevented, by the law and custom of Parliament, (which is the law of the land) from sitting in the House of Commons, and the Judges of Scotland are declared incapable of being elected by the Act of 7 Geo. the IIId, the very great impropriety of the Judges for the principality of Wales sitting in this House.

I beg leave to recommend this matter to the consideration of the Honourable Gentleman who has this day moved to augment the Welch Judges salaries.

The Act, Sir, of the 5th and 6th of William and Mary, which laid a duty on salt, beer, ale, and other liquors, expressly declared, that no person concerned in farming, managing, or collecting the said duties, shall be capable of sitting in Parliament. It also disqualifies the managers of all other aids that shall hereafter be granted. The 11th and 12th of King William excluded

cluded the Commissioners of the Customs. It went farther, and even forbids them from using any influence with voters under certain penalties. The Act of the 4th of Queen Anne went still farther, and excluded various descriptions of men, all of whom are declared incapable of being elected by the Act of the 6th of Queen Anne.

The 1st of Geo. I. Section II. cap. 56. disables any person from sitting in the House of Commons, who shall have any pension from the Crown, for any term or number of years, and subjects such persons as should so fit to the penalty of 20l. per day.

The 17th of Geo. II. regulates the elections of Members to serve for Scotland, and incapacitates the Judges of the Court of Sessions, Court of Justiciary, and Barons of the Court of Exchequer in Scotland, from being elected Members of Parliament.

During the administration of Sir Robert Walpole, various attempts were made to restrain the influence of the Crown over this branch of the legislature; Place and Pension Bills were frequently brought in, and two or three times actually passed the House of Commons, but were as often lost in the other House of Parliament. On the retreat or removal of Sir Robert Walpole, an Act of Parliament was however passed in 1742, 15 Geo. II. which disabled the Commissioners of Revenue in Ireland, the Commissioners of the Navy and Victualling Offices, Clerks in various departments, and many other descriptions of men, who, from their situation, were supposed, natural enough, to be under influence, from sitting in Parliament; and subjecting such as should, notwithstanding, presume to sit and vote, to a penalty of 20l. a day.

In the 33d of George II. an Act passed to oblige Members to deliver in a schedule of their qualifications, and take and subscribe an oath of the same. These, Sir, are all the disqualifications on the persons to be elected to Parliament, excepting that there are three Acts in the reign of Queen Anne, and one

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in the reign of George the II^d, disabling the Registers, or their Deputies, for the three Ridings in Yorkshire, and the county of Middlesex, from sitting in Parliament.

Sir Joseph Mawbey, March 11, 1775.

THAT the office of Secretary of State is of very ancient establishment in this kingdom, I am ready to allow, though they were not always considered of equal importance as now. I have endeavoured to acquire all the knowledge I could of that office; I think, therefore, I am warranted in saying, that there never was more than one Secretary of State till towards the end of Henry the Eighth.

Two Secretaries of State only were appointed at the same time in King Henry's reign. In the time of his successor, Edward the Sixth, there were only two Secretaries of State, till towards the close of his reign; a third Secretary was then appointed in the person of Sir John Cheek. Of this appointment, as I expect to hear much from the opposite side of the House, I will presently speak more fully.

In the reign of Queen Elizabeth there were but two Secretaries of State; there were no more in the reign of King James. In the reign of Charles the First there were but two, they were Secretary Windebank, at one time, and Coke, and afterwards the elder Sir Henry Vane succeeded. At the Restoration, Sir Edward Nicholas and Sir William Morris were the Secretaries. On or about the year 1670, Henry Lord Arlington succeeded Sir Edward Nicholas, and Sir John Trevor Sir William Morris. There continued to be only two Secretaries of State during the remainder of King Charles the Second's reign. There were but two in the reign of King James the Second. There were no more than two in that of King William, nor, I believe, in that of Queen Anne; at least, in that part of it which preceded the year 1705.

Having thus shewn that originally, and till the end of the reign of Henry the Eighth, there was but one Secretary of State,

State, and afterwards but two, (except in the single case of Sir John Cheek's, in Edward the Sixth's time) I now proceed to take more particular notice of that appointment.

I contend, Sir, that the precedent is not such as should have attention paid to it. It was established in a time of faction, and existed but a moment. Gentlemen know that the Duke of Northumberland plotted to bring the Crown into his own family, in consequence of the marriage of his son, the Lord Guildford Dudley, with the Lady Jane Grey, who, after the King's sisters, Mary and Elizabeth, was presumptive heir to the Crown. He prepared himself accordingly; some of his creatures were put into old offices; for others, new offices were created. Sir John Cheek had been the King's Preceptor; he had, it may be reasonably presumed, in consequence, an influence over the Royal Mind. Mr. Secretary Cecil had besides married Sir John Cheek's sister, and Cecil had at first objected to the settlement of the Crown in favour of the Lady Jane, though he afterwards became a witness to it: it was of the utmost importance to Northumberland's views to gain Sir John Cheek a new office; a new appointment was therefore created for him, that of third Secretary of State; he had besides *douceurs* given him. Sir William Petre was the other Secretary; a man, I may safely say, without principle, who served four Crowned Heads in that capacity, as different in intellect and turn of mind as principle; namely, Henry the Eighth, Edward the Sixth, Queen Mary, and Queen Elizabeth. Strype, in his Ecclesiastic Memorials, in 1553, says of Sir John Cheek:

“ In the next month, viz. June, a third Secretary was appointed, (a thing not known before,) viz. Sir John Cheek, whose love and zeal for religion made him safe to the interest of Lady Jane; and a gift was added to him and his heirs, of Clare, in Suffolk, with other lands, to the yearly value of one hundred pounds.”

That the appointment in his favour was merely the result of political arrangement, to forward the Duke of Northumberland's

land's views, I think is beyond a doubt. He was appointed in 1553; King Edward died on the 6th of July following, and on the 15th of the same month the Lady Jane resigned her pretensions to the Crown; so that Sir John Cheek could only have held that office for a month. That he was the Duke of Northumberland's agent, I have no doubt; he fled on Mary's accession; he was brought back, imprisoned in the Tower, and stripped of his substance: to save his life he signed a declaration, professing popery, and died in 1557, contemned, as he deserved to be, by all good men, for wanting principle.—I trust the House will agree with me, that such a precedent, in such a time, for such a purpose, and for a month only, deserves not the least attention.

I am, Sir, at a loss to guess upon what ground the Noble Lord's (Lord George Germaine) right to a seat in this House will be defended. I contend that it is a new office, new in fact, though not in name.

The 27th section of the Act of the 6th of Queen Anne declares, in order to prevent too great a number of Commissioners from being appointed for the execution of any office, that no greater number of Commissioners shall be appointed for the execution of any office, than have been employed in the execution of such respective office before the first day of that Parliament. It is incumbent, therefore, on the Noble Lord, or his friends, to prove, that before that Parliament there existed more than two Secretaries of State, which I contend never was the case, except during a single month of Edward the Sixth's time; a precedent which, from what I have said of it, I trust will not have any weight.

The office of Secretary of State for the Colonies was first established in 1768, in favour of the Earl of Hillsborough; he was succeeded, in 1772, by Lord Dartmouth; in 1775, the Noble Lord (Lord Geo. Germaine) over the way took that office.

Sir Joseph Mawbey, March 11, 1779.

THERE

THERE are many precedents since Queen Anne's time, to shew that there have been six different appointments, of *three*, and once *four* Secretaries of State. In the time of Edward the VIth, there was a third Secretary of State; and in 1708-9, more business arising, she thought it fit to appoint a third Secretary of State. There is an instance when there were *four* Secretaries, one of whom was a Commoner, that was in 1723; these were the Duke of Roxburgh and two others; one of whom going with the King to Hanover, *Sir Robert Walpole* was appointed *fourth* Secretary of State. A new writ issued on the 4th of May, 1723, he was re-elected, and his seat was never questioned; and in 1730, it was not given in as a *new* place, when the account of such was called for.

Mr. De Grey, March 11, 1775.

No Irishman ever dreamt of the power of England to bind Ireland; so far back as the year 1642, the Roman Catholics of Ireland, in their great Assembly of Trim, in the county of Meath, solemnly resolved, that Ireland was an independent kingdom, and its Crown imperial; and in the year before, the Parliament of Ireland had voted a similar Proposition. The claims of the Irish are not novel, they are as old as Henry the II, who gave them the laws and constitution of England, and granted them of course a Parliament. The Great Charter was given them by his grandson, Henry the III, and they had a free and independent legislature till the year 1719, when the Lords of England thought proper to resolve, that a cause which had been tried in appeal by the Lords of Ireland, had been *coram non judice*; and then, and not before, did England think of asserting by law the supremacy of England over Ireland, though the latter had, till that period, even after the Revolution, enjoyed the right of appeal to her own King, in his Parliament of Ireland.

Mr. Courtenay, May 17, 1782.

WHEN

WHEN Augustus Cæsar modestly consented to become the tribune of the people, Rome gave up into the hands of that Prince the only remaining shield she had to protect her liberty. The tribunitian power in this country, as in ancient Rome, was wisely kept distinct and separate from the executive power: in this government it was constitutionally lodged where it ought naturally to be lodged, in the House of Commons; and to that House the people ought first to carry their complaints, even when they were directed against the measures of the House itself: but now the people are taught to pass by the door of the House of Commons, and supplicate the Throne for the protection of their liberties: hence the dissolution of the late Parliament, pretendedly in obedience to the sense of the people; from addresses the sense of the people have been collected, and not from the House of Commons. But I warn the people to beware of this double House of Commons, which Ministers are erecting on the foundation of their delusion; the Commons of England in Parliament assembled; and the Commons of England in corporation and county meetings dispersed; an artful Minister would craftily play off the one after the other; he would make use of a pliant House of Commons to oppress the people; and he would make use of a deluded House of Commons, dispersed through the country, to awe a refractory or independent collected House of Commons. If the proceedings of the late Parliament had been really disagreeable to the people, why had they not petitioned that House against those proceedings? If they had petitioned, and their prayers had been disregarded, or treated with contempt, then addresses to the Throne for a dissolution of Parliament would have been extremely proper: when public œconomy became the general wish of the people, petitions were presented not to the Crown, but to the House of Commons; but means have been contrived of late so to delude the people, as to make them the very instruments of the degradation of that branch of the government, the destruction of which must necessarily be attended with the loss of their liberty.

Mr. Burke, June 15, 1784.

IN 1751, there was in the Exchequer of Ireland, a surplus of 400,000*l*. This, instead of being a matter of joy, was the cause of general consternation throughout the kingdom. It was feared that the Crown was become so rich, that it could pay off the debt that was then upon the nation; and, having no farther occasion for the annual grants, would call no more Parliaments. The alarm was universal. "Good God! the "Crown out of debt!" was the general cry. "What's to "become of us?" said the Parliament. "And what further "employment is there for me?" exclaimed the politician. In short the terror and dismay were indescribable.

Lord North, May 30, 1785.

ATTACK.

A T T A C K.

AS the Honourable Gentleman (Sir Robert Walpole) who spoke last, has made grievous complaints of the treatment he and his friends receive from other Gentlemen, I am a good deal surprized, that he should at the same time fall into that very error, which he so much complains of in others; for to say that Gentlemen make Motions, only for the sake of having an opportunity to declaim against those in the Administration, or for the sake of making a figure in the Votes, is language, in my opinion, as unparliamentary, and treating Gentlemen with as little candour, as what he has blamed others for.

I must say it seems to be a very difficult matter to know how to please these great men the Administration; for I find that when any encomiums are made upon them, when any thing is said in praise of their measures, they immediately take it to be meant by way of irony; and if any Gentleman happens to give them any names which may seem to be a little harsh, those they understand exactly as they are spoke, and complain that Gentlemen do not treat them in a parliamentary way: but, whatever other people may do, I am none of those who have bestowed panegyrics either upon the present or upon any Administration; and I hope I never was or ever shall be guilty of calling names.

Mr. Shippen, Jan. 23, 1734.

UPON such a slight view, Sir, as I have taken of the accounts now upon the table, it is not possible for me to enter into the particular articles: but I cannot help taking notice of one, which to me seems very extraordinary. There is near 250,000 l. charged, not for the building of ships, but for the building of houses; whether such houses were necessary, I shall not now proceed to determine: but if they were, I think it

is too large a sum for any Administration to have expended, without a previous authority from Parliament; and that, I am sure, was never asked for: what the present age may think of such a sum, I do not know, but I am sure our ancestors, even of the very last age, would have been extremely shy of loading the people with at least six-pence in the pound upon all the lands in Great-Britain, for building houses for the Officers belonging to the Admiralty: and I must think it a little extraordinary to see Ministers, of their own heads, undertake to do that, which even Parliaments of old would scarcely have thought of doing. It is true, that Parliaments have of late become very good-natured; they have put great confidence in Ministers, and have generally, I shall not say blindly, approved of all ministerial measures: this may, perhaps, have made Ministers presume a little farther than they would otherwise have done; but I am very sure, that till very lately, no Minister would have dared to have drawn the nation into such an expence, without an authority from Parliament for so doing.

Sir William Wyndham, Feb. 24, 1735.

THAT there are discontents among the people, Sir, and that those discontents are too general, I shall readily agree; but whether they are owing to disaffection, I shall not pretend to determine; I am sure they are not owing to reason: for there is no country in the world where the liberties and properties of the subjects are sacredly preserved, nor are more there any subjects who pay less for the ease and security they enjoy, than the subjects of this kingdom: but there are some men who seem to think they ought to pay nothing, nor be at any trouble, for preserving to themselves the blessings of peace and security. To please such men, or to prevent their being dissatisfied, is impossible; for government must always be expensive, some men must be employed for managing and transacting the affairs of the society; and some must now and then expose themselves to danger for the defence of the society: and it is both reason-
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able and necessary, that those who spend their whole time, or a great part of their time in government affairs, as well as those who venture their lives for the preservation of others, should be rewarded by those, who by their means are enabled to prosecute their own private affairs with safety, and without interruption. There are other men, and those not a few, who are so fond of novelty and change, that they are continually wishing for public convulsions and revolutions: such men are of so odd a temper, that they become dissatisfied with the security they enjoy; and a long uninterrupted course of public happiness, renders them completely miserable; and there are others who never can be pleased, unless they have the entire direction of all public affairs; therefore when they are not employed, and chiefly employed, they are continually spreading virulent libels and seditious pamphlets against those that are; by which means many unwary persons are caught, and are made to believe that the nation is ruined and undone; though every man in the nation, who is tolerably frugal and industrious, finds himself in an easy and thriving condition.

Col. Mordaunt, Feb. 3, 1738.

I HATE, Sir, all expedients, and I disdain all Ministers (looking at Sir Robert Walpole) who use them. Some Ministers, Sir, there are, who live upon expedients, and who cannot do their dirty work without them. Expedients, Sir, in the hands of weak Ministers, are the instruments of defeating the most beneficial, and promoting the most destructive measures.

Mr. Pulteney, May 12, 1738.

THOUGH the manner in which the Honourable Gentleman who spoke last delivered himself may well excuse me from saying any thing in answer to a speech so very unparliamentary, and so very inconsistent with all the rules of common decency; yet I think I ought to shew so much regard to the House as to declare, that I abhor dirty expedients as much the Honourable

Gentleman would be thought to do : as for his common-place railing against Ministers, it gives me very little trouble, so long as I am conscious I do not deserve to have it applied to me. Were I ambitious of shewing my wit, I might have a fair opportunity of doing it, by railing against mock-patriots as much as the Honourable Gentleman has been pleased to do against corrupt Ministers, and both perhaps might be equally instructive to the House. But, railing of all kinds, Sir, has always been looked upon as the last expedient of disappointed ambition, and a poor expedient it is. Were I one who for many years had unsuccessfully endeavoured, by all the arts that malice and falsehood could suggest, to work myself into those posts and dignities that I outwardly affected to despise, I know not how far, Sir, my temper might be soured, as to make use of such an expedient ; but really, Sir, if I did, I should make but a very poor figure in the world.

Sir Robert Walpole, May 12, 1738.

THE measures which the Gentleman who spoke last (Sir William Wyndham) and his friends may pursue, afford me no uneasiness. The minds of the nation and his Majesty, are obliged to them for pulling off the mask. We can be upon our guard, Sir, against open rebellion, but it is hard to guard against secret treason. The faction I speak of, Sir, never sat in this House ; they never joined in any public measure of the government, but with a view to distress it, and to serve a popish interest. The Gentleman who is now the mouth of this faction was looked upon as the head of these traitors, who 25 years ago, conspired the destruction of their country, and of the Royal Family, to set up a Popish Pretender upon the Throne. He was seized by the vigilance of the then government, and pardoned by its clemency : but all the use he has ungratefully made of that clemency, has been to qualify himself according to law, that he and his party may, some time or other, have an opportunity to overthrow all law.

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I am afraid, Sir, that the Honourable Gentleman (Sir William Wyndham) and his friends, will not be so good as their word, to withdraw themselves from Parliament, for I remember that, in the case of a favourite Prelate who was impeached of Treason, the same Gentleman, and his faction, made the same resolution. They then went off like Traitors as they were, Sir, but their retreat had not the detestable effect they expected and wished, and therefore they returned. Ever since, Sir, they have persevered in the same treasonable intention of serving that interest by distressing Government. But I hope their behaviour will unite all the true friends of the present happy Establishment of the Crown in his Majesty's Person and Family, more firmly than ever; and that the Gentlemen who, with good intentions, have been deluded into the like measures, will awake from their delusion, since the Trumpet of Rebellion is now sounded.

Sir Robert Walpole, March 13, 1739.

AFTER what had passed last Sessions, and after the repeated declarations of the Honourable Gentleman who spoke last, (Mr. Pulteney) and his friends, I little thought that we should have this Session been again favoured with their company. I am always pleased, Sir, when I see Gentlemen in the way of their duty, and glad that these Gentlemen have returned to theirs; though, to say the truth, I was in no great concern lest the service either of his Majesty, or the Nation, should suffer by their absence. I believe the Nation is generally sensible, that the many useful and popular Acts which passed towards the end of last Session, were greatly forwarded and facilitated by the secession of those Gentlemen; and if they are returned only to oppose and perplex, I shall not at all be sorry if they secede again.

Sir Robert Walpole, June 14, 1739.

I MUST own, Sir, I can see but one reason for raising, at this present juncture, this additional number of troops; and that is, to strengthen the hands of the Minister against the next Election, by giving him the power of disposing of Commissions to the sons, brothers, nephews, cousins, and friends of such as have interests in Boroughs, into some of which, perhaps, troops may be sent to procure the free election of their Members, in imitation of the late Czarina sending her troops into Poland to secure the free election of a King.

But still there is one thing more fatal than all I have yet named, that must be the consequence of so great a body of troops being kept on foot in England, and will be the finishing stroke to all our Liberties. For as the towns in England will not be able much longer to contain quarters for them, most of those who keep public houses, being nearly ruined by foldiers billeted on them; so on pretence of the necessity of it, barracks will be built for quartering them, which will be as so many fortresses, with strong garrisons in them, erected in all parts of England, which can tend to nothing but by degrees to subdue and enslave the kingdom.

But if ever this scheme should be attempted, it will be incumbent on every Englishman to endeavour to prevent it by all methods; and as it would be the last stand that could ever be made for our Liberties, rather than suffer it to be put in execution, it would be our duty to draw our swords, and never put them up till our Liberties are secured, and the authors of our intended slavery brought to condign punishment.

Lord Gage, Nov. 29, 1739.

NOTWITHSTANDING the bad success of my last Motion, for inquiring into the late conduct of our public affairs, it shall not discourage me from offering another of the same nature; because, I think, our making some sort of inquiry, during this Session of Parliament, absolutely necessary for quieting the minds of the People, and for restoring, in some degree, the character

character and credit of our Government. What sort of company some Gentlemen may keep, I do not know ; but to me, that keep all sorts of company, the disappointment upon the former Motion's being rejected, appeared evident in the face of every man, who had not reason, upon his own account, or the account of some of his friends, to dread the consequences of that inquiry ; and whatever we may think within doors, it will be thought without, nay, it is now generally said, that if some people were not conscious of their own guilt, they would not so vigorously oppose an inquiry : for an innocent man, when he finds himself accused or suspected, will always desire to be brought to a fair and legal trial, that he may have an opportunity to vindicate his character against those whispers that are spread about against him. This, Sir, is the language now held without doors ; and the certain consequence will be, that if we let this Session pass over without any inquiry, it will be said, that a Majority of us have been partakers in the guilt, and partners in the plunder of our Country.

From hence, Sir, I must hope, that every innocent man in this House, (and now that one man is gone from amongst us, I hope, all of us are so) will be for the Question I am now to propose, because I have taken care to prevent its being liable to the two chief objections that seemed to prevail against my last Motion. These were, its being too extensive as to time, and too extensive as to matter. An inquiry for twenty years back was thought to be without precedent, and that it would be such a precedent as might be of dangerous consequence in future times. This was one of the chief objections against it, and an objection which, I believe, had weight with some whose concurrence I hope to be favoured with in this Motion. And the other objection was, its comprehending all our foreign as well as domestic affairs, which must of course have brought all the papers relating to our foreign negotiations before our Committee. To this it was objected, that it would endanger the discovery of some of the most important secrets of our Government

ment to our enemies, which might be of the most fatal consequence now that we are engaged in one war, and in great likelihood of being soon obliged to engage in another. This likewise seemed to have weight, and, I believe, prevailed with some Gentlemen to be against my former Motion; for which reason I shall now only move, That a Committee be appointed to inquire into the conduct of *Robert Earl of Orford*, during the last ten years of his being First Commissioner of the Treasury, and Chancellor and Under Treasurer of his Majesty's Exchequer.

Sir, I hope the time of inquiry proposed by this Motion will not be thought too extensive; for considering the chief crime of a domestic nature he has been accused of, our inquiry cannot, I think, be confined within narrower bounds. The crime I mean, is that of applying not only all the favours of the Crown, but even the Public Money, towards gaining a corrupt influence at Elections and in Parliament. This he is generally accused of by the voice of the People without doors, and, I believe, there is not a Gentleman in this House that has been chosen in opposition to what was called the Court Interest, who was not sensible of some such practices being carried on against him, before and at the time of his Election. Every Gentleman must be sensible, that it is very difficult to fix such practices upon a Minister, because they are not only carried on in an hidden manner, but by Tools and Under-Agents, who do not appear at the Election as Agents for the Minister, but as Agents for the Court Candidate; and generally spend their money very freely; though it is often known, that neither they nor their Candidate had ever any money of their own to spare: nay, those Agents are often known to be Treasury-Agents, though in the common course of justice it is impossible to prove that they are: it will even be difficult for a Committee of this House, with all the powers we can give them, to trace this practice up to its original source: but, considering the general suspicion without doors, and the many strong reasons there are for

for believing that suspicion to be well grounded, we ought certainly to aim at it; and if we do, we cannot begin later than the time when canvassing may be supposed to have begun for the chusing of the last Parliament, which, I reckon, was about ten years ago; for as that Parliament was chosen in the summer 1734, we must suppose that the Candidates, especially where there was like to be an opposition, began to take measures for securing their interest in the summer 1732, which will just come within the term of ten years, computing back from this time.

For this reason, I hope, this will appear to be the shortest time I could move for: and as it is much shorter than the time proposed by my last Motion, I hope I shall have the concurrence of many Gentlemen who then appeared against me; especially as I have likewise in this taken care to obviate the other objection, of its being too extensive as to the matters proposed to be inquired into; for as this Noble Lord had by none of his Offices any thing to do with foreign affairs, this Motion cannot be said to relate to, or comprehend any affairs of that nature, unless it be supposed, that this Minister directed every other branch of public business, as well as that of the Treasury; which, I am sure, none of his friends will pretend to say, because this would be as great a crime as any he is accused of. This Motion cannot therefore be supposed to relate to any Foreign Affairs, and, consequently, an inquiry into this Nobleman's conduct, cannot be supposed to endanger the discovery of any of the secrets of our Government. Nay, if he, whilst he was in office, confined himself to the duty of his office, our inquiry, in pursuance of this Motion, can comprehend but one branch even of our Domestic Affairs, and that branch too, which, of all others, has the least to do with our Foreign Affairs. An inquiry into the conduct of a Secretary of State, a Secretary at War, a Commissioner of the Admiralty, or even the Lord High Chancellor, might be said to have some relation to Foreign Affairs; but I cannot suggest to myself

self what a Commissioner of the Treasury can have to do with Foreign Affairs, or how an inquiry into his conduct can have the least relation to any Foreign Affairs whatever: consequently, I hope, this Motion will appear to be quite free from this objection, which seemed to be urged with so much weight against my former: and as much has in this Session been said, upon former occasions, about the necessity of an immediate inquiry, I shall add no more, but move to resolve, That a Committee be appointed, as I have before-mentioned.

Lord Limerick, March 23, 1741.

THE Laws and Liberties we now enjoy, were procured for us by such of our ancestors, as were utter strangers to every system but what conduced to honour and virtue. A Government supported upon any other basis ought not to subsist a moment longer, nor is such a one worth contending for; no, not even by those whose depraved minds are not to be gratified by the corruptest Government, because those who act or fight for hire only, are always looking out for the best market. So that I hope we shall not let this Session pass without a good Militia Bill; for a standing army, even in time of war, was never yet an object that suited the genius of this Nation, supposing it kept up with the strictest œconomy, because it is not our natural defence; and I can aver, there hath nothing happened within these twelve months and upwards to render it more acceptable: for be it ever so formidable, it cannot be every where, much less can it prevent invasions or insurrections, when, to our late memorable shame, we were twice baffled by a *banditti* rabble; and, in all probability, we had been served so a third time, but for the presence of his Royal Highness the Duke: whereas a well-armed and well-disciplined Militia, dispersed over the face of this Kingdom, must suppress all risings in the first instance, besides the great benefits we should have of them in every maritime county, to put a stop to that abominable trade of smuggling, without having recourse to a
much

much more abominable practice, of putting your laws in execution by a military force: a precedent, give me leave to tell you, Sir, that must be fatal to the Liberties of this Kingdom, if not timely prevented.

Sir, the conduct of our late and present Patriots, as they presume to call themselves, proves the necessity there is for some alteration in your Constitution; because, how inhumane is it for that eloquence, which was given by Providence for its defence and preservation, to be employed in its ruin and destruction! Punishments there are for the thief, the murderer, and the bare-faced traitor; but alas! to the grief of all well-disposed minds, there is none for the *sordid orator*: I say, Sir, there is none for the *sordid orator*, who shall one day display his eloquence in the cause of his country, to shew his parts and gain attention; and the next shall convince his injured countrymen, that he is a prostitute to venality, and the purchased slave of a corrupt Ministry. What pity it is that such wretches cannot be brought to condign punishment, without doing violence to the laws of their country, who one day fling out sarcasms against the Measures of an Administration, as ruinous and destructive, for no other cause but to be admitted principals in it: and the next day pursue the very same measures which they had so emphatically exploded, without the least jot or tittle of alteration in the whole ministerial System. Surely, Sir, if there is one of that abject style in being, how can he stand clear of that *occultum quatiante animo tortere flagellum*?—Or why should he not expect every moment to be hurled down into that execrable, that most detestable pit, where the worm never dies, and the fire is never quenched!

Sir, I should have no objection to addressing his Majesty, could I perceive the least tendency to restore the Constitution to its ancient purity. The Royal Family upon the Throne, under whom we enjoy so many blessings, found us in possession of the Triennial Act; and although it might be proper to repeal it upon an extraordinary occasion, yet to continue
Parliaments

Parliaments to their present length, hath, I fear, been productive of many political misfortunes, subsequent to that alteration. Yet, if ever the good people of South-Britain deserved a triennial holiday, it is for that steady loyalty they have so lately shewn, in opposition to those of the Northern Parts of this Kingdom; who have also distinguished themselves, but not at all to their honour or credit. The Repealing of the Septennial Act would bring us a little nearer to that happy situation of Independency, which Annual Parliaments would undoubtedly compleat.

Thus, such as now think it ill policy to be unattached, or unfashionable to be disengaged, may then come to have nobler views, than to prostitute their legislative trust, conferred upon them by their Constituents; who, in all probability, could be no otherwise influenced in their choice, (for so short a period) but merely from a personal regard. As I am one of those that shall be ever proud of being so unfashionably *degagée*, as to detest nothing so much as an attachment to any side, or set of men whatsoever; so, according to that laudable practice of our ancestors, I shall wait to see some of the many grievances we labour under first redressed, before I can give my assent to the Address moved for.

Major Selwyn, Nov. 18, 1746.

ABOUT the latter end of May, or the beginning of June, the Ministry were acquainted with the fate of Falkland Island. At that time they learned, that the Governor of *Buenos Ayres* had sent a frigate or two, to warn our troops to quit the Island; that our Commanding Officer had threatened to fire upon them if they would not depart; that the Spaniards, in consequence, declared their resolution of employing force; and that there was no doubt they would put their threat in execution. Where their pride is concerned, the Spaniards are tenacious of their words: and it could not be supposed, that the Governor of *Buenos Ayres* would, in this case, belie

the character of his nation. But who is this Governor, this mighty Potentate, against whom the King of Great-Britain is going to draw his sword? I will tell the House. When at Gibraltar, in an inferior station I confess, I happened in an excursion to meet this Governor, this *Don Francisco de Buccarelli*, whom our Ministers consider as great and formidable. For a Spaniard, he was not a bad companion; but I do not believe he had, at that time, the most distant hope of ever entering into a competition with the King of Great-Britain. But our Ministers were made for rendering absurdity fashionable. As they have, for these two years, degraded their Royal Master by a quarrel with a wretched Libeller, so now they commit his dignity in a contest with a little *Spanish* Officer. The terrible foes that rouse his vengeance, are *John Wilkes*, and my old friend *Buccarelli*. How much more honourable would it have been, to have at once considered the King of Spain as the aggressor, as the delinquent? It is evident, from the coolness and deliberation with which *Buccarelli* acted, that he acted under the authority, and by the express command of the King of Spain. If he had not, he would have, ere now, forfeited his head. Why then did not our Ministers, upon the first intelligence, deem this act of hostility the most explicit and effectual Declaration of War? Why did they not immediately arm the nation, and prepare for striking as decisive a blow, as that which secured us the superiority of the late war? This step would have brought into our ports their ships and sailors, and effectually ruined their Marine. Of this truth no person of common sense can entertain the least doubt. Instead of adopting this vigorous measure, they let the affair sleep for three or four months, as if time had no wings. And, when at last waked out of their lethargy, what have they done? What harbours have they improved? What forts have they repaired? What cities have they fortified? Have they strengthened the lines at Quebec? Have they secured that spot, which, if taken by the enemy, will ruin our fishery, if it is not already ruined

ruined by their indolence, timidity, or ignorance? Have you taken any Measures for defending those Sugar Islands, which, from their situation, are exposed to the insults of the enemy? What precautions have you taken for the safety of *Minorca*? I know, that when the troops from *Ireland* arrive, the garrison will consist of nine battalions. But whosoever told you this number would be sufficient, knows nothing of the service. I am confident, that every Officer of judgment and experience, will coincide with me in opinion. You see then where you are vulnerable. More instances might be pointed out; but that were impiety! I should hold myself inexcusable for what I have already said, were I not sensible that our enemies know them as well as we do. Such then is the situation of this country, to which our Minister, in the course of last Session, promised a ten years peace. I stood up in my place, and ventured to call his prophecy in question; I gave my reasons, but they were called the suggestions of faction. The Minister, trusting to his own sagacity and foresight, paid no regard to the forebodings of the gallant Admiral, who now sits at the head of the Marine Department. The illustrious seaman, than whom I know not a better Officer, nor a more excellent citizen, declared, that whoever occupied next year the place then held by him, would be forced to call for an augmentation of six thousand sailors. These words shew that I was not singular in my opinion, and that other respectable persons felt the approach of war. I know not what the opinion of the Minister may be, but I still continue of the same. I smell war; a calamity which might have been easily prevented, had our negociators acted with spirit and resolution in the affair of *Corfica*. I happened then to be at Paris; and can with the greatest truth affirm, that the French would have deemed your interposition the part of a friend. Tired and exhausted with such an effusion of blood and treasure, they would have thanked you for any honourable pretence to withdraw from that scene of so many disasters. But you acted then like poltroons, and poltroons

troons always bring upon themselves a succession of insults. And now, that like bullies, you hector and bluster, and run swaggering about, what will you do? Where is there a man among you who can make the proper arrangements for war? Whom will you appoint Commander in Chief? He, alas! who could fill that office with dignity and ability, is no more; and no friend of Britain will refuse his memory a tear. For when shall we see his like again? Regardless of money, and studious only of true glory, he sought the applause and affection of his country, and he acquired them. His honour (the late Marquis of Granby) and integrity were unquestioned: his courage, which was of the most ardent and decisive kind, and covered him with laurel, so much the more honourable, that he did not employ the weight and authority thence derived to his own private emolument, but for the public good. Such virtue, rare at any time, was to be doubly prized in such an age as this. Such talents might have given life and vigour to our military counsels. But, snatched away when we most needed his heart and his hand, he is, alas! no more.

It is, however, some consolation under this distress, that we have such an able Secretary at War. His superior talents will make us amends for the loss of so great a character. That clearness for which his dispatches are so remarkable, is a sufficient earnest for his future achievements. In the last war, some of his letters to the Governor of *Gibraltar* were, if I remember right, unintelligible, some were contradictory, and all confused and perplexed. Hence the loss of *Minorca*. If his head produced such effects, when he acted only an under part, what may we expect from it, where he is the supreme director? It is not that the Noble Lord cannot write with sufficient perspicuity, where the question is to destroy his Majesty's subjects. There I confess the power of his eloquence. There he is quite intelligible. There he can inspire the soldiers with alacrity. I wish the Ministry joy of such a superintendant of the military

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department ; but I am sorry I cannot pay my country the same compliment.

Colonel Barré, Nov. 13, 1770.

THE Noble Lord at the head of the Treasury (Lord North) is the greatest of all Contractors ;—he is a Contractor for men ; —a Contractor for your flock, Mr. Speaker, (addressing himself to the Chair) ; a Contractor for the Representatives of the people. The Noble Lord proposed to give a place of a thousand a year, provided a Noble Duke would prevail on the most insignificant Member in that House to vacate his seat in Parliament.

The Noble Duke behaved like a man upon the occasion ; like a friend, like a brother : he rejected the villainous proposition that Noble Lord had the assurance to make.

I am not acquainted with the Noble Lord. I have never spoken to him ; I have never had the honour of being introduced to him ; but I sincerely wish him to save his country and his own life. I exhort him to call off his butchers and ravagers from the Colonies ; to retire with the rest of his Majesty's evil advisers from the public government, and make way for honest and wiser Counsellors ; to turn from his wickedness and live ; it is not yet too late to repent.

Lord George Gordon, April 13, 1778.

THERE is but one answer I have to give, as applicable to Administration in a body. Opposition are well warranted to reply to them in the words of a celebrated author, (Swift's Gulliver) a little altered and enlarged ; where, at the conclusion of his well-known Travels, he says, he could bear them well enough in some respects ; he could make allowances for their incapacity, ignorance, folly, corruption, love of place, and emolument ; he could pity them for their blunders, their wants, weaknesses, and gross stupidity ; he felt for their miserable situation, knowing not whether to rush headlong on certain ruin,

or

or retreat with safety : but despicable, unprincipled, and detested as they are, I had nevertheless learned to treat their persons with respect : yet, when such men grow abusive and insolent, urge their claims of merit for what they deserve an axe ; when I behold such men, in the very midst of these dire disasters and national misfortunes, endeavouring to contend that those misfortunes do not exist, or if they do, that they ought justly and solely to be imputed to Opposition ; to see a lump of deformity and disease, of folly and wickedness, of ignorance and temerity, smitten with pride, immediately breaks all measures of patience ; it being hardly conceivable, that so much pride, vice, and folly, can exist in the same animal.

Mr. Fox, May 13, 1775.

I do not rise, my Lords, with any intention to oppose the Motion for the Address to his Majesty. The Speech from the Throne, must, in my mind, give very general satisfaction ; and I shall never descend to the meanness of a factious Opposition. If I were called upon to deliver my sentiments on the Speech, I should rather find fault with it for its omissions than for what it contains. It speaks a language of zeal and earnestness, and, as far as it goes, is congenial with my feelings and ideas. But, my Lords, having said this, I may be permitted to state my reasons for with-holding confidence from the present Administration. I have no wish to inflame—I am not instigated by envy ; I do not speak hastily, but on the most mature deliberation—I must declare, that I have no confidence in the present Ministers.

My Lords, when I look back but a very few months to the events in our history, I do not hesitate to pronounce it as my opinion, that the present Ministers have in one great measure attacked, if they have not destroyed, the constitution of the country. This is a bold assertion ; but I do not throw it out lightly and at hazard ; it is the result of inquiry and discussion. I say, my Lords, that the constitution of the country must be destroyed, when a set of men can seize on the reins of govern-

ment, and take the closet of the King by assault. I am not weak enough to hazard this charge, eight months after the event, without having seriously weighed it in my mind ; and I should have delivered it at an earlier period, but that I was absent in another place (Ireland). My situation at that time I accepted in duty to my Sovereign and country—I was introduced into it by no party—I was neither the adherent nor the dupe of any faction. I received it in the most honourable manner from the Crown ; and I maintained myself in the situation by the purest and most upright means, by acting under the principles of the constitution, and studying the happiness and welfare of the country. When I saw the bold and unconstitutional attack that was made on the dignity of the Crown, and on the system of the country, I thought it high time to lay at his Majesty's feet the commission (Lord Lieutenant of Ireland) which I had received. There was a time, my Lords, when this House was voted to be useless. On this occasion the bold faction did not proceed to this indecent length : but where, my Lords, was the virtue, where the energy, where the influence and use of this House, when they could see and suffer such an infringement to be made on the constitution ? This House, in that moment, was evidently a cypher, and in so far I aver the equilibrium of the legislature was overturned. I speak from no envy nor disappointment. The manner in which I accepted and resigned my office, will acquit me from the imputation of interested motives ; and I do not speak from any factious desire of setting up an indiscriminate opposition to his Majesty's government.

I have reasons, from the conduct of Ministers since they came into office, for distrusting them. The treaty with the Americans is concluded ; both of that and of the definitive treaties with France and Spain, they are certainly the legitimate children of the preliminary articles ; but having adopted the issue which they so violently condemned, it surely became them to have nurtured the offspring with the greatest care and tenderness,

ness, to have made them at least as vigorous and promising as possible; instead of which, have they taken the measures which prudence and policy pointed out? What is become of the commercial treaty with America, from which so much good fortune was promised: has it not terminated in air? The Gentleman who was employed to negotiate that treaty is returned from Paris; the whole is broken off, and broken off for reasons, which, if his information was right, were censurable. These reasons were not communicated to the public, but they were perfectly well known to individuals. I am not willing to take up rumours, and argue from the hearsay evidence of the day; but reports are circulated with great openness, that this treaty has not only been broken off, but is not likely to be renewed, for reasons by no means favourable to the King's Ministers.

Preliminary articles are signed with Holland; but give me leave to say, my Lords, that they also are but the legitimate offspring of the measures of the former Ministry; the advantages procured in that treaty were secured, and it will be required—it must be known why these preliminary articles have not yet been wrought up into a definitive treaty. Why have we not yet begun even to reap the advantages of this peace? Why have not our Ministers been more vigorous and decisive in giving the finishing hand to a treaty, which they boast to be so profitable?

The critical and very serious affairs of the East-Indies, properly make a paragraph in the Speech from the Throne: it certainly was time that the nation should begin to reap the advantages of the elaborate inquiries which had taken place. I must confess, I have not undergone the fatigue of reading those voluminous reports and papers which are on the table of the House of Commons; but the subject must be instantly discussed, and I much doubt, whether, by being delayed so long, we shall not want other information, and more recent materials than any of which we are now possessed.

The state of the funds, my Lords, call for the most serious consideration: at this instant, they are more depressed than almost at any period during the late distress and exertions of the nation, nay, even in the moment of threatened invasion: and, indeed, it was likely to be so, when, along with the other causes, there was so immense a sum as three or four and twenty millions of unfounded debt, part of which bore an interest of eight per cent. Was it not singular, that his Majesty's Ministers should not have thought fit to recommend from the Throne, the immediate and earnest consideration of the funds, and to take notice of their late extraordinary fall—a fall which could not be the effect of chance, but of a fixed and alarming cause? It would not have been improper to have stated what they mean to do in this business, that the minds of the stockholders might be quieted.

I now come, my Lords, to mention a matter of the most delicate kind; and, when I presume to touch it all, I do it with pain to myself and anxiety. But your Lordships may conceive that I feel myself particularly interested in whatever belongs to Ireland. Surely Ministers, on this delicate ground, should have given us some general consolatory expression, merely to quiet the suspicions that must be excited by their total silence—if they had done no more than just echoed the Addresses of the House of Lords and Commons, and framed any general words which might have shewn their disposition to harmony and union.

I said, my Lords, that I did not mean to give any opposition to the Motion for the Address, nor to suggest any Amendment. I have delivered to you my reason for distrusting the King's Ministers—I shall certainly watch their conduct, and in doing so, without being instigated by factious motives, I shall, in my place, state whatever appears to me to be censurable or injurious.

Earl Temple, Nov. 12, 1783.

I HAVE

I HAVE watched the debate with great attention, and have endeavoured to find out if any thing fell in the course of it, that would afford the least hopes of an union of parties, but in vain. Nothing of that kind has been hinted at; and I am sorry to have observed, that those who have taken part in the debate, and are known to be the most intimate with the Right Hon. Gentleman, (Mr. Fox) and the nearest about him, have all, more or less, indulged themselves in personal asperities: which pretty plainly shews, that the Right Hon. Gentleman (Mr. Pitt) has not been sincerely inclined to union all along. The sort of attack that has this day been made on my Right Hon. Friend is what he by no means deserves; and I am the more sorry, because, undoubtedly, such is the state of the country, that all the abilities of this House are wanted to restore it to its proper state of vigour and prosperity. The great and extraordinary talents of the two Right Hon. Gentlemen are universally acknowledged; but as far as regards that circumstance, I am not sorry for the contests that have occurred, since this House has assembled after the recess of the last summer, as they have given occasion for a farther display of the abilities of each of the Right Hon. Gentlemen, that has called forth greater admiration and greater wonder. I cannot but express my astonishment to hear Gentlemen complaining that there is no charge made against the Right Hon. Gentleman, (Mr. Pitt) nor any fault imputed to him. In the present case it would have been a little extraordinary if there had been any charge or imputation, because there is not the smallest occasion for either. The Question has nothing personal in it; it throws no disgrace on the Right Hon. Gentleman opposite to him, nor on his colleagues. When Sir Robert Walpole had a Motion for his removal made against him, there was not any charge thought necessary; it was held to be enough that he had lost the confidence of this House; and when, upon the division, it appeared that Sir Robert had but a majority of one in his favour, he thought that a sufficient hint, and he no longer appeared as a Minister. But no charge had been called

for—[A cry from the Treasury Bench of, *yes there was!*]*—*But I must deny that there was any. After Sir Robert had been made a Peer, I am perfectly aware that a Secret Committee was instituted for the purpose of investigating all the transactions of the past ten years of his life, and every body knows in what manner the Secret Committee was put an end to. In the present case it has been asked, “ what, *no fault* imputed?” So far from any faults being capable of being imputed to the Right Hon. Gentleman, I protest I do not know any person less culpable. The fact is, the House has thought proper to deny its confidence to the Right Hon. Gentleman, not with any view to proscription in future, but merely on account of the grounds upon which he came into office; and no Minister can think of standing after this House has withdrawn its confidence. It never has been done, nor indeed ever attempted. Let the Right Hon. Gentleman reflect a little how extraordinary it is, therefore, for him to persist in keeping his place. Not that I mean to blame him for it. I like his spirit. He has shewn it, and proved, what I always thought he would prove, fit to be a Minister. But let the Right Hon. Gentleman look to the manner in which a period has been put to former Administrations. The Earl of Shelburne lost his situation by the peace he made; a peace which I always considered as a good thing for the country, but of which I now entertain ten times a better opinion than before; because if the war had continued, and the divisions and contests we had been lately engaged in taken place, the country must have been utterly ruined. The Earl of Shelburne, upon a majority of sixteen only against him in this House, though with a considerable majority in the other House, thought fit to retire. My Noble Friend in the blue ribbon also, had not had a majority against him two years ago, but he nevertheless thought it right to retire, when he saw his majority rapidly decreasing. My Noble Friend has done wisely in so retiring. I thought and said so at the time, having, as I recollect, stood up pretty nearly in the same place in which I now stand, and advised my
Noble

Noble Friend to take the hint and retire. Ministers may imagine whatever they please, but it is impossible for them to remain after this House has denied them their confidence. I am well known to be a friend to the prerogative of the Crown, but that prerogative has been lately exercised in so lavish a way, that though I would not point it out as a *fault* imputable to the Right Hon. Gentleman, (Mr. Pitt) yet certainly it has been used in such a manner, as to excite and deserve the notice of this House. The Crown has an undoubted right to distribute honours, but it never has been held to be a right or a constitutional exercise of the prerogative to lavish honours and titles in such a manner as has of late been the case. This House has seen four peerages within the last month, and I understand there is a promise of thirteen or fourteen more. It is not a little extraordinary that three out of four are bestowed on Gentlemen from Cornwall, a county that was ever remarkable for more of what is called rotten boroughs than any other county in the kingdom. I do not mean to abuse the Gentlemen who have received these honours, but it cannot escape the notice of the House, that it is extraordinary they should happen to be created just now, and three of them out of such a county. The Duke of Northumberland has but lately come into that county, and, tottering as he is under the load of ribbons and honours, and other favours of the Crown, he has been decked with one more honour. How the Noble Duke came by his former honours, you all know; perhaps it might be guessed at, why he has an additional honour granted him at this time. When I say this, I declare I mean nothing derogatory to the Noble Duke; I have a very high respect for him; but I thought it right to observe a little upon this matter, since my Right-Hon. Friend has been ridiculed, because he could not, when Minister, make a single Peer. The fact certainly was so. My Right Hon. Friend has also lately been sneered at, and it has been said, that his majorities did not increase. I will venture to say, that the House, under such temptations, has evinced unexampled integrity,

grity, and daring disinterestedness. Had my Right Hon. Friend had it in his power to make one-half, and promise seven out of the fourteen Peers he had mentioned, I would have undertaken to have answered for his majorities having increased, rather than decreased.—With regard to the reason of making these Peers just now, I conceive it not to have been so much, because the persons so to be honoured were wanted to do the business in the House of Lords, but because there were others wanted to do business in the House of Commons. The advising his Majesty to dismiss his Ministers about Christmas was a rash and foolish thing; but having done so, the present Ministers should complete the business. They should have instantly dissolved the present Parliament. That would have been acting rightly and wisely; not that I mean to speak inconsistently with my former opinion against a dissolution. All I mean now is, that a measure which I by no means approve, could only have been rendered of any effect by being immediately followed up by another measure, which I likewise, abstractedly considered, deemed equally rash and improper. I voted for Mr. Fox's India Bill, because I thought upon the whole the Bill a good one. There were parts of it, undoubtedly, which wanted, and which I was pretty certain would now receive the necessary improvement. Mr. Pitt's Bill I will call by no nick-name; I will apply no watch-word of a party to it; I will barely say it does not appear to me to have been any thing like effectual, or equal to the real necessity of the case. With regard to the patronage the Bill gave, I had, at any time, rather trust a large influence, broad and ostensible, in the hands of a Minister, properly responsible, than the smallest portion of an influence, secret in its nature, in any hands whatever. Before I sit down, however warmly I may have delivered myself, I hope I have not spoken offensively; I am sure I had no intention to do so.

Mr. Rigby, Feb. 8, 1784.

AMERICAN

AMERICAN AFFAIRS.

THERE are two things which Ministry have laboured to deceive the People in, and have persuaded them to; first, that it was an affair of Boston only, and that the very appearance of one single regiment there, would quiet every thing.

I have foretold the falsehood of both; I was conversant with that country more, more years, perhaps, than any man; I knew the cause of Boston would be made the cause of America; I knew the mode of the Military would not be effectual.

The manner of proceeding against Boston, was a proscription of a People unheard;—unheard in any Court, either in the common Courts of Justice, or the higher, of Parliament, in both of which, evidence of facts are stated in proof of criminality; but the Americans were denied to be heard. The People of America condemned, and not heard, have a right to resist.

By whose advice vindictive counsels were pursued—by whose advice false representations were made—by whose advice malice and ill-will were made principles of governing a free People;—all these are questions that will be asked. I mean no personal charge on any man farther than his misdoings call for.

There ought to be some instant proceeding towards a settlement before meeting of the Delegates. My object is to put the foot on the threshold of Peace, and to shew an intention of reconciling; I will, unless I am fixed to a sick bed—I will attend this business throughout, till I see America obtain what I think satisfaction for her injuries—still attentive that she shall own the supremacy of this country.

It would be my advice to his Majesty to end this quarrel the soonest possible; his repose is our duty. Who by mis-advice had planted a thorn in his side, by a contest with a People determined on their purpose?—

I wish

I wish to offer myself, mean as I am—I have a Plan, a Plan of a Settlement; solid, honourable, and lasting.

America means only to have safety in Property, and personal Liberty. These, and these only were her object. Independency was falsely charged on her.

I disclaim all metaphysical distinctions.

The Declaratory Act leaves you a right to take their money when you please.

I mean to meddle with no man's opinion; and leaving all men to follow the Plan of their own opinions of former professions, my Plan is to establish for the American an unequivocal, express right of not having his Property taken from him but by his own Consent, in his own Assembly.

Eight weeks delay admits no farther hesitation, no, not of a moment; the thing may be over; a drop of blood renders it *immedicabile vulnus*.

Whether it can ever now be a true Reconciliation, must be owing to the full compensation that America shall receive. Repeal the mutual ill-will that subsists, for it is not the repeal of a little Act of Parliament that will work Peace. Will the repeal of a bit of parchment avail? Will, think you, three millions of People in Arms be satisfied by such a repeal? It must be a repeal on the principle of Justice? There must be no procrastination; you are to a moment—now—instantaneously. Every hour, that a beginning is not made towards softening, towards healing! the very news of which might work wonders—endangers the fixed Liberty of America, and the honour of the Mother Country.

The success and permanent effect of the best measures may arise from mutual good-will.

My Motion is part of a Plan; and I begin with a proof of good-will. My Motion is, “to address the King to remove the Forces from the town of Boston.”

The Congress, they are more wise, and more prudent than the meeting of ancient Greece. Your Lordships have read

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Thucydides. He mentions nothing of ancient story more honourable, more respectable, than this despised meeting.

The Congress is treated harshly—I wish we would imitate their temper; firm, indeed, if you please—but Congress is conducted with firmness and moderation. I wish our House of Commons as freely and uncorruptly chosen.

The proceedings from hence arise from ignorance of the circumstances of America.—The idea of *coercion* by Troops, where they were not the natural resource, was wanton and idle.

Anger was your motive in all you did. “What! shall America presume to be free? Don’t hear them—chastise them!” This was your language *castigat auditque*—the severest Judge, though he chastises, also hears the party.

All the mischief has arisen from your anger; for your not adapting your means to your ends; troops and violence were ill means to answer the ends of Peace.

I understand Government is not altogether satisfied with the Commander of your troops; he has not been quick enough to shed blood; his moderation is ridiculed: but I know that Gentleman, an Officer of long service, has acted prudently; it was want of wisdom to place an army there—I have heard of armies of observation, but this is an army of irritation.

In the civil war of Paris, where those great men, the Prince of Condé and Marshal Turenne commanded the two parties—Marshal Turenne was said often to have been near the Prince.—The Queen was angry; she did not see why, when he was so near the Prince, he should not take him; she was offended, and with some anger asked, “*Quand vous étiez si pris, pourquoi n’avez-vous pas pris le Prince?*” That great Officer who knew his business, answered coolly, “*J’avois peur, Madame, qu’il ne m’eût pris.*”

The Ministry tell you, that the Americans will not abide by the Congress;—they are tired of the Association;—true, many of the Merchants may be—but it does not now depend on the Merchants,

Merchants, nor do the accounts come even from the principal Merchants, but from the runners of Ministry. But were the dissatisfaction among the Merchants ever so great, the account is no way conformable to the nature of America.

The nation of America, who have the virtues of the People they sprung from, will not be slaves. Their language is, if Trade and Slavery are companions, we quit the Trade; let Trade and Slavery go where they will, they are not for us.

Your anger represents them as refractory and ungrateful, in not submitting to the parent they sprung from; but they are in truth grown an accession of strength to this country; they know their importance; they wish to continue their utility to you; but though they may be sick of the Association, those sons of the earth will never be dissuaded from their Association.

After the repeal of the Stamp Act, two years after, I was in the country an hundred miles off; a Gentleman who knew the country, told me, that if regiments had landed at that time, and ships had been sent to destroy the towns, they had come to a resolution to retire back into the country.—It is a fact—a Noble Lord smiles; if I were to mention the Gentleman's name, it would not increase his smile.

I wish the young Gentlemen of our time, would imitate those Americans that are misrepresented to them; I wish they would imitate their frugality; I wish they would imitate that Liberty which the Americans love better than life; imitate that courage which a love of Liberty produces.

One word more. I will send my Plan, if the state of a miserable constitution stretches me on a sick-bed. It is to put an end to the quarrel. “What before you know whether they will come to terms?” Yes, let my expectations be what they will, I should recall the troops; it partakes of a nullity to accept submission under the influence of arms.

I foretel, these Bills must be repealed.—I submit to be called an idiot if they are not; three millions of men ready to be armed, and talk of forcing them?

There may be dangerous men, and dangerous men and dangerous councils, who would instil bad doctrines, advise the enslaving of America; they might not endanger the Crown, perhaps, but they would render it not worth the wearing.

The cause of America is allied to every true Whig. They will not bear the enslaving of America. Some Whigs may love their fortunes better than their principles; but the body of Whigs will join; they will not enslave America. The whole Irish nation, all the true English Whigs, the whole nation of America, these combined make many millions of Whigs, averse to the system. France has her full attention upon you; war is at your door; carrying a question here, will not save your country in such extremities.

This being the state of things, my advice is, to proceed to allay heats; I would at the instant begin, and do something towards allaying and softening resentment.

My Motion, you see, respects the army, and their dangerous situation. Not to undervalue General Gage, who has served with credit,—he acts upon his instructions; if he has not been alert enough to shed blood;

Non dimicare quam vincere maluit.

And he judged well. The Americans too have acted with a prudence and moderation, that had been worthy of our example, were we wise;—to their moderation it is owing, that our troops have so long remained in safety.

Mal-Administration has run its line—it has not a move left—it is a check-mate.

Forty thousand men are not adequate to the idea of subduing them to your Taxation. Taxation exists only in Representation; take them to your heart, who knows what their generosity may effect?

I am not to be understood as meaning a naked, unconditional repeal; no, I would maintain the superiority of this country at all events.

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But you are anxious who shall disarm first. That great Poet, and, perhaps, a wiser and greater Politician than ever he was a Poet, has given you wisest counsel, follow it:

Tuque prior, tu parce; genus qui ducis Olympo.

Projice tela manu. —————

Who is this man that will own this system of force as practicable? And is it not the height of folly to pursue a system that is owned to be impracticable.

I therefore move, that an humble Address be presented to his Majesty, most humbly to advise and beseech his Majesty, that, in order to open the ways towards an happy settlement of the dangerous troubles in America, by beginning to allay ferments and soften animosities there; and above all, for preventing in the mean time, any sudden and fatal catastrophe at Boston, now suffering under the daily irritation of an army before their eyes, posted in their town, it may graciously please his Majesty, that immediate orders may be dispatched to General Gage, for removing his Majesty's forces from the town of Boston, as soon as the rigour of the season, and other circumstances indispensable to the safety and accommodation of the said troops may render the same practicable.

The Earl of Chatham, Jan. 20, 1775.

I ENTIRELY agree with the Honourable Gentleman who seconded the Motion for an Address to his Majesty, that every man ought now to speak out; and in a moment so important as the present to the whole empire, I think it ill becomes the dignity and duty of Parliament to lose itself in such a fulsome, adulatory Address to the Throne as that now proposed. We ought rather, Sir, to approach our Sovereign with sound and wholesome advice, and even with Remonstrances against the conduct of his Ministers, who have precipitated the nation into an unjust, ruinous, felonious and murderous war. I call the war with our brethren in America an unjust, felonious war,
because

because the primary cause and confessed origin of it is, to attempt to take their money from them without their consent, contrary to the common rights of all mankind, and those great fundamental principles of the English constitution, for which Hampden bled. I assert, Sir, that it is in consequence a murderous war; because it is an attempt to deprive men of their lives, for standing up in the just cause of the defence of their property and their clear rights. It becomes no less a murderous war, with respect to many of our fellow-subjects of this island: for every man, either of the navy or army, who has been sent by government to America, and has fallen a victim in this unnatural and unjust contest, has been murdered by Administration, and his blood lies at their door. Such a war, I fear, Sir, will draw down the vengeance of heaven upon this devoted kingdom.

I think this war, Sir, fatal and ruinous to our country. It absolutely annihilates the only great source of our wealth, which we enjoyed unrivaled by other nations; and deprives us of the fruits of the laborious industry of near three millions of subjects, which centered here. That commerce has already taken its flight, and our American Merchants are now deploring the consequences of a wretched policy, which has been pursued to their destruction. It is, Sir, no less ruinous with regard to the enormous expences of the fleets and armies necessary for this nefarious undertaking; so that we are wasting our present wealth, while we are destroying the sources of all we might have in future.

I speak, Sir, as a friend to England and America, but still more to universal liberty, and the rights of all mankind. I trust no part of the subjects of this vast empire will ever submit to be slaves. I am sure the Americans are too high spirited to brook the idea. Your whole power, and that of your allies, if you had any, and of all the German troops you can hire, cannot effect so wicked a purpose. The conduct of the present Administration has already wrested the sceptre of America out of the

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hands

hands of our Sovereign, and you have now scarcely a Postmaster left in the whole northern continent; more than half the empire is already lost, and almost all the rest is in confusion and anarchy. The Ministry have brought our Sovereign into a more disgraceful situation than any crowned head now living. He alone has already lost, by their fatal counsels, more territory than the three great united powers of Russia, Austria, and Prussia have together robbed Poland of; and by equal acts of violence and injustice from Administration.

England was never engaged in a contest of such importance to our most valuable concerns and possessions. We are fighting for the subjection of a country infinitely more extended than our own; of which every day increases the wealth, the natural strength, and population. Should we not succeed, it would be a bosom friendship soured to hate and resentment. We shall be considered as their most implacable enemies; an eternal separation will succeed, and the grandeur of the British empire pass away. Success seems to me not equivocal, but impossible. However we may differ among ourselves, they are perfectly united. On this side the Atlantic, party-rage unhappily divides us; but one soul animates the vast northern continent of America, the General Congress, and each Provincial Assembly. An appeal has been made to the sword, and at the close of the last campaign, what have we conquered? Bunker's-hill, with the loss of 1200 men. Are we to pay as dearly for the rest of America? The idea of conquest is as romantic as unjust.

The Honourable Gentleman who moved the Address, says, "The Americans have been treated with lenity." Was your Boston Port Bill a measure of lenity? Was your Fishery Bill a measure of lenity? Was your Bill for taking away the Charter of the Massachusetts Bay a measure of lenity, or even justice? I omit your many other gross provocations and insults, by which the brave Americans have been driven into their present state. He asserts, that they avow a disposition to be independent. On the

the contrary, Sir, all the declarations both of the late and the present Congress, uniformly tend to this one object, of being put on the same footing they were in the year 1763. This has been their only demand, from which they have never varied. Their daily prayers are for liberty, peace, and safety. I use the words of the Congress last year. They justly expect to be put on an equal footing with the other subjects of the empire. If you confine all our trade to yourselves, say they; if you make a monopoly of our commerce; if you shut all other ports of the world against us, tax us not too. If you do, then give us a free trade, such as you enjoy yourselves; let us have equal advantages of commerce, all other ports open to us; then we can, and cheerfully will pay taxes.

It must give, Sir, every man who loves his country, the deepest concern, at the naming in the Address foreign troops, Hanoverians and Hessians, who are now called to interfere in our domestic quarrels; not to dwell this day on the illegality of the measure. The militia, indeed, are now employed, and that noble institution is at present complimented by Ministers, who hate the very name of a militia; because the embodying of these forces enables Administration to butcher more of our fellow-subjects in America.

Mr. Wilkes, Oct. 26, 1775.

I AM still clear, my Lords; as to the right this country has to exercise its sovereignty over America by taxation. I had no hand in passing the Stamp Act, in the Declaratory Bill, in the Bill laying Duties upon Teas, and other commodities, in the partial repeal of that Act, nor yet in the insanity of sending the tea to America without repealing the duty. From these and other causes, together with the imbecillity of Administration, this country is reduced to a situation so deplorable, that the wisest and honestest man in the kingdom can propose nothing that promises an happy and honourable issue. I feel that I speak in fetters; I therefore will not press arguments on

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either

either side to their full extent. The next easterly wind will carry to America what shall fall from any, and from every Lord in the House. I do not wish that the nakedness of my country and its weakness, should stand confirmed by the authority and sanction of testimonies given here. It is a time to act, and not to talk. Much is to be done, and little said. The die of war is cast, the sword is drawn, and the scabbard thrown away. With great respect to your Lordships, wise as you are, and no doubt the great hereditary council of the King and kingdom, yet allow me to say, you are not enabled to decide upon matters of such transcendent importance and difficulty, without having the fullest materials before you, which you most certainly have not. This is a question for the Ministers to decide, who must be supposed to have the fullest information: the execution will likewise lie with them. They have decided; and it is to be wished they have at last some well-considered plan: not only taking into pay all the troops that can be got, at any rate, but also how they can be supported, supplied, and enabled to act with effect; in short, a plan consisting of a great variety of efficient parts. If I had the honour of being in the King's Council (which thank God I have not) I should expect the amplest information before I should decide; but decide I would, and abide by the decision. Retired, however, as I now am, and uninformed, I have not presumption enough to give an opinion, nor do I hold myself specially called upon to do it. My country is, indeed, reduced to a deplorable condition. We are driven between Scylla and Charybdis, and it will be transcendently difficult to steer the vessel of the state into a safe port. I must be allowed freely to confess, that I have not a good opinion of the King's servants. Past experience will not justify confidence. I cannot, therefore, answer to myself or to my country, the trusting such men with the expenditure of ten millions; and laying the foundation of lavishing many more, our last stake; thereby accelerating that bankruptcy, which, sooner or later, I fear, by adopting either measure, is become inevitable.

inevitable. Nor am I, on the other hand, so friendly to them, as by declaring our utter inability to reduce America, to furnish them with a golden bridge for concluding an inglorious peace, on any the most ruinous and disgraceful terms, I cannot consent to throw this once great and glorious country at the feet of America; and there humbly implore such peace, as she, in her generosity and magnanimity shall condescend to grant us. I am not yet made to the idea of hanging out a white flag of surrender. To those who lament the present most melancholy state of the Colonies, once so prosperous and flourishing, beyond the example of any others known in the annals of time, I cannot help observing, that I rejoice in the testimony, because it does honour to the government of England, under whose care and influence they had prospered so wonderfully. I do verily believe, that till the late troubles, they had infinitely less to complain of than the Mother Country herself; and that, separated as they are by the vast Atlantic, it was not in the nature of things, that there must not be much to complain of, tho' not sufficient to justify their ingratitude to the Parent State. I cannot blame a determination to make peace, sword in hand; the sooner it can be had upon reasonable, safe, and honourable terms, the better for both countries. I never did declare, whether I thought it was consistent with sound policy to impose any new tax upon America, and it will hardly be expected that I should decide it now. I have heard it called an unjust war; I know not who in this House have a right to call it so. Infinite sagacity and discretion are necessary to the attainment of what all alike, I am persuaded, must eagerly wish. When the happy and favourable moment for conciliation shall arrive, I hope the Ministers will seize it, and I sincerely wish them success. At least at such a crisis, I will not hang upon the wheels of Government, and thereby render what is already but too difficult, the more impracticable.

Earl Temple, March 5, 1776.

My Lords, I have not the arrogance to think, that what I shall submit to your Lordships has escaped the vigilance of all your Lordship's judgments: I have not the vanity to imagine, that the arguments my circumscribed talents may suggest to me to use, can have the good fortune to persuade the majority of this House, unless they should meet with the support of men of greater weight. Some there are who chance to be absent, whose great authorities I must lament the loss of. But, my Lords, if what I may offer should throw any light upon a subject as interesting as ever arose since Britain has extended her power beyond the confines of the isle, I shall at least have the satisfaction to think, I have not buried my ideas; I have not been wanting in that duty, which, from the rank we hold in life, is mine, is that of every Lord in this House. My Lords, for a paltry set of words, for an unreasonable claim of power, for a fascinating assertion of impracticable authority, for an airy nothing, a visionary shadow of ideal revenue, impossible to be raised but by the consent of that people whose contributions we so much thirst after, and whose consent we do despise, has Britain been duped into an unnatural war, where victory or defeat must each enfeeble this lately great empire: a war carried on against a part of our fellow-subjects, whose numbers, at least, equal a fifth of the whole; and who in extent of country so far exceeds the size of Britain, that the comparison of her is but as a speck in the disk of the sun. I will not dwell on the disadvantages our army must labour under from the far-extended distance of the war; a common map, to the commonest understanding, must demonstrate more than rhetoric can paint. But, my Lords, it has been your pleasure to enter into this war; the matter has been laid before you, and often has been debated, and your Lordships, in your judgments, have deemed it necessary to correct the saucy freedom of high-minded sons, grown up to manly age; to check in your American children that independent spirit, that strange love of liberty, which, where permitted to take root, does so insatiate mankind,

mankind, and which has long been the honour and safety of this Isle. You have thought it right to curb their ideas of property, which lead them to imagine, we have no right to take any part of that property away from them without their free consent. My Lords, I respect the Decisions of the Majorities of this House; but if these Decisions may have arisen from any peculiar circumstances now no more existing; if they may have sprung from false or mistaken intelligence; if the whole disposition of things, from various accidents and events, may have become totally different; perhaps it may not be unworthy your Lordships wisdom to reconsider what you have decided, to revise your judgments, to retrace the steps we may have too hastily trod. My Lords, in the beginning of our unhappy contests with America, those who debated the matter on the side of the ruling Power of Government, stated not only the necessity, but the great facility of forcing to a compliance with all the demands of Government, such Colonies as should dare to offer their vain resistance: we are told they had not strength for war, they had not means of war, they had not union among themselves, that they wanted money, that they wanted discipline, that they wanted Officers: and, to sum up the whole, to make them contemptible even as submissive subjects, that they possessed not courage to face an English Soldier, whose birth on this side the Atlantic endowed him with that intrepid spirit, an American, whom even necessity had inured to toils, could never aspire to reach. The Decisions, my Lords, of Administration, gave them union; the refusal to hear their Petitions, confined the whole in a firm knot of calm, deliberate, desperate determination to resist. Money, which is but the type of property, was soon supplied by a type of equal sense and use; even personal freedom gave way to public security, and personal property was sacrificed to the necessities of the rising State. The disaffection was general, and British Governors now no longer administer Law in British America. How true the charge of wanting martial spirit proved, let those

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relate who first saw the blood of civil war spilt at Lexington. To those who saved the honour of the day, at the bloody forcing of the lines on Bunker's-Hill, to those who saw the British valour checked, may I safely refer for a full confutation of the absurd supposition, that men descended from the same line as ourselves, whose all is at stake, who think their cause just, would, like the most enervated Asiatic tribe, yield a bloodless victory. My Lords, the history of human nature teaches us, that the greatest talents often lie hid in the most disguised obscurity, till accident, till the bustle of the times, calls forth the genius, and lights the ethereal spark; then do these meteors cast an unexpected blaze: an Apothecary's late 'prentice leads forth armies, displays the warrior's skill, the warrior's intrepidity, and meets a death a Roman might have envied: another, who, in peaceable times, might have never rose to greater praise than a jockey's skill, amidst every rigour of an inclement season, in an inclement country, astonishes us with a march a Hannibal would have admired, and carries the alarm of war to the walls of a great city, which must probably have yielded to the boldness of the undertaking, had not a *Carleton* saved it: I am not making a panegyric on American prowess, though great achievements, even by an enemy, will ever meet my praise. But, my Lords, these are facts incapable of dispute. To come now, my Lords, to that which has cast the deepest stain on the glory of the British arms, to that which must rouse the indignation of all who feel for her disgrace: the army of Britain, equipped with every possible essential of war, a chosen army, with chosen Officers, backed with the power of a mighty fleet, sent to correct revolted subjects, sent to chastise a resisting city, sent to assert Britain's authority, has for many tedious months been imprisoned within that town by the Provincial Army, who, their watchful guards, permitted them no inlet to the country, who braved all their efforts, and defied all their skill and abilities in war could ever attempt. One way, indeed, of escape was left; the fleet is yet

yet respected; to the fleet the army has recourse, and British Generals, whose names never met with a blot of dishonour, are forced to quit that town which was the first object of the war, the immediate cause of hostilities, the place of arms, which has cost this nation more than a million to defend.

The Duke of Manchester, May 10, 1776.

I HAVE been reading a work given us by a country, that is perpetually employed in productions of merit—I believe it is not yet published—the History of Philip the II^d; and there find, that that tyrannical monarch never dreamt of the tyranny exercised by this Administration. Gods! Sir, shall we be told, that you cannot annalyze grievances! that you can have no communication with Rebels, because they have declared for Independency! Shall you be told this, when the tyrant Philip did it after the same circumstance in the Netherlands. By Edi^ct he allowed their ships to enter their ports, and suffered them to depart in peace; he treated with them; made them Propositions; and positively declared that he would redress all their grievances. And James the II^d, when he was sailing from France, at the head of a formidable force, assisted like you by foreign troops, and having a great party in the kingdom, still offered specific terms; while his exceptions of pardon were few, amongst the rest my honourable friend's ancestor, *Sir Stephen Fox*. But you will offer none;—you simply tell them to lay down their arms, and then you will do just as you please. Could the most cruel conqueror say less? Had you conquered the devil himself in hell, could you be less liberal? No! Sir, you would offer no terms;—you meant to drive them to the declaration of Independency: and even after it was issued, ought, by your offers, to have reversed the effect. You would not receive the Remonstrance that I brought you from New-York, because it denied your Rights to certain Powers;—yet the late King of France received the Remonstrances from his Parliaments, that expressly denied his Rights
to

to the Powers he was in the constant exercise of—answered them, and even redressed some of the Grievances which those very Remonstrances complained of; though he refused to grant what he thought more peculiarly entrenched upon his own Authority.

In this situation, Sir, shocking to say, are we called upon by another Proclamation to go to the Altar of the Almighty, with war and vengeance in our hearts, instead of the peace of our Blessed Saviour; he said, “*My peace I give you,*” but we are on this Fast to have war only in our hearts and mouths; war against our brethren.—’Till our churches are purified from this abominable service, I shall consider them, not as the temples of the Almighty, but the synagogues of Satan. An act not more *infamous*, respecting its political, than *blasphemous* and *profane* as a pretended act of national devotion, when the People are called upon, in the most solemn and awful manner, to repair to Church, to partake of a Sacrament, and at the foot of the Altar to commit sacrilege; to perjure themselves publicly by charging their American brethren with the horrid crime of Rebellion, with propagating “*specious falsehood*,” when either the charge must be *notoriously false*, or those who make it, not knowing it to be true, call Almighty God to witness to not a *specious*, but a most *audacious* and *blasphemous* falsehood.

Mr. Burke, Nov. 2, 1776.

I HAVE read, Sir, a late Proclamation of that great General and Preacher, Mr. Burgoyne, which is shocking to a civilized and generous nation. As a State Paper it disgraces our country. The Imperial Court have often employed many kind of irregular troops, Croats, Pandours, and Hussars, but their names disgrace no public act. If they plunder, they do not torture. The pious Preacher, Mr. Burgoyne, complains of this froward and stubborn generation; and at the very moment of mentioning his consciousness of Christianity, displays a spirit of cruelty repugnant to every principle of humanity.

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He boasts that he will give stretch to the Indian forces under his direction, and they amount to thousands. Merciful Heaven! Thousands of Indian savages let loose by the command of a British General against our brethren in America! Human nature shrinks back from such a scene. At his heels, least in like hounds, should famine, sword, and fire, crouch for employment. Mr. Burgoyne's feelings as a man, I fear, will not hereafter be as universally acknowledged, as the military talents of the great General. In the present case I have that pity for him and his employers, which they have not shewn to others. What, Sir, has been, and continues, the conduct of the Indian savages in war? Is it not to exercise the most wanton cruelties on their enemies, without distinction of age and sex? The conduct of this war goes on a par with its principles. Has the feeble old man, the helpless infant, the defenceless female, ever experienced the tender mercies of an Indian savage? He drinks the blood of his enemy, and his favourite repast is on human flesh. Is a stretch given to thousands of these cannibals by command, in a public Manifesto of one of the King's Generals? I am bold, Sir, to declare, that such orders are unworthy the General of any Christian King. (They are only becoming a Jewish Priest to a Jewish King, a Samuel to a Saul, in the most bloody and barbarous of all histories, the History of the Jewish Nation. The orders of the Jewish Priests were, now go and smite the *Amalekites*, and destroy all that they have, and spare them not; but slay both man and woman, ox and sheep, camel and ass.) General Burgoyne threatens the Americans with all the vengeance of the State, not its justice, that the messenger of wrath will meet them in the field, devastation, and famine, and every concomitant horror. Not the sword of even-handed justice falling on the head of the bold rebel, but the savage horrors of the tomahawk, from the thousands of Indians under his direction, on the innocent women and children. I remember, Sir, an honourable Gentleman, (Lord Advocate of Scotland) whom I see in his place; a Gentleman very

very high in the Law, not only humanely proposing, according to the ideas, and in the language of his own country, but dwelling with rapture on what he classically called a Starvation Bill for the poor Americans. I rely, however, Sir, on the spirit of the Americans, that they will neither suffer the fate of the *Amalekites*, nor retaliate the attempt on the savages of Europe.

Governor Johnstone, Nov. 18, 1777.

- No man can have a more determined abhorrence of the employing the Indian savages in our wars than I have; because no man, in this House at least, has had occasion to know so much of this matter, as it fell to my lot to have during the last war. My horror of their cruel services does not arise from the paintings of imagination, but from what I have known of the fact; there is not so hellish, so unfair an engine of war, as the service of the Indian savage, when mixed in with the wars of civilized nations. What then must *we* think of it, what must be *our* feelings, when they are employed in a war, between parts of the same nation, branches of the same family, in the war between us and our brethren?

The mutual feelings of humanity, and a spirit of honour, have, amidst civilized nations, defined even rights, and given laws to a state of war; have laid a restraint on havock, and given limits to destruction and bloodshed. There are even in rigours of war, the *jura belli*, which civilized nations have adopted, and do almost universally observe. The war of the savage, instead of being a contest of right by power, regulated and restrained by any feelings of honour or humanity, is an unrestrained effusion of the passions of revenge and blood-thirstiness, *est certare odiis*, is a war of universal ravage and devastation to utter destruction; instead of giving laws to war, it gives the name and effect of right to every cruel exertion of passion, revenge, and barbarity, *jusque datum sceleris*.

Governor Pownall, Feb. 6, 1778.

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WHEN America was first settled, the whole right to conquest, discovery, and division of lands was in the King;—it was in his power to grant them to any body, and on any condition. This power he used in America, in all cases without, and in some against the consent of Parliament, who never, indeed, supposed, that such feudal Rights were vested in them.

At what time the King gave up, or Parliament usurped these Rights, is not now my business to inquire; but I must maintain, that unless America had consented to such a cession, America is not bound by it, but her Rights remain the same as when first established by her Charters.

A late decision in the King's Bench has fully established this doctrine. The King may lay any impositions on a conquered country by his own authority, till he has by Proclamation, or otherwise, given up that power by establishing another.

Sir Cecil Wray, April 6, 1778.

ARMY.

A R M Y.

“ I HAVE spoken so often against maintaining an extra-
 “ ordinary number of land forces in time of peace; that I
 “ should now chuse to be silent, if I had not the first day of
 “ the Session entered my claim to dispute the continuance of
 “ the four thousand Augmentation Troops; and if I did not
 “ think it my duty to oppose every proposition, which seems
 “ to carry the least appearance of danger to our Constitution.

“ I ask pardon, if I take the present Question to be of this
 “ nature. Nor can I be persuaded; that the frequent im-
 “ positions of unnecessary Taxes, or the repetition of any
 “ grievance, ought to beget an insensibility, or a slavish ac-
 “ quiescence in it. On the contrary, I think it ought to
 “ awaken and double our attention, lest it should in time
 “ plead a prescriptive right; and gradually grow into an
 “ establishment.

“ If I may be permitted to consider the King’s Speech as
 “ the composition of his Ministers, which, though I know by
 “ experience to be a more dangerous, is yet a more parlia-
 “ mentary way, than to consider it as an Edict from the
 “ Throne, I will observe, that it does not ask the advice and
 “ opinion of the Commons, how far they will use their great,
 “ essential, and undisputed Right of raising money; but it
 “ positively prescribes the exact provision we are to make, both
 “ by sea and land, for the service of the ensuing year: and
 “ whether that be not a new method of speaking to Parlia-
 “ ments, is with all deference submitted to the wisdom of this
 “ House, which is the best judge of its own Privileges and
 “ Power.

“ Surely, Sir, it is very melancholy to hear, one Session af-
 “ ter another, that, though we are in a state of tranquillity,
 “ as the language is, yet we can neither be secure at home,

“ nor

“ nor respected abroad, without continuing above eighteen
“ thousand land forces in pay.

“ This way of reasoning entirely misrepresents our circum-
“ stances and condition. For it would suggest, that we can-
“ not enjoy the blessings of a good Reign, without enduring
“ at the same time the hardships of a bad one ; which is a
“ contradiction in itself, and inconsistent with the notions we,
“ as Englishmen, must ever entertain of our legal liberties ;
“ in maintenance of which, our predecessors in Parliament
“ thought fit to alter the lineal succession of our Royal Fa-
“ mily. This way of reasoning farther supposes, that the
“ mutual confidence betwixt his Majesty and his People is
“ destroyed ; that there is a distrust on one hand, and a
“ disaffection on the other, for which there is not the least
“ ground or pretence. For his Majesty, by his residence
“ amongst us this last summer, has not only given us the
“ clearest proof of his preferring the welfare and happiness
“ of these Kingdoms to that of his own foreign Dominions,
“ but has for ever secured the love of his subjects here, by his
“ most gracious affability and personal condescension to them.
“ He has for ever secured that tranquillity at home, on which
“ he is pleased with so much satisfaction to congratulate his
“ Parliament. Nor can this tranquillity be affected by the
“ clamours in Ireland, against a late Patent for coining ; for
“ there is a large army in that Kingdom sufficient to curb tu-
“ multuous spirits, and to awe patronizing malcontents,
“ should any such be found. Nay, if more forces are judged
“ necessary, either for the honour or safety of the Government
“ here, that Kingdom is able and willing to maintain more on its
“ own Establishment ; and therefore all arguments drawn from
“ thence relating to the present Question must be inconclusive.
“ The House may perhaps think fit, at a proper season, to
“ listen so far to the complaints of our fellow-subjects in ano-
“ ther Kingdom, as to call for this obnoxious Patent, and to
“ examine into the grounds of it. For the mis-government

“ of

“ of Ireland has been frequently under the examination of the
 “ House of Commons here, and such examinations have fre-
 “ quently proved fatal to as great Ministers as England ever
 “ bred : which may be matter of reflection to their successors,
 “ and to those it may concern ; but never can be any induce-
 “ ment to any English Parliament, to pay one Soldier more
 “ than is absolutely necessary for our own use.

“ Now all Rebellions, all Conspiracies, seems to be totally
 “ extinguished, not more by the late seasonable exertion of par-
 “ liamentary justice, than by the wise and prudent conduct of
 “ those in the Administration. They have so carefully re-
 “ viewed, and modelled the forces of this summer in every
 “ part of the nation, that, we are to hope, there are not left
 “ even so many as three or four Serjeants and Corporals, who
 “ shall have fool-hardiness enough to undertake again to draw
 “ the whole Army into wild and chimerical attempts. They
 “ have freed the Church from all apprehensions of danger, by
 “ promoting only the most orthodox and learned part of the
 “ Clergy to the episcopal Dignity, and other ecclesiastical
 “ Preferments. They have preserved the State, by advancing
 “ only men of distinguished ability and experience to all great
 “ Offices and Civil Employments. They have, which is
 “ above all, reconciled their own animosities, and have no
 “ other contentions now, but who shall best serve his Majesty
 “ and the Public, without any views of accumulating im-
 “ mense wealth to themselves, or of aggrandizing their own
 “ private families. Such an Administration can never need
 “ the assistance and protection of above eighteen thousand dis-
 “ ciplined troops. Such an Administration should not suffer
 “ the Army to run away with the reputation of their good and
 “ great works, or to assume the glory of raising our Credit,
 “ enlarging our Trade, and establishing our present Prosperity.
 “ Nor are our Foreign Affairs in a less flourishing con-
 “ dition than those at home, so far as I am capable of judging
 “ from

“ from the common appearance of things, without being in
 “ the secrets of the Cabinet.

“ We can have no apprehensions from our nearest neigh-
 “ bour France. For that Kingdom is engaged to us by many
 “ strict Treaties; and I have heard the French *bona fides*, of
 “ late years, as much asserted and extolled in this House, as
 “ I have formerly heard it ridiculed and exploded. Besides,
 “ we have a vigilant Minister at Paris, who, by his own skill
 “ and penetration in Politics, as well as by good advice and
 “ assistance from hence, is not only promoting the British in-
 “ terests there, but influencing and directing the French
 “ Councils.

“ Nor can we have any pretence to keep up those forces on
 “ account of danger from Spain. For if that Monarchy should
 “ be indiscreet enough to entertain the least harsh remem-
 “ brance of any pretended ill usage from Great-Britain; if
 “ it should resent our glorious and seasonable conquest over
 “ their fleet in the Mediterranean, for which we struck a Me-
 “ dal with pompous inscriptions; if it should insist on a resti-
 “ tution of Gibraltar and Port Mahon, which, in my humble
 “ opinion, can never be surrendered without the highest in-
 “ famy, as well as injury to England. I say, if any thing of
 “ this kind should remain in the breast of the Court of Spain,
 “ notwithstanding our Treaties, and daily Negotiations there,
 “ it is our comfort, that we need fear no invasion from their
 “ Armada: that the mutability of their Councils, their pre-
 “ tensions in Italy, their distance from Great-Britain, render
 “ it impracticable for them to annoy or distress us. And if
 “ King Philip's Resignation of the Crown was a good argu-
 “ ment the last year for continuing the four thousand Augmen-
 “ tation Troops, then his Resumption of it now must be a
 “ good one for disbanding them this year.

“ The Emperor's personal obligations to Great-Britain are
 “ such, that it is impossible for him to entertain any ill in-
 “ tentions against us, either on account of the Ostend East-

“ India Company, or of his Majesty’s glorious endeavours to
 “ remove the religious grievances in Germany, and to pro-
 “ mote the Protestant interest there, of which he is the great
 “ Guardian.

“ The Dutch are our natural allies, and always ready to
 “ assist us. Nor is it their fault, that we have sometimes
 “ disputed amongst ourselves, concerning the expence of trans-
 “ porting their auxiliar forces. They are bound to us by
 “ antient ties of gratitude, for their original preservation, and
 “ by, what is yet a stronger cement, their own interest and
 “ safety.

“ As to the two northern Crowns, Swéden and Denmark,
 “ they have in their turns received our protection, and tasted
 “ of our bounty. We all remember the famous æra, when
 “ two hundred and fifty thousand pounds, as well as many
 “ smaller supplies since, were raised on that account. Besides,
 “ we are to hope our expeditions into the Baltic, under the
 “ conduct of a brave Officer here present, have been as effec-
 “ tual as they have been expensive ; and that our fleet has not
 “ only awed them into a reconciliation betwixt themselves, but
 “ into an absolute submission to Great-Britain.

“ The Czar is stretching his conquests into remote parts of
 “ the world ; and if what we hear of a late Treaty be true, that
 “ it is made entirely in favour of Great-Britain, without any
 “ regard to foreign principalities, we can apprehend nothing
 “ from our new ally, who is otherwise so fully employed.
 “ For however extensive our mediating care may be, I presume
 “ we are not engaged with him to oppose the intended succeßion
 “ of the Crown of Poland, or to settle the balance of Empire
 “ in Persia.

“ If such then is our prosperous situation at home and abroad,
 “ why should we be denied the promised happy consequences of
 “ it ? Why should we be afraid of reducing our land forces ?
 “ Why should we not at least strike off the four thousand aug-
 “ mentation troops, in compassion to a nation loaded, and al-

“ most

" most sunk with debt? For should a storm arise after this
 " calm, should any new event produce a rupture in Europe,
 " it will be time enough, if we are either prompted by our own
 " heroic disposition, or bound by any inviolable Treaties, to
 " enter into the quarrels of the Continent. I say, it will be
 " time enough, when the war shall be actually declared, to
 " lend our assistance to those, who we voluntarily espouse, or
 " to perform our engagements to our respective allies, if they
 " should not be found romantic or impracticable. We have
 " the opinion of a most eminent author in civil learning, That
 " it is more grievous to any nation, to bear the least extra-
 " ordinary taxes in times of peace, than to endure the greatest
 " impositions in times of war. Because a war may prove ad-
 " vantageous, may terminate in conquest and glorious acqui-
 " sitions. But a continuance of extraordinary taxes without
 " it, must inevitably end in poverty and ruin.

" Now I can never be so unjust to his Majesty's mild and
 " gracious Government, as to ascribe our present tranquillity
 " to the continuance of an extraordinary number of troops,
 " any more than I can believe, it would cease at the reduction
 " of part of them. This would be a dangerous, as well as an
 " absurd doctrine, with relation to us at home. For should it
 " be admitted, that above eighteen thousand land forces, have
 " not only procured our present tranquillity, but that they are
 " absolutely necessary for the security of the kingdom; then it
 " will follow, that the same number will be always absolutely
 " necessary; that a military power is the most pacific form of
 " Government; and that an army will be a better preserver
 " of peace and plenty, a better guardian of our civil and re-
 " ligious Rights, than the Law of the Land. This doctrine
 " too, considered with regard to the respect and influence we
 " may have abroad, is as absurd as ill grounded: for that re-
 " spect and influence can never proceed from the number of
 " land forces we may think fit to burthen ourselves with in
 " time of peace, but it must proceed from the advantages of

“ our natural situation, from our naval strength, from our extended commerce, from our vast riches, which have enabled us to carry on long and expensive wars; to maintain, when our allies failed in their quotas, three great armies at once in their different nations; and these advantages will ever enable us to hold the balance of power in Europe, unless worn out with unnecessary and insupportable taxes.

“ But if not so much as the four thousand augmentation troops are to be parted with, if they are to be continued till the pretences of all the Princes of Europe shall be adjusted, till the different interests of different nations shall be reconciled, till the claim of Bremen and Verden shall be fully settled and acquiesced in, till the long expected form of a Congress shall be compleated, I freely own, I am not without my apprehensions, that our immense national debt, instead of being annually reduced, will be daily increased: that our present grievances, for grievances we have in the midst of all our tranquillity, instead of being speedily removed, will become perpetual, and we may dream of blessings we shall never enjoy.”

Mr. Shippen, Nov. 22, 1724.

“ My sentiments concerning a standing army, in time of peace, are well known here; and it may seem unnecessary, perhaps be thought impertinent in me, to debate anew on a worn-out and exhausted topic, when other Gentlemen, who entertain the same sentiments, are pleased to be silent. But surely the question before you is not become a Motion of course; surely as long as the grievance is continued on one hand, so long there is a right of complaint on the other; and that complaint, I should think, may without offence be continued, till it can be proved that the British Government is in its nature military, or ought to be made so.

“ I do not intend to trouble you with what I have formerly urged, or to use any argument drawn from the expence and burthen,

burthen, or from the terror and oppression which have been brought upon this and other nations, by raising and keeping up a greater number of forces, than were absolutely necessary in time of peace : not but that the gradations, by which armies, with all their inconveniencies, have been first introduced into free states, and afterwards imposed upon them, ought to be had in perpetual remembrance. We ought never to forget, that such steps have been usually taken, to gratify the views of ambitious Princes, to carry on the schemes of evil Ministers, to terrify Parliaments into obedience, and to make the Members of them dumb spectators of the miseries of their country.

‘ I will not insist on these arguments, however just in themselves, however proper on other occasions, because they would be inapplicable to the present situation of our affairs. For we have a Prince whose aim is to continue us the blessings of peace and plenty ; we have a Ministry who have merits above my commendation ; we have a Parliament, which acts with a spirit superior to all influences, and to all temptations. Besides, every year has its particular circumstances, and those particular circumstances ought to guide our resolutions, when we are marking our annual parliamentary provisions for the public service. I thought our circumstances both at home and abroad, were so prosperous the last Session, that we might without hazard have disbanded at least the four thousand augmentation troops. But the Majority of the House was of another opinion. There was then indeed a Rendezvous, though not a formed Congress, of Plenipotentiaries, vying with each other in the splendor of their equipages and the magnificence of their entertainments at Cambray, which had for some time employed our speculations, and promised great events to the world. And it was thought good policy to show the negotiating Powers, by continuing our army, that, if they would not accept of his Majesty’s plan for settling the balance of power, and for establishing the tranquillity of Europe, Great-Britain was ready to do her part toward compelling them to a com-

pliance. But that policy proved ineffectual, and that negotiation appears at last to have wanted substance as well as form, and to have produced nothing to Great-Britain, but an increase of the civil list debt, as we were given to understand the last Sessions, in a Debate on that subject, by one that knew the secret.

‘ But we are now told, that prudent and powerful alliances are actually made, and that what was only attempted at Cambray, has been fully accomplished at Herenhausen: nor can there be any doubt, of his Majesty’s extensive care over all his concerns both foreign and domestic; but that his alternate residence here and abroad, as it hath procured, so it would, with the advice of a good Ministry, and without the aid of a great army, preserve to us, through the whole course of his reign, that security, and those blessings we now enjoy. For, whether at home or abroad, his influence is irresistible; because his councils are wise and his designs are just. Nor am I altered in this opinion by what has happened at Glasgow and other places in Scotland, or at Thorn in Poland.

‘ For, if I am rightly informed, the tumult at Glasgow was no more than a mob, composed chiefly of women, a mere mock-resemblance of an Amazonian army, that might have been quelled by the interposition of the civil power, without recourse to that military vengeance which was executed there. Such commotions we see arise almost in every nation, when the occasions of the public call for new and extraordinary taxes; and yet they are generally despised, as impotent efforts against established Governments, and left to be punished by the laws of the country. But, now all is quiet, now all is safe in Scotland, not the least murmur is heard against Administration. The Highland Clans have been disarmed without any disturbance; they rejoice, we are told, in their submission, and are brought to a perfect sense of their duty to his Majesty, by the obliging behaviour and prudent conduct of the General, whose province it was to enforce the act of Parliament against them.

‘ As

‘ As to the important affair of Thorn, which by the way was no act of retaliation, as some, who neither consider the circumstance of time nor things would insinuate, but the effect of a spirit of persecution ; we are assured, that his Majesty has done more towards obtaining the desired satisfaction for the barbarous and unchristian cruelties committed there, and gained greater concessions from the Catholic Princes, by his pacific mediation and by his personal interest, than he could probably have done by rougher expedients, by threatening, or even entering into a religious war. Nor can malice itself suppose, that, whilst he is resenting the violation of Treaties, he would do any thing that would but look like an infraction of the limitation in the Act of Succession, which restrains the Crown from involving Great-Britain in any foreign disputes, except where her own immediate interests and alliances are concerned.

‘ I hope we conceive no ill omens from the French King’s marriage to the daughter of the Pretender to the Crown of Poland ; no distrust, that such an alliance can shake our late Protestant Treaty with that young Prince ; no jealousy that he will follow the example of the Emperor and the King of Spain, by engaging in a clandestine League without our knowledge, and to our prejudice. I must own, that would be a melancholy consideration. For then an army of twice eighteen thousand men would not be sufficient to defend that cause, which his Majesty has hitherto asserted, with so much glory to himself, and so much advantage to the Protestant part of Europe.

‘ It was a notorious saying, and the avowed policy of our late famous Statesman, who lived till after the Revolution, and was thought a secret instrument in it, that notwithstanding the noise and clamour of the people against soldiers in time of peace, the easiest and best way of governing England was by an army ; and that a Minister so guarded, might prosecute his measures with safety and success, and soon make the boasting assertors of Liberty and Property, as tame as a flock of turkies, and drive

them which way he pleased. This gives us a true idea of some sorts of modern policy, and of the insolence of that man in authority, who ruined the Prince by the very methods he would have enslaved his own fellow-subjects, but not of the genius of the people of England. For he found another spirit in them; he found they perpetually struggled with him in defence of the Church and State, when he was endeavouring to sacrifice both, as well as he did his own honour and conscience, in order to erect an arbitrary and unlimited dominion in these kingdoms. Nor could they endure his return into power after the Revolution, though he was countenanced by King William himself, and though his meritorious perfidy was strongly pleaded in his favour. But they continued their opposition to him, till they had accomplished his disgrace; and still his memory is as detestable, as his Administration was wicked, though he neither aggrandized his family, nor augmented his estate by the spoils of the Public.

‘ Now we are to hope the military principles of this Statesman are dead with him, and we are sure good Ministers will never pursue the maxims of bad ones, because the means of their actions must necessarily be as different as the ends are. It is therefore unintelligible to me, how the keeping up an army in time of peace, which has formerly been thought criminal advice in a Minister, as being incompatible with our Constitution, should now be annually recommended to Parliament by our modern patriots, as the only method of securing us in the possession of our Laws and Liberties. I say, this is unintelligible to me; and till the seeming paradox can be reconciled to reason, I must beg leave constantly to oppose the Question.’

Mr. Shippen, Jan. 28, 1726.

I AM sorry to hear a parrallel drawn by any Member of this House, between the army kept up by the late King James, and the army intended to be kept up at present. King James's army was raised against law, was maintained against the con-

sent

sent of the people, and was employed in overturning the liberties of the people : the present question is about an army which is to be kept up according to law, and by and with the consent of the people. If we look into the *Petition of Right* itself, what does it say ? Why that an army raised, or kept up, without consent of Parliament, is contrary to the constitution ; but it never was said, that an army kept up by consent of Parliament, is illegal, or any way contrary to the constitution ; in this respect, no parallel can therefore be drawn between the present army, which is to be kept up only by consent of the people, and maintained by them, and that army which was raised and maintained by King James himself ; and was so far from being by the concurrence or consent of the people, that it was to be employed *against* them ; and I am persuaded, that no man here expects that the present army is to be employed in such manner.

I really believe, and I hope I am right, that there is but very little dissatisfaction in the nation, and that the Jacobite party is now become very inconsiderable ; but still that party is not to be ridiculed and made a joke of : we are not so much to despise all attempts that may be made by them, as not to take any measures to provide ourselves against them ; such a security is the best thing they can wish for ; they would be glad to be despised in such a manner. Gentlemen may say what they will of the little consequence of any endeavours that have been, or may be used by them ; but the late rebellion is a certain testimony that they are not to be too much despised. The fate of the kingdom was at that time brought even to the decision of a day ; and if the Rebels had been successful at Preston, I do not know what might have been the consequences ; I dread to think of them : but let them have been never so fatal, if the liberties of this nation had been overthrown by the success of those Rebels, it would have been entirely owing to our having so few regular forces on foot at that time. We have escaped that danger, but do not let us expose ourselves every day to such dangers for the future ; which must be the necessary consequence
of

of reducing any part of the small army now on foot, and desired to be continued.

A parliamentary army never yet did any harm in this nation ; but reductions of that army have often been fatal. I have been assured by a Minister of very great consequence of the Court of France, that the reducing our army after the Peace of Ryswick, very much encouraged the Court of France to take such measures, and to make such bold steps as they afterwards did. They would have been more cautious, if we had kept ourselves in a capacity of pouring in a numerous army upon them ; but they saw that we had put it out of our power, and therefore they despised us. The reduction of the army after the Peace of Utrecht, had not, by good luck, all the ill consequences that were designed, but the reduction was certainly made with no good intent. I have a good opinion enough of the late Queen ; she had not, perhaps, any ill intentions ; but I am convinced, that her Minister had laid a scheme for overturning the Protestant succession ; and they had no other way of executing this scheme, but by getting free of all those brave officers and soldiers who had served their country so faithfully in the late wars ; this was what made the army be reduced at that time so low as it was : the Ministers knew, that these honest officers would not serve them in the execution of their destructive schemes ; but they took care to supply their place with a body of above 6000 men, who were privately kept in pay, and maintained under colour of Chelsea-hospital ; and the consequence shewed what sort of men these new troops were, for almost every man of them appeared in arms in the late Rebellion against the government. We have heard the Treaty of Utrecht, upon which this reduction was made, applauded by some ; whether it deserves any such applause I do not know ; but I am certain that since that time we have been obliged to enter into separate treaties and negotiations almost with every power in Europe, for amending and explaining the blunders of that Treaty : and if we are now right, whoever ascribes our

being so to that Treaty, may be said to be like a man, who, after breaking another's bones, and seeing them set again very right, and well cured by an able Surgeon, cries, you are obliged to me, Sir, for this great cure that has been performed upon you.

Mr. Horatio Walpole, Jan. 26, 1732.

I CANNOT but be against even giving this Bill a second reading, because at first view it appears to be for supporting a numerous standing army in time of peace : this I need not any time to consider of ; this appears evidently to be the purport and intention of the Bill now read to us ; and this, my Lords, is against the very words of the *Petition of Right*, and alters the very nature of our constitution. All the confusions and disorders that have been brought upon this kingdom for many years, have all been brought upon it by the means of standing armies : it was, my Lords, a standing army that took off King *Charles* the First's head, and turned that very Parliament out of doors which had established them ; and the very same army that had murdered the father restored the son : it was by King *James* the Second's keeping up a standing army, that the affections of the people were alienated from him ; and by that very army, in whom he had put his only trust, he was turned out ; for by their joining the other side, the scales were turned against him, and he found himself at last obliged to succumb under the just resentments of an injured people. In this country, in every country, my Lords, where numerous standing armies have been kept up, we may find that innumerable evils and strange confusions have been brought on by the means of such armies : and therefore I shall always be against giving the least countenance to any Bill, that seems to tend towards keeping up a standing army in time of peace in this country.

Earl of Aylesford, Feb. 24, 1732.

I SHALL readily grant that there is a continual rivalry between the two great contending powers of Europe ; there
always

always will, I hope, be such a rivalship; for if ever that rivalship should cease, which it never can, but by one of them being swallowed up by the other, it would be an unlucky thing for this nation, as well as for all the rest of *Europe*: but, my Lords, are we to keep up a numerous standing army as long as that rivalship shall continue? If so, we must never think of any reduction: no, my Lords, that rivalship has already continued for many ages, and yet we have always supported ourselves against both, without having ever kept up a standing army: this new sort of defence has been but lately thought on, and never can be a proper defence for this nation; the only way we have to secure ourselves at home, to make ourselves considerable abroad, and to force a respect from both these contending powers, is to do as we have always formerly done, to put our whole trust in our natural strength, which consists in our fleet, and in the natural bravery of our men in general; as long as we trust to this, and observe a neutrality as to both these contending powers, we shall be courted by both: we may fall in sometimes with the one and sometimes with the other, according as may best suit with our own interest, and with the circumstances of affairs at the time: by such a management we shall always be able to hold the balance of *Europe* in our own hands, and never will have any occasion either to court the friendship, or to fear the resentment of any power on earth.

But, my Lords, if we begin to pursue contrary measures, if we be always the first to enter into alliances with the powers of *Europe*, and the original contracting parties in most treaties, we thereby give the power of holding the balance of *Europe* out of our hands; and the neglecting our fleet and militia, for the sake of keeping up a standing army, will soon render us contemptible to every one of our neighbours, unless we resolve to keep up a much more numerous army than what is proposed by this Bill; and such a proposition will, I hope, never be approved of by a majority of either House of Parliament.

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A standing army and military law, has, my Lords, been always inconsistent with the liberties of the people; the officers and soldiers under such a regulation, are always obliged to give the most implicit obedience to the commands of their superior officers; they must observe and execute the orders they receive without any reserve or hesitation; they must not inquire whether their orders be according to law, if they do, they are guilty of mutiny, and may be immediately shot for any such disobedience: the chief Commander of an army must always be vested with an arbitrary and absolute power over the army; and if his army be numerous, he may easily, by their means, extend his power over the whole people of the country where such army is kept up: and therefore, my Lords, in all countries where the people have any regard to their liberties, they ought never to keep up a greater number of regular forces than are absolutely necessary for the security of the government, and for the preservation of the country against any sudden invasion or inroad that may be made by a foreign enemy. In this country we have the happiness to be surrounded by the sea; we know how difficult and expensive it is to make any invasion upon us with any great body of men; any such invasion we must have a timely warning of, and by having our militia in good order, and our men, as they were formerly, all trained up to arms and military discipline, we should always be able to draw, upon any occasion, and in any place within the island, a great army together, to oppose our enemies, if they should happen to have the good fortune to escape our fleet at sea.

In our present circumstances, my Lords, and considering the happy situation of our country, I must be of opinion, that 12,000 men are abundantly sufficient for all the good uses we can have for them, and therefore I shall give my assent to the reduction proposed.

Earl Strafford, March 6, 1733.

I CAN-

I CANNOT imagine how some people have got into that way of thinking, that the liberties of all the countries in *Europe* have been overturned by standing armies : I do not know one country in *Europe* whose liberties have been overturned by their standing army. It is a mistake to say so of the Romans ; the liberties of *Rome*, were in a great measure overturned, by the luxury and corruption that had crept in among the people long before the time of *Julius Cæsar* : and in his time, their standing army were so far from being the only means of overturning the liberties of *Rome*, that the greatest part of the standing army joined against *Julius Cæsar* : but he had a devilish head of his own, so that by his own good conduct, and bravery of his troops, he got the better of his enemies, though they had the greatest number of regular troops of their side. If the *Romans* at that time had had no standing army, would not the people, would not the very mob have done the same ? Every man who had courage, or who could be persuaded to go to fight, would have joined that party he liked best : the Commander who could make the best use of those that joined him, would have got the advantage, and the victorious army would have had it in their power to have settled the future form of government upon what footing they had a mind.

It is the same with respect to all the other countries of *Europe*, where arbitrary power is or ever was established : in *France*, it is certain that their liberties were overturned long before they had such a thing as a standing army : the oldest regiment or corps of regular troops in *France*, is what they call the regiment of *Picardy* ; that regiment was raised only in the first or second year of the reign of our Queen *Elizabeth* ; and it is well known, that long before that time the liberties of the *French* people were entirely destroyed. In *Spain* we know that it was their priests that destroyed the liberties of the people ; and it is by means of their Inquisition, that their arbitrary government is to this day supported : by means of that terrible spiritual court, their priests support their own despotic rule not only
over

over the people, but likewise over the court, and even over their army too. In *Sweden*, my Lords, it was likewise their priests that formerly established an arbitrary rule in that country; and it was by their army that their liberties were restored. In *Denmark* it was a House of Commons that surrendered up their liberties to the Crown; they first gave up their own liberties; and thereby enabled their King to get himself declared the absolute and the arbitrary Sovereign over the whole country.

Thus, my Lords, we may find that a standing army never had in any country the chief hand in destroying the liberties of their country: nor indeed can it be supposed that they ever will. Can it be supposed that any man of common sense, who has a good post in the army, and has the laws of his country for his protection as long as he behaves well, can it, I say, my Lords, be supposed, that any such man will ever join in measures for subjecting himself to the uncontrollable will and giddy pleasure of any one man? He must know that true honour and virtue, or a faithful performance of his duty, could then be no protection to him; his life, his estate, and every thing that is dear to him, must then depend on the mere pleasure of a court: and every man knows, that about courts, true honour and virtue often falls a sacrifice to whispers, to deceitful insinuations, and to false and private accusations: is it then reasonable to presume, that the Gentlemen of the army, who are by their education bred strangers to the low arts and vile practices usual about courts, will ever give up that honourable dependence they have upon their own behaviour, and the laws of their country, for the sake of a slavish dependance upon any court whatever? For my part, it is not possible for me to suspect any such thing, and therefore I cannot from thence draw any argument against keeping up a standing army in this country.

Duke of Argyle, March 6, 1733.

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I AM one of those, and I believe there are a great many more, who are against the second reading of this Bill, presented by a Noble Duke (the Duke of Marlborough) for the better securing the constitution, by preventing the Officers of the land forces from being deprived of their commissions, otherwise than by judgment of a Court-martial. I did not, it is true, rise up immediately after the Motion was made, to give my reasons for being against a second reading, because I thought the Bill was of a nature so very extraordinary, and the objections to it so strong and evident, that I thought it unnecessary for me, or any other Lord in this House, to give himself or the House the trouble of explaining them: but since the Noble Lord who spoke last, insists so much upon it, in order to satisfy him, I shall give him some of those reasons which prevail with me to be against a second reading of the Bill now before us: and if either that Noble Lord, or any other, can give sufficient answers to those reasons, I shall most readily join with those Noble Lords who are for reading this Bill a second time.

With me, my Lords, one of the principal objections against the Bill is, that I look upon it as an open and a direct attack upon the Prerogative of the Crown. It is an attack upon a Prerogative, which his Majesty and his ancestors have enjoyed ever since our monarchy had a being; and we all know how nearly connected the Privileges of this House are with the Prerogative of the Crown: we know, my Lords, that the last open and direct attack that was made upon the Prerogative of the Crown, ended in the total subversion of our monarchy, and an entire dissolution of this House; and therefore I cannot but be surprized, to see a Bill of this nature brought first into this House: if such a Bill had passed the other House, and had been sent up to us from thence, I do not doubt but that every one of your Lordships would have easily seen through the design; you would have seen the snare that was laid against the monarchical establishment of our government, upon which the Privileges of every Lord in the nation absolutely depend. This
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would have given your Lordships a just claim ; and this, I doubt not, would have made you receive such a Bill in the manner it deserved.

I have often heard, my Lords, of a compact between the King and the people ; and a compact, upon which, it is said, our constitution and government depend ; if there be any such, the nature of it must certainly be mutual. On the one part, our Kings are obliged not to usurp, or encroach upon the liberties of the people : but surely there must be a counterpart, and by that there must be an obligation on the part of the people not to usurp or encroach upon the Powers and Prerogatives of the Crown : for it would be a very unjust compact, if, on the one hand, the King was most strictly tied down, and, on the other hand, the people left at full liberty to encroach as often, and as far as they pleased, upon the Prerogatives of the Crown. This cannot be the case ; the compact must be mutual ; and as his present Majesty has never once attempted, nor desires, in the least to encroach upon the Liberties or the Privileges of the people, it would be very unjust and unfair in us, to make any encroachment upon him. Nay, it would be most unwise, and might be attended with the most fatal consequences ; for a breach of covenant on one side, would dissolve all the covenants on the other, which would at once unhinge the whole of our constitution.

It has always been thought necessary, my Lords, to give our Kings the sole power of naming, preferring, and reforming at pleasure the Officers of our armies, in order to give our Kings that power and influence over our armies ; which is absolutely necessary for supporting and promoting a proper military discipline among them, without which they would be of no use against a foreign enemy, and might soon become most oppressive to the people, for whose safety they were raised and maintained. This power was thought so necessary at the time of the Revolution, and it was then thought to be of so little danger to the freedom of the constitution, that at that time, when the

liberties of the People were fully considered, when every thing was removed that could be of dangerous consequence to them, there was not the least mention made of taking this Power from the Crown, or even of laying it under any restraints: and I do not know any thing that has happened, which can give us the least ground for being of an opinion different from that, which was the opinion of our ancestors at that time.

The happiness of our Constitution, my Lords, depends upon that equal Division of Power, which is established amongst the three Branches of our Legislature: the executive Power, and the defending of the People against their enemies, is now, and always has been, entrusted solely with our King; it must always be absolutely necessary to give our Kings proper Powers for these purposes: the supreme and ultimate determination of all disputes about property is lodged solely in this House; and the raising of money for the public use, or laying Taxes upon the People, is what now seems to be principally the province of the other House. Thus the three Branches of the Legislature are a check upon one another, which prevents its being in the power of any one of them to oppress the People, or to destroy the other two. Under this Establishment we have been happy for many ages, under this the nation has grown up to a very high pitch of riches and power; and while this Establishment continues, it is more than probable, we shall always be happy.

But, my Lords, by the Bill now before us, we are to establish a fourth Power, a new sort of Power, which, I am persuaded, will soon become independent of the other three. This is making a most considerable alteration in the Constitution; an alteration that may be attended with such fatal consequences, that it makes me tremble to think of it: to establish a General for life at the head of a well-disciplined army, commanded by Officers who [could not be removed but by the consent of one another, would soon put it in the power of that

that General to make himself master of both King and Parliament: the transition from *Dux* to *Rex* would soon become easy to him; by this the Constitution might be entirely overthrown, and the nation might be involved in a multitude of calamities.

It is true, my Lords, that by what is proposed in the Bill now before us, an Officer may still be removed from his Command in the Army, upon an Address of either House of Parliament; but as the Parliament cannot always be kept sitting, this Address could not be speedily obtained: and if an Officer should be discovered to be conspiring the overthrow of the Government, and should, notwithstanding, be continued in his Commission, and in the possession of that power in the army which he had, by virtue of his Commission, till the next Session of Parliament, both Houses might, perhaps, address for turning him out: but his power in the Army might, perhaps, by that time be so well established, that it would be out of the power of both King and Parliament to divest him of his Command: and as for a trial by Court-Martial, I believe it would not be so much as pretended, that a sentence could be got against such an Officer, or indeed, against any Officer who had a great influence in the army: it is not to be presumed that Officers would be ready to condemn one another, unless it was for a crime which they themselves could no way approve of, especially when they knew that they could not be removed by any other authority.

Since then, my Lords, I can see no manner of occasion for the Regulation now proposed; since I am of opinion, that it would be great injury done to his Majesty, that it would tend to destroy all military discipline in the Army, and would greatly endanger, if not totally subvert our happy Constitution, I cannot therefore agree to the giving it a second reading.

Lord Hervey, Jan. 17, 1734.

THE Honourable Gentleman who spoke first for the Motion, has indeed made the best excuse for the Ministry that can be

made, Ministers are but men, sometimes weak men; and though it would be unjust to suppose them endued with a spirit of prophecy, yet, I think, they should at least be possessed of a tolerable share of prudence. I should not, indeed, wonder, if one or two Measures went wrong upon a Minister's hand, through unavoidable accidents; yet I think it strange, that every Measure should go wrong; that not one of the numerous expedients that have been set on foot for securing the tranquillity of Europe, or providing for the security of Great-Britain, should prove effectual. Sir, I own this gives me strong apprehensions of what I am not inclined to express on the occasion. I own that I was apt to think, that the round of Negotiations and Treaties we have been carrying on for these ten or twelve years past, with all the Powers of Europe, might have procured us, at least, some respite from a burden which our forefathers never knew; I mean, Sir, that of a standing Army. I call it a standing Army, because it has continued for these many years; and we have always been told the same things over and over again, as reasons why it is continued. I have, during many years, told the House every Session, that we should have a return of the very same reasons next Session; but Gentlemen never seemed to believe me, though they have hitherto found my words but too true. Now, Sir, as the same causes have subsisted for above these forty years, without being any worse for the wearing, I am apt to think that they may subsist forty years longer; and while the same causes subsist, the same effects must follow: so that in reality a standing Army may be thought as much a part of our Constitution, as the more lawful Prerogative, or Privilege, which either Prince or People may claim. But, Sir, though even the Gentlemen who are most conversant in Public Affairs, will, I believe, be puzzled to find out one new argument in favour of a standing Army, yet there is nothing easier than to bring twenty against it. The reason of this, Sir, is because it produces but one single good, which is the security of the Administration; but
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it begets many inconveniencies, two of which are the impoverishing the People, and the increase of Taxes.

And here give me leave to say, Sir, that no country can give more melancholy instances of the effects of a military force than England can. The very army which was raised by the Parliament in defence of the subjects, against some encroachments made by Charles the 1st upon their liberties, afterwards gave law to the Parliament itself, turned its Members out of doors, razed our Constitution to the foundation, and brought that unhappy Prince to the block. This catastrophe, Sir, was not owing to the People; for of them, nine parts in ten were well affected to the person and cause of the King; but to their Army, which, like other wild beasts, turned upon and destroyed their keepers. After the Restoration of the Royal Family, the Prince then upon the Throne raised a few guards, which never swelled to above 5890; and yet so jealous was the nation even of that small number, that he never could get his Parliament, prostitute as it was, to pass over one Session without taking notice of them. This, Sir, was the more extraordinary, as the Parliament was never asked for any money for their support; and the money which was then raised for the support of the Government, was nothing when compared with the sums that have been granted since. The next Parliament proved as uneasy to him on this head as the former had been; and were so distrustful of his intentions, that they appointed Commissioners of their own, for applying the money granted for disbanding them, and it was paid into the Chamber of London. Nay, Sir, as a farther proof of the apprehensions the Nation was under from a standing Army, they came to a Resolution, 'That the continuance of standing Forces in this Kingdom, other than the Militia, is illegal, and a great grievance and vexation to the People.' I have mentioned this period of our history, Sir, to shew, that notwithstanding the venality of that very Reign, the Parliament never could be brought to concur with what might one day overthrow both

their own and the People's Liberties. If the nation was then so jealous of an inconsiderable number, which did not cost it a shilling, ought we consent to keep on foot so formidable a number as eighteen thousand? Sir, it is in vain for any Gentleman to say, that the Army is under the direction of a wise and a just Sovereign, who will never harbour a thought inconsistent with the good of his subjects. I am as thoroughly persuaded of his Majesty's personal virtues as any Gentleman; but an Army, when it once finds its own power, may very probably refuse to take laws, even from that very Sovereign under whose immediate direction they are. The Parliament's Army, Sir, was as absolutely under the direction of the Parliament in the time of Charles the First, as any Army is now under the direction of his Majesty; and yet it is well known, they obeyed orders no longer than they found it convenient for themselves.

The period, Sir, from which we are to date the rise of our standing Army in Britain, is the ninth year of the late King William, when the Parliament granted an Army of ten thousand men for the service of the current year. This was done, in consideration of the powerful faction at that time subsisting in the kingdom in favour of King James. And if ever a standing Army can be of use at any time, it is at such a juncture. But nothing, Sir, can make so palpable an infraction of the subjects rights, as established at the Revolution, go down. Though this nation was then blessed with a Prince that had hazarded every thing to free us from oppression and tyranny, and therefore could never be supposed to have any designs upon our Constitution; yet many Gentlemen, who were friends of the Revolution upon principles of liberty, with one consent remonstrated against a standing Army, though but kept up from year to year, as subversive of the People's Rights, and of the Revolution principles.

Some I know, Sir, who appeared early for the Revolution, were so much delighted with the sunshine of a Court, that
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they joined in all its measures, though some of them were found to be directly opposite to the principles upon which the Revolution was founded: but we find that they, who ever were acknowledged to be the sincere well-wishers of that cause, forsook them, and could never be brought to concur with them in any one measure. On this account, Sir, these Gentlemen were branded by some, who then sat in the House, with the name of Jacobites and Republicans, two denominations of men equally enemies to the present establishment. But, Sir, there was this difference betwixt their antagonists and them, that the former never refused to concur with any measure proposed by the Court, and the latter never voted for any step that was disliked by their country.

Their late deliverance from a Prince, who, by means of his Army, aimed at arbitrary Power, made them look back with so much horror upon the precipice they had just escaped, that there was an express Proviso against standing Armies in times of peace, inserted in the Claim of Right, which we may in some measure call the last great Charter of our Liberty. I own that it gives me great concern to see Gentlemen, who have always valued themselves upon treading in the footsteps of those who brought about the Revolution, act a part so inconsistent with the principles of their ancestors, by voting for this Question. I know a set of men under a different denomination, who have always been more moderate in their pretences, but more steady in their adherence to those principles. I am not at all inclined to revive any party distinction; but I will venture to say, Sir, that let any man compare the conduct of some Gentlemen who have affected to pass for Whigs, with that of Gentlemen who have always been looked on as Tories, he shall find the latter acting a part most consistent with the Revolution Principles. He will find them opposing the Crown in every encroachment upon the People, and in every infringement of the Claim of Right. He never will find them complimenting the Crown at the expence of the People when in

Post, nor distressing it by opposing any reasonable Measure when out. Can some Gentlemen, Sir, who now affect to call themselves Whigs, boast of such an uniformity of conduct? Can they say that times and circumstances never influenced the Measures they pursued? Or that when they were in Office, they always acted in consequence of the Principles they professed when they were out? Sir, I believe I have sat long enough in this House to convince Gentlemen, if there were occasion, of very great inconsistencies in certain characters. But, Sir, I forbear it, because the eyes of some of these Gentlemen seem to be now open, and I hope these distinctions are in a great measure either entirely abolished or better understood.

As no Question, Sir, is of greater importance, so none has been so frequently debated in this House as the present. Yet I never heard any Gentleman make a doubt, that a standing Army in time of peace was a grievance to the People of Great-Britain. But, Sir, the Tories always opposed this Grievance. When his late Majesty, upon the Rebellion against him being suppressed, for the ease of his subjects, ordered ten thousand of his troops to be disbanded, I remember a particular friend of mine, who always passed for a Tory, proposed that it should be inserted in our Address to his Majesty on that occasion, *That nothing could more endear his Majesty to all his subjects, than his reducing the Land Forces to the old establishment of guards and garrisons, as his Majesty found it at his Accession to the Throne.* This, Sir, happened in the fourth year of his late Majesty's Reign; and had his Majesty thought fit to have made the proposed reduction, or, rather, had he been advised by his Ministers to have done it, and had the Military Establishment continued on that footing till now, we should have discharged upwards of twelve millions of our national debt, and yet have enabled his Majesty to have made good such engagements with his allies, as tended to secure the public tranquillity.

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As to what the Honourable Gentleman, who spoke last, mentioned with regard to restraining the Liberty of the Press, and concerning the general depravity that obtains among the People, I shall leave him to be answered by other Gentlemen, who can do it much better than I can. But I agree with the Honourable Gentleman so far as to own, that the People are at present very much dissatisfied; and, as I think that ferment ought to subside gradually, I am willing to give my vote for a larger number of forces this Session, than perhaps I may think necessary to be kept up the next. I therefore move, That the number of Land Forces for the service of the current year may be twelve thousand men.

Mr. Shippen, Jan. 28, 1738.

THE keeping up of a numerous standing Army in time of peace, is absolutely inconsistent with the liberties of this country. Gentlemen talk of an army of eighteen thousand men, as always necessary to be kept up in this Island. This, Sir, is the true secret of this day's Motion: these Gentlemen know, that when peace is restored, the nation will insist upon a reduction being made; therefore, think they, let us now increase the army, that when peace is restored we may stop the mouths of the disaffected, (as they call them) by making a reduction of the troops we are now to add; and thus, Sir, we shall have a standing Army of eighteen thousand men saddled upon us for ever. As I am of opinion, that an army of eighteen thousand men is at least ten thousand more than we ought to have in time of peace; as I am of opinion, that such a numerous army can be necessary for no end, but that of enabling a Minister to trample upon the liberties of his country, I think the Motion ought to be rejected with disdain.

As for Ministers, they must not expect regard and esteem from their equipage, but from the wisdom and address of their negotiations: for a Minister with a blundering head, or one that is sent upon ridiculous errands, will make as sorry a figure with

with an equipage of regular troops, as an equipage of footmen; and I am afraid the ass's ears will appear much more conspicuous under a well-burnished head-piece, than ever they did under a well-powdered peruke.

Mr. Pulteney, Feb. 14, 1735.

As the keeping up of a great number of land forces in this Island is quite unnecessary, and even inconsistent with the nature of our happy Constitution, and the freedom of our Government; therefore, when any war is like to break out in which we may probably have a concern, we are always obliged to take foreign troops into our pay: whether we have always been in the right when we have done so, is what I shall not now controvert; but I have always observed, that no foreign Prince would lend us any of his troops, without our engaging not only to pay them, but to grant him a subsidy, perhaps greater than the pay of those troops, upon their own footing, would have amounted to; and that, even in cases where the Prince stood obliged, perhaps by former Treaties, to assist us with troops at his own expence; and often in cases, when his own preservation was more immediately concerned in the event of the war than ours.

Mr. Walter Plumer, Jan. 26, 1736.

In a free country, I am afraid that a standing Army rather occasions than prevents mobs: where a Magistrate has a guard of regular troops to trust to, he is apt to neglect humouring the People he despises and sometimes oppresses; in which case the People as long as there is any spirit among them, will certainly grow tumultuous. If a tumult happens with any just cause of complaint, a little gentle usage and calm reasoning, generally prevents any mischief, and prevails with the People to return to their duty: but a Magistrate with an army at his back will seldom take this method, for few men will be at the pains of persuading, when they know they can compel. But

in a free country, if a tumult happens from a just cause of complaint, the people ought to be satisfied, their grievances ought to be redressed ; they ought not surely to be immediately knocked on the head, because that they happen to complain in an irregular way. To make use of regular troops upon every such occasion, is like a tyrannical school-master, who never makes use of the soft arts of persuasion and allurements, but always makes use of the rod : such a man may break the *spirit*, but never can improve the *minds* of his scholars.

Sir John Barnard, Feb. 3, 1737.

OUR armies have known no other power than that of the Secretary at War, who directs all their motions, and fills up every vacancy without opposition, and without appeal.

But never, my Lord, was his power more conspicuous than in raising the levies of this year ; never was ever any authority more despotically exerted, or more tamely submitted to ; never did any man more wantonly sport with his command, or more capriciously sport with posts of preferment ; never did any tyrant appear to set censure more openly at defiance, treat murmurs or remonstrances with greater contempt, or with more confidence or security distribute posts amongst his slaves, without any other reason of preferment, than his own uncontrollable pleasure.

And surely no man, my Lords, could have made choice of such wretches for military commands, but to shew, that nothing but his own private inclinations should influence his conduct, and that he considered himself as supreme and unaccountable : for we have seen, my Lords, the same animals to-day cringing behind a counter, and to-morrow swelling in a military dress ; we have seen boys sent from school in despair of improvement, and entrusted with the military command : fools that cannot learn their duty, and children that cannot perform it, have been indiscriminately promoted : the dross of the nation has been collected together to compose our new forces, and every man
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who was too stupid or infamous to learn; or carry on any trade, has been placed, by this great disposer of honours, above the necessity of application, or the reach of censure.

Did not sometimes indignation, and sometimes pity, check the sallies of mirth, it would not be a disagreeable entertainment, my Lords, to observe in the Park, the various appearances of these raw Commanders, when they are exposing their new scarlet to view, and strutting with the first raptures of sudden elevation: to see the mechanic new-modelling his mien, and the stripping tottering beneath the weight of his cockade; or to hear the conversation of these new adventurers, and the instructive dialogues of school-boys and shopkeepers.

I take this opportunity, my Lords, of clearing myself from any suspicion of having contributed, by my advice, to this stupendous collection.

Duke of Argyle, Dec. 9, 1740.

SIR, let us at least, not adopt that damn'd *Machiavilian* doctrine, *that a free People cannot be governed but by force*, who may so easily be won by love and affection. An army, Sir, was never kept up in any country in time of peace, but, sooner or later, it was used against the Liberties of the People, and at last enslaved them.

Sir, I lament that the People of this country have now too unequal terms to contend upon, for securing their Properties and their Independency. *Machiavel* says, iron will prevail over gold; but, by this army added to the other power, our managers possess both—so are regardless of complaints, and of gratifying the expectations of the People. To whom can they fly for refuge, or from whom can they expect redress, if not from persons now at the helm of affairs, famed through the land for being the supporters of Liberty, and for their detestation of Tyranny and Oppression?

If the People do complain, perhaps they have just cause for so doing; feeling numberless burthens and taxes laid upon them,

them, chiefly to support needless offices and places at immense salaries : the People are sensible of it, by their being generally occupied by persons of loose lives, without abilities, who make them sine-cures, or, at most, appoint deputies, at small salaries, to transact them : they complain their Representatives are debauched from them, that *Tax-Masters vote Taxes, that the Army vote the Army*; in short, *Cuncti pœne patres clamant perisse pudorem*. I must confess, I almost despair of any good to be done in this detested age, or of any reformation, so many having drank of *Circe's* fell cup, the cup of corruption, that they are, imperceptibly to themselves, become monsters, and glory in it, that I almost join in with *Jugurtha's* reflection when he he left *Rome, Urbem venalem & mature perituram si Emptorem invenerit*.

Persons trained up in the principles of Liberty can ill brook this new doctrine, of being retained in subjection by an army; having imbibed other notions in their education, so strong as not to be able to divest themselves of them : that he, for one, did detest and abhor the men that would offer it, and did declare, *Manus hic inimica Tyrannis*. Could, Sir, our forefathers at the Revolution, have conceived that their much-boasted and dear-purchased Liberty would have ended in a large Standing Army, as a protection for *Bureaux* and *Pastors*, from the remonstrances of their much-injured posterity, and saddled with a debt of eight millions, would they have called that a *Deliverance*? They would scarce have thought the alternative a valuable consideration. Though I should allow, Sir, there is no intention in some of our managers to enslave us, it will be but a melancholy reflection when it does happen, towards alleviating the distressed, to say it was not intended. Is it not a severe imputation upon those who have every advantage to make themselves esteemed by, as the disposal of all the revenue, posts, and preferments in the realm, to call out for a Military to support their measures against the hate of the People? Does it not convey

convey something as if they were not the best managers in the world?

Persons in high stations, surrounded by flatterers and sycophants, are much imposed upon, and impose upon themselves, by imagining their actions are not, and ought not to be scanned by the People; they flatter themselves they are approved. Much in the manner of a story I have heard of a certain Esquire, oppressive and arbitrary in his neighbourhood, where he basked away, had good eating and drinking, for the sake of which many persons resorted to him, who always said as he said, commended all his faults, and told him they were virtues, and that the whole country admired him; and flattered him continually, for the sake only of what they could get from him.

He not long after put it to the test, by sallying out into a neighbouring village, where, instead of pæans and shouts of joy, he was saluted with dirt and dead dogs, and pelted out of the village with rotten eggs. He came home vastly disconcerted and dejected, and accosted his Parson, who had been one of the forwardest of his flatterers, *How now, Parson, says he, did not you tell me how much I was admired, and you see what has happened?*

Sir, I shall leave the application to the House, and conclude with imploring Gentlemen, if they have any bowels for their Country, any affection for his Majesty, and for his Family being long amongst us, or any regard for the Liberties of their Posterity, to reduce the Army, and to lessen thereby our numerous Taxes.

William Thornton, Esq; Nov. 26, 1751.

THE dangers that must arise from the introduction of foreign troops into the dependencies of the realm, if not illegal, might be very great; for it might easily be in the power of an ill designing Prince, to fill all the exterior parts of the dominions with foreign mercenaries, and take opportunities to make them the means of overturning the Constitution. No man should forget

forget the natural tendency of, standing foreign troops ; they cannot esteem your Laws ; they know not your Constitution ; they cannot respect it. Recollect the case of the Hanoverian soldier at Maidstone, where the commanding Officer told the civil Office, *Release the man, or I have eight thousand men here, and I will beat down your gaol, and take him by force.* Sir, that will be the language of Commanders of foreign troops ; they know not the Laws ; they cannot respect them. Disputes will arise in quarters, and they must be terminated in this manner. But let us turn our eyes to the other countries of Europe, and see what miserable work the soldiery have made. Sir, they have overturned Europe from its basis. Look at Sweden, where the King, merely by the means of an army, has cut the throat of Swedish Liberty, and rules by the sword : and I might here observe, *à-propos*, that this Administration in England was necessary to the mischief, or at least attempted to prevent a reparation. I do not assert this upon my own knowledge, but I have been told it upon pretty good authority, when the Empress of Russia was about to stir in favour of the old Government of Sweden, we interposed, and threatened her with the fleet of England, if she made any such attempt.

Right Hon. T. Townshend, Nov. 2, 1775.

B R I B E R Y.

THOUGH this Bill at first sight seemed to be a self-denying Bill, and to some particular Members, might perhaps prove so, yet I suspect the Commons, considered as a House of Parliament, would find in it a very great enlargement of power. Whatever tends to break the balance between the Powers essential to this Constitution, must, sooner or later, prove the ruin of the whole. An independent House of Commons, or an independent House of Lords, is as inconsistent with our Constitution, as an independent, that is an absolute King. Whoever loves the Liberties and Laws of his Country, would no more desire to see one than the other. Let Bribery be punished; but not by giving so much strength to one Power of this Constitution, as shall make it able to overbear the rest.

Bishop of Bangor, Jan. 21, 1731; on the Bill for preventing Bribery in the Election of Members of Parliament.

MY LORDS, it is now so late, and so much has been said in favour of the Motion, for the second reading of the Pension Bill, by Lords much abler than I am, that I shall detain you but a very short while with what I have to say upon the subject. It has been said by a Noble Duke, that this Bill can be looked on only as a Bill for preventing a grievance that is foreseen, and not as a Bill for remedying a grievance that is already felt; because it is not asserted, nor so much as insinuated in the Preamble of the Bill, that any corrupt practices are now made use of, for gaining an undue influence over the other House. My Lords, this was the very reason for bringing in the Bill. They could not assert, that any such practices are now made use of, without a proof; and the means for coming at this proof, is what they want, and what they propose to get by this Bill. They suspect there are such practices, but they cannot prove it.

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The crime is of such a secret nature, that it can very seldom be proved by witnesses; and therefore they want to put it to the trial, at least, of being proved by the oath of one of the parties; which is a method often taken in cases that can admit of no other proof. This is, therefore, no argument of the grievance not being felt; for a man may, very sensibly, feel a grievance, and yet may not be able to prove it.

That there is a suspicion of some such practices being now made use of, or that they will soon be made use of, the many Remonstrances from all parts of the united kingdoms are a sufficient proof. That this suspicion has crept into the other House, their having so frequently sent up this Bill, is a manifest demonstration, and a strong argument for its being necessary to have some such Bill passed into a law. The other House must be allowed to be better judges of what passes, or must pass, within their own walls, than we can pretend to be. It is evident, they suspect that corrupt practices have been, or soon may be made use of, for gaining an undue influence over some of their measures; and they have calculated this Bill for curing the evil if it is felt, for preventing it if it is only foreseen. That any such practices have been actually made use of, or are now made use of, is what I shall not pretend to affirm, but I am sure I shall not affirm the contrary. If any such are made use of, I will, with confidence, vindicate his Majesty. I am sure he knows nothing of them. I am sure he would disdain to suffer them; but I cannot pass such a compliment upon his Ministers, nor upon any set of Ministers that ever was, or ever will be, in this nation: and therefore I think I cannot more faithfully, more effectually serve his present Majesty, as well as his successors, than by putting it out of the power of Ministers to gain any corrupt influence over either House of Parliament. Such an attempt may be necessary for the security of the Minister, but never can be necessary for, must always be inconsistent with, the security of his Master: and the more necessary it is for the Minister's security, the

more inconsistent it will always be with the King's, and the more dangerous to the Liberties of the nation.

To pretend, my Lords, that this Bill diminishes, or any way encroaches upon the Prerogative, is something very strange. What Prerogative, my Lords? Has the Crown a Prerogative to bribe, to infringe the law, by sending its Pensioners into the other House? To say so, is destroying the credit, the authority of the Crown, under the pretence of supporting its Prerogative. If his Majesty knew, that any man received a Pension from him, or any thing like a Pension, and yet kept his seat in the other House, he would himself declare it, or withdraw his Pension, because he knows it is against law. This Bill, therefore, no way diminishes or encroaches upon the Prerogatives of the Crown, which can never be exercised but for the public good. It diminishes only the Prerogatives usurped by Ministers, which are never exercised but for its destruction. The Crown may still reward merit in the proper way, that is openly. The Bill is intended, and can operate only against clandestine rewards or gratuities given by Ministers. These are scandalous, and never were, nor will be given but for scandalous services.

True generosity, and true merit, my Lords, delight in sunshine. It is glorious to reward true merit, it is glorious to receive the reward; and therefore, whoever gives or receives the reward, will be fond of doing it publicly, and of declaring it openly, without fear of being impeached of corruption. When *Admiral Vernon* was a Member of the other House, the Majority was generally against him: they did not then like his face; and I believe, if he were still a Member, they would as little like it now: yet, if he should receive a reward from the Crown, that Majority would not, I believe, vote that reward to be a bribe. I am sensible, Majorities have sometimes done very extraordinary things; but yet I do not believe they would do this, because that Admiral has so well deserved a reward. He has done with *six* ships, about 2000 seamen, and 200 tattered soldiers from Jamaica, what, we are told, could not be

done

done by a larger Squadron, and at least 8000 seamen, when our ships and sailors lay rotting at the *Bastimento's*. When war was resolved on, he was called from ploughing the ground, to plough the ocean; and as the service of his country required dispatch, he desired but three days to settle his family-affairs. In time of peace, he was never employed: he was even disappointed in his preferment. The reason is plain: he was not fit for those services that entitle our sea and land Captains to preferment in time of peace. He had shewed it, when he was a Member of the other House; and this, I believe, is the true reason of his not being a Member now. But if he should be a Member in the next Parliament, as he probably will, if he lives, the passing of this Bill could no way prevent his Majesty from rewarding him in any manner he may then think fit; nor could his accepting of the reward subject him to any inconvenience or danger.

This Bill can, therefore, no way affect the Prerogatives of the Crown, or prevent any man's receiving a just and well-deserved reward; which is the only reward the Crown ought, or has any title, even from Prerogative, to bestow: for this Prerogative, like all the other Prerogatives of the Crown, is so far subject to the controul of Parliament, that if it be abused, the Parliament may enquire into, and punish the advisers of that abuse.

It is very remarkable, my Lords, it is even diverting, to see such a squeamishness about perjury upon this occasion, amongst those, who upon other occasions, have invented and enacted multitudes of oaths, to be taken by men who are under great temptations, from their private interest, to be guilty of perjury. Is not this the case of almost every oath that relates to the collection of the public revenue, or to the exercise of any office? Is not this perjury one of the chief objections made by the Dissenters against the Test and Corporation Act? And shall we shew a less concern for the preservation of our Constitution, than for the preservation of our Church? The reverend Bench should be cautious of making use of this argument, for if they

will not allow us an oath for the preservation of the former, it may induce many people to think, they ought not to be allowed an oath for the preservation of the latter.

By this time, I hope, my Lord, all the inconveniencies pretended to arise from this Bill have vanished; and therefore I shall consider some of the arguments brought to shew that it is not necessary. Here I must observe, that most of the arguments made use of for this purpose, are equally strong for a repeal of the laws we have now in being, against admitting Pensioners to sit and vote in the other House. If it be impossible to suppose, that a Gentleman of great estate, and ancient family, can, by a pension, be influenced to do what he ought not to do; and if we must suppose that none but such Gentlemen can ever get into the other House, I am sure the laws for preventing Pensioners from having seats in that House, are quite unnecessary, and ought to be repealed. Therefore, if these arguments prevail with your Lordships to put a negative upon the present Question, I shall expect to see that negative followed by a Motion for the repeal of those laws. Nay, in a few Sessions, I shall expect to see a Bill brought in, for preventing any man's being a Member of the other House, but such as have some place or pension under the Crown. As an argument for such a Bill, it must be said, that his Majesty's most faithful subjects ought to be chosen Members of Parliament, and that those Gentlemen will always be most faithful to the King that receive the King's money. I shall grant, my Lords, that such Gentlemen will be always the most faithful, and the most obedient to the Minister; but for this very reason, I should be for excluding them from Parliament. The King's real interest, however much he may be made by his Ministers to mistake it, must always be the same with the People's; but the Minister's interest is generally distinct from, and often contrary to both: therefore, I shall always be for excluding, as much as possible, from Parliament, every man who is under the least inducement to prefer the interest of the Minister,

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to that of both King and People: and this I take to be the case of every Gentleman, let his estate and family be what they will, that holds a pension at the will of the Minister.

Those who say, they depend so much upon the honour, integrity, and impartiality of men of family and fortune, seem to think our Constitution can never be dissolved, as long as we have the shadow of a Parliament. My opinion, my Lord, is so very different, that if ever our Constitution be dissolved, if ever an absolute Monarchy be established in this kingdom, I am convinced it will be under that shadow. Our constitution consists in the two Houses of Parliament being a check upon the Crown, as well as upon one another. If that check should ever be removed, if the Crown should, by corrupt means, by places, pensions, and bribes, get the absolute direction of our two Houses of Parliament, our Constitution will, from that moment, be destroyed. There would be no occasion for the Crown to proceed any farther. It would be ridiculous to lay aside the forms of Parliament; for under that shadow, our King would be more absolute, and might govern more arbitrarily than he could do without it. A Gentleman of family and fortune would not, perhaps, for the sake of a pension, agree to lay aside the forms of Government; because, by his venal service there, he earns his infamous pension, and could not expect the continuance of it, if those forms were laid aside: but a Gentleman of family and fortune may, for the sake of a pension, whilst he is in Parliament, approve of the most blundering measures, consent to the most excessive and useless grants, enact the most oppressive laws, pass the most villainous accounts, acquit the most heinous criminals, and condemn the most innocent persons, at the desire of that Minister who pays him his pension. And if a majority of such House of Parliament consisted of such men, would it not be ridiculous in us to talk of our Constitution, or to say we had any liberty left?

This misfortune, this terrible condition we may be reduced to by corruption: as brave, as free a people as we, the *Romans*,

were reduced to it by the same means; and to prevent such a horrid catastrophe, is the design of this House.

If people would at all think, if they would consider the consequences of corruption, there would be no occasion, my Lords, for making laws against it. It would appear so horrible, that no man would allow it to approach him. The corrupted ought to consider, that they do not sell their vote, or their country only: these, perhaps, they may disregard; but they sell likewise themselves: they become the bond-slaves of the corrupter who corrupts them, not for their sakes, but for his own. No man ever corrupted another, for the sake of doing him a service. And, therefore, if people would but consider, they would always reject the offer with disdain. But this is not to be expected. The histories of all countries, the history even of our own country shews, it is not to be depended on. The proffered bribe, people think, will satisfy the immediate cravings of some infamous appetite; and this makes them swallow the alluring bait, though the liberties of their country, the happiness of their posterity, and even their own liberty, evidently depend upon their refusing it. This makes it necessary, in every free State, to contrive, if possible, effectual laws against corruption: and as the laws we now have for excluding Pensioners from the other House, are allowed to be ineffectual, we ought to make a trial, at least, of the remedy now proposed: for though it should prove ineffectual, it will be attended with this advantage, that it will put us upon contriving some other remedy that may be effectual; and the sooner such a remedy is contrived and applied, the less danger we shall be exposed to of falling into that fatal distemper, from which no free State, where it has once become general, has ever yet recovered.

Earl of Chesterfield, Feb. 22, 1740.

CIVIL LIST.

I Agree with the Hon. Member who spoke first, (Sir Robert Walpole) that on his Majesty's happy Accession to the Throne, there ought to be no other contention amongst us, than who should most contribute to his service, than who should express their duty and loyalty in the most respectful and the most extensive manner. But then I hope he will agree with me, that this is to be done with some regard to those we represent : that this is to be done, consistent with the trust reposed in us ; consistent with that frugality which this House is bound to use, whenever the Crown is pleased to call upon it, to exercise its great power of giving money.

Now, notwithstanding what has been urged, I think we shall so far depart from the rule of frugality, as we exceed the revenue granted to his late Majesty, whether that exceeding shall amount yearly to 93,000*l.* as computed at the highest by the Hon. Member, or to above 130,000*l.* as I have seen it more truly computed by another. For I remember very well, that the yearly sum of 700,000*l.* though now thought too little, was not obtained for his late Majesty, without a long and solemn debate ; and it was allowed by every one that contended for it, to be an ample Royal revenue. Nor was it asked inconsiderately, and on a sudden ; it was asked on mature deliberation, after the Queen's Civil List branches were found deficient ; it was asked after many computations had been made of every charge requisite to support the honour and dignity of the Crown, and to maintain the present Royal Family ; it was asked, after duly weighing what provision would be sufficient to answer all the ordinary and extraordinary occasions of the Civil Government ; what would be sufficient to answer all proper augmentations of salaries, all reasonable and charitable pensions, all secret services at home and abroad, necessary to carry on a just

and wise Administration, It was asked by that Hon. Member himself and others, who were entering into great employments, who were going to taste of the Royal bounty, and who therefore could not possibly be suspected to have any design of cramping his Majesty, by a too contracted and narrow revenue.

Nor does the late alteration in the Royal Family call for any increase of expence. For if the establishment for the Queen should be enlarged; whose distinguished character and many princely virtues, taken notice of in your Address, entitle her to all degrees of grandeur, which any former Queen Consort ever enjoyed; I say, if her Majesty's establishment should be enlarged, I presume the establishment for Prince Frederick will be much inferior to that settled on his present Majesty when Prince of Wales. Besides, our ardent wishes for his Majesty's constant residence in these kingdoms, and his Royal intentions of making us a great and happy people, give us hopes, that many personal, many particular expences in the late reign, especially those for frequent journeys to Hanover, will be discontinued and entirely cease.

Nor is it any objection to the reasoning of that time, when the 700,000*l.* was granted to the late King, or to the computation then made, that this sum is said to have been found, by the experience of past times, to be not answerable to the necessities of the Civil Government.

For this experience could not be found in the Queen's reign, because her Civil List branches seldom amounted to 600,000*l.* commonly to about 550,000*l.* and sometimes to very little above 500,000*l.* as appears by accounts formerly laid before this House: and I will not suppose those accounts which were brought from the Treasury to be otherwise than true, in regard to my Hon. Friend.—I ask pardon, I should have said the Hon. Member, for there is no friendship betwixt us. But he must give me leave to observe, that when he asserts her Civil List Branches amounted to about 700,000*l.* yearly, he can only mean

mean the gross, and not the neat produce; which is a very uncandid and fallacious way of arguing.

Though her revenues were so low, yet she called upon her Parliament but once in her reign of above thirteen years, to pay the debts contracted in her Civil Government; and it is a justice due to the memory of that excellent Princess, to remind Gentlemen of the unparalleled instances of her piety and generosity which occasioned those debts. She gave the first-fruits and tenths, arising now, as the Hon. Member who made this Motion, says, to 19,000*l.* a year, for the augmentation of the maintenance of the poor Clergy; she gave 5000*l.* a year out of the Post-office to the Duke of Marlborough; she suffered 700*l.* a week to be likewise charged on the Post-office for the public service, and by that concession lost a vast sum, the additional duty then producing only 8000*l.* a year; she gave several hundred thousand pounds for building the Castle of Blenheim; she allowed Prince Charles of Denmark 4000*l.* a year; she sustained great losses by the Tin Contract; she supported the poor Palatines; she gave 100,000*l.* to the use of the war.—These, with many other Royal bounties, which escape my present remembrance, were the reasons that brought her under the necessity of asking for 500,000*l.* But she was so sensible of the inconvenience, and so determined never to apply to her Parliament again in the like manner, that she ordered a considerable reduction to be made of her Civil Government expences. I have seen a scheme of this reduction, as it was actually settled a little before her death, and intended to commence the Lady-day following. It would be tedious to go through all the particular articles of it, and I will only name three or four. The Chamberlain's-office payments were reduced from 85,000*l.* to 75,000*l.* the allowances for Foreign Ministers from 75,000*l.* to 30,000*l.* Pensions and Bounties from upwards of 87,490*l.* to 60,000*l.* Secret Services from 27,000*l.* to 20,000*l.* a sum surprizingly small, when compared with the late disbursements on that head. In short, the whole yearly expences were designed

signed to be reduced to 459,941 l. and that would have been done without eclipsing the glory of the Crown, which, some Gentlemen so roundly affirm, cannot now be maintained under almost a double appointment.

From hence it appears plainly, that this argument of the experience of past times can have no reference to the Queen's reign. It must therefore be applied, though put in the plural number, to the late Administration only: and I confess, if the same management was to be continued, if the same Ministers were to be again employed, a million a year would not be sufficient to carry on the exorbitant expences, so often, and so justly complained of in this House. For it is notorious, it is fresh in all our memories, that besides the yearly 700,000 l. there have been many occasional taxes, many excessive sums raised, and they have been all sunk in that bottomless gulf of Secret Service. First, the memorable 250,000 l. was raised, in defiance of the ancient parliamentary methods, to secure us from the apprehensions of a Swedish invasion. Then the two Insurance-offices were erected in as regular a manner, by a Bill brought into this House, at the latter end of a Session, and after the Committee of Supply had been closed, upon the Hon. Member's return into power; and those bubbles paid near 300,000 l. for their charters. Then a new scene of affairs opening in Sweden, changed our enmity into an alliance, and there was a subsidy of 72,000 l. implicitly granted, to make good some secret bargain and engagement with that Crown. At that time near 24,000 l. were given for burning two Merchant ships arrived from infected places; but the goods, as well as the ships, were paid for by the House, that they might, without injury to the Owners, be destroyed for the public safety; yet most of them were privately conveyed into counties adjacent to the port where the ships lay, and sold there. Then soon after a sum of 500,000 l. was demanded and granted for the payment of the Civil List Debts; on which occasion his late Majesty declared in his Message, " That he was resolved to cause a retrenchment

ment to be made of his expences for the future." But notwithstanding that resolution, in less than four years, the necessities of the Government having rendered the promised retrenchment impracticable, there was a new demand, and a new grant of 500,000*l.* more, to discharge new incumbrances. I might mention, too, the Spanish ships which were taken in the famous Mediterranean sea-fight, and, as we have reason to believe, sold for a considerable sum of money. Nor is it possible to forget the 125,000*l.* which we could only be told the last Session, in a general unexplained article, was secretly disposed of for the public utility, for the conservation of the peace of Europe, and for the security of the commerce and navigation of Great-Britain.

After all these and other extraordinary supplies, I am informed there yet remains a debt in the Civil Government of above 600,000*l.* If so, surely there must have been a most egregious neglect of duty, to say no worse; there must have been a strange spirit of extravagance somewhere, or such immense sums could never have been so soon, so insensibly squandered away: and it is amazing this extravagance should happen under the conduct of persons, pretending to surpass all their predecessors in the knowledge and care of the public revenue. But we are not to wonder that the world has been free in its censures, since none of these sums have been accounted for, since they have been employed in services not fit to be owned. None but those who were in the secret, and who had the disposal of them, can refute the reflections that are made without doors, not only on the Ministry, but even on both Houses of Parliament.—I must say no more—But I heartily wish, that time, the great discoverer of hidden truths and concealed iniquities, may produce a list of all such, if any such there were, who have been perverted from their public duty by private pensions; who have been the hired slaves, and the corrupt instruments of a profane and vain-glorious Administration. If there have been none such, then the whole weight, then the whole

whole guilt of the late mismanagement lies on the Ministers themselves,

But it seems to be matter of universal joy to the nation, that the case is like to be altered; we hope we are arrived at a day of better oeconomy; we hope such practices will be so far from being imitated, that they will be detested and abhorred: nor can any one entertain the least doubt of this, when he considers that a Prince is ascending the Throne, who will chuse a knowing, faithful, and frugal Ministry; who will not permit his domestic or foreign affairs to be negotiated by bribery and corruption, for want of sufficiency and skill in politics; whose wisdom will enable him, and whose goodness will incline him, not only to inspect the management of the Civil List branches, but in justice to his Parliaments, and in compassion to his people, to direct and require a due and exact disposition of all the other public funds, according to their respective appropriations.

Now, in consequence of this most just notion of his Majesty's frugality, which, amongst other his innumerable virtues, endears him so much to his subjects, I hope I may, without offence, propose the addition of some words to the question, that may restrain it to 700,000*l.* and in this I as much consult the service of his Majesty, and the honour and dignity of the Crown, as those who are for granting the funds without any restrictions. For, in my humble opinion, the voting a greater than was settled on his late Majesty, is only voting an indemnity; is voting at least in favour of Ministers, whose conduct, as I have already hinted, if laid before you, and duly examined, would perhaps rather deserve your censure than approbation.

Besides, the surplus of these branches is appropriated to the Sinking Fund; and that, I thought had been a sacred depositum, reserved for the gradual discharge of the national debt. I thought it would be looked upon as a sort of sacrilege, to have diverted the least part of it, on any pretence whatsoever, from its original uses: and it is as surprizing to me, that the Honour-

able Person should be for destroying his own darling project, and that he should be for pulling down the boasted monument of his glory, as it may be to others,—that I am for supporting any scheme of his, which might have transmitted his name with advantage to posterity.

If his Majesty was rightly apprized of these circumstances, he would doubtless rather be content with a clear annual revenue of 700,000 l. than suffer his first demand of money, by any precipitate proof of our zeal, to carry the least appearance of being burthensome to his people, who have long laboured under the pressure of grievous and exorbitant taxes; for he has been graciously pleased to signify from the Throne his fixed resolution, “By all possible means to merit their love and affection, which he shall always look upon as the best support and security of his Crown.”

Mr. Shippen, July 3, 1727, on Sir Robert Walpole's Motion for settling on the King the entire revenues of the Civil List.

I MUST declare it to be my opinion, that the creditors of the public have, in a manner, a right to that sacred fund, called the Sinking Fund; it is in its nature a security to them: first, for the payment of the interest coming yearly due to them; and next for the payment of their principal sums. The whole people of England have a right to have it duly applied; because it is by such application only, that we can get free of those many and grievous taxes, which lie so heavy upon the poor, and are such a clog to the trade and the manufactures of this nation: and therefore the applying that fund to any other use, is robbing the public creditors of their right, and doing an injustice to the whole people of England.

The present circumstances of this motion are, my Lords, in some manner deplorable. By the many taxes we now pay, the necessities and conveniencies of life are rendered so dear, that it is impossible for our tradesmen or manufacturers to live so cheap, or to sell the produce of their country at so small a price

as our neighbours do: from hence it is, my Lords, that our neighbours are every day encroaching upon us, and our trade is daily decaying. If a journeyman in any manufacture whatever, can live better in France or Germany on six-pence a day than he can live in England on a shilling, we may depend on it, that most of our tradesmen will find their way thither, if they are not prevented either by our own good politics, or by some very bad policy amongst our neighbours: and if a master tradesman can get the same work done in France for six-pence, which would cost him a shilling in England, he certainly can undersell the English tradesman in all the foreign markets in the world. The only method, therefore, to preserve our trade, is to take off these taxes, which now lie so heavy upon the poor tradesmen and labourers; and this the whole people of England know, can be done no other way but by a due application of the Sinking Fund. How shocking then must it be to the whole nation, to see that fund plundered of so large a sum at once? The whole nation must from thence conclude, that they must for ever groan under these taxes and burthens, which they now find almost insupportable, and which must soon become absolutely so, by the decay of our trade and our manufactures.

This fund, my Lords, has therefore been clandestinely defrauded of several small sums, at different times, which, indeed, together, amount to a pretty large sum: but by the Bill which we have ordered to be committed, (for granting to his Majesty a certain sum out of the Sinking Fund) it is to be openly and avowedly plundered of 500,000 l. at once. After such a direct misapplication of that fund, can any public creditor depend upon his ever being paid his principal sum? Can any public creditor ever think himself secure, even of that yearly interest or annuity which is due to him? By this Bill, he sees one half of the Sinking Fund applied to the current service of the year: this he sees done, and this, my Lords, he sees done at a time of the most profound peace and tranquillity: how then can he be cer-

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tain, but that the whole Sinking Fund may be next year applied to the same purposes? He must then see himself deprived of all hopes of ever receiving his principal sum; and if the funds now appropriated to the payment of the yearly interest or annuities, growing due to the public creditors, should hereafter prove deficient, where could they have recourse for the payment even of those annuities? The Sinking Fund being otherwise applied, their annuities, or at least some part of them, must remain unpaid; and at last, perhaps, the whole might cease. Such a suspicion may, even by this misapplication, arise among the creditors of the public; and if such should arise, it would be the most terrible shock that ever happened to the public credit of this nation. To prevent, therefore, any such suspicion, it will be absolutely necessary for your Lordships to come to some resolution for quieting the minds of the people, and for assuring them, that no such misapplication shall for the future be admitted of on any pretence whatever.

Lord Carteret, May 30, 1733.

I WONDER to hear it affirmed by any Noble Lord in this House, that the public creditors have any manner of right in the Sinking Fund: they certainly have no right to any part of it: they have a right only to receive their yearly interest when it comes due; for the payment of which there are other funds appropriated: and therefore as long as they are regularly paid their interest, they have nothing to fear, they have nothing to complain of. It is well known that the Sinking Fund was from its very first original, subject to be disposed of by Parliament; and the Parliament has it still in their power to apply it to the paying off a part of the public debt, or to whatever other public use they shall think most proper; and in this year, there is as much of it applied towards the paying off the public debts as is either necessary or convenient.

By the same Bill, my Lords, there is a million to be applied towards the paying off a part of the public debts of the nation, which

which is more than the creditors of the public either desire or expect. The circumstances of this nation are now so happy, and the public credit so well established, that none of the public creditors desire to have their money: on the contrary, my Lords, we see that those funds bear the highest price, and are the most sought after, which are expected to be the longest in being paid off. Under such circumstances we have an opportunity to look about us, and to apply a part of that fund where we find it is most wanted: this is what is proposed by this Bill. It must be granted, my Lords, that the landed Gentlemen have of all others borne for many years the greatest share of the public charge; they are, therefore, the first that ought to be relieved; and for this reason, 500,000 l. part of the Sinking Fund, is to be applied to the current service of the present year, in order to relieve them of a part of that burden they have long laboured under. Since then by this Bill the landed Gentlemen are to be relieved, and the service of the year provided for without contracting any new-debt, or laying any new burden on the people, it must be allowed to be a public benefit. It is, my Lords, a good design; such a design as can give no man an alarm; it can raise no jealousies or fears, and is, therefore, highly deserving your Lordships approbation and support.

Duke of Newcastle, May 30, 1733.

THE Message that has been read, will, I dare say, meet with no obstruction in this House. It is with pleasure, Sir, that every good subject sees the Royal Line so strong, as to secure a long duration of happiness to these kingdoms, in the persons of his Majesty's descendants: and the attachment of his Royal House to the liberties of this nation, give us all reason to hope, that succeeding Princes will tread in the paths of his present Majesty, who has been hitherto so careful of all his subjects rights, and so watchful over their preservation.

Sir, his Majesty has been so tender of asking for any thing on account of his own family, that they are now, in case of his
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his demise, in a more precarious situation than the children of any Gentlemen of fortune in England. In such an event, Sir, which heaven avert ! no Gentleman can, from the history of our constitution, take upon him to say, in what manner they have a right to be provided for. I believe a future Parliament will reflect with gratitude upon the blessings of his present Majesty's reign, and make a suitable provision for his Royal progeny ; but I imagine no Gentleman in this House, would chuse to leave the provision of his younger children upon a precarious footing. Parliaments, like other bodies, are changeable ; and it would be an unpardonable neglect in his Majesty, as a father, should he leave so numerous an issue to the uncertainty of a parliamentary provision to be made after his demise.

The other only method, by which his Majesty's younger children in such a case could be provided for, is by the Prince upon the Throne. But, Sir, tho' I have, and I believe every Gentleman has, the greatest opinion of the virtues of the Royal Person who is the Heir of the Crown, yet we are to consider, that his Royal Highness is blessed with a young progeny ; and that, as no man can answer for events, if the two Royal lives should fall before the children of his Royal Highness are of age, the Government devolves upon a Regency : and give me leave, Sir, to say, that there is no precedent in this nation, nor any positive law now in being, that can determine, as the Royal Family must in such a case stand, to what person the Regency devolves. This consideration is of itself sufficient to justify the application now made by his Majesty to this House ; it is no more than any private Gentleman would do, to put his younger children above a precarious dependence : and I dare say, that no Gentleman will think, that his Majesty ought to be put under disabilities, which every one here, who is a father, would look upon as hard and unreasonable.

I hope Gentlemen are fully convinced, how becoming it is in his Majesty, as a father, to make such an application ; and how becoming it is in us, as a House of Commons, to answer

it in the most effectual manner: the only consideration, therefore, that Gentlemen can now have, is with regard to the *quantum* that is demanded by this Message. As to that, Sir, I will venture to say, that when we grant it, it is the smallest provision that ever was granted for the Crown of Britain; nay, the whole of the provision for four Royal Personages, does not amount to one half of what former Parliaments have thought but a moderate provision for one. King James, Sir, when Duke of York, had 100,000*l.* settled upon him by Act of Parliament; and that, I think, is the only parliamentary provision for younger children that can serve as a precedent on this occasion, because it is the only one since the Restoration; for before that time the Crown had a great property in lands, and could, without a parliamentary concurrence, provide for its younger children. King Charles the II^d had ^{not} a lawful issue of his own body to provide for; the children of King James were married, and their settlements made before he came to the Crown; King William had no children; Queen Anne had none that lived till after she came to be Queen; and the daughters of his late Majesty were married before his accession to the Throne of Britain. Upon the whole, therefore, I believe there never was a demand made by the Crown more reasonable and moderate than this is. It is for a provision to younger children, which cannot be made without consent of Parliament; and a provision so moderate, that I dare say, no other objections to it will be made in this House, but that it is too little. Therefore I humbly move, That leave be given to bring in a Bill, to enable his Majesty to settle an annuity of 15,000*l.* *per annum* upon his Royal Highness the Duke of Cumberland, and his heirs; and also one other annuity of 24,000*l.* *per annum* upon the Princesses Amelia, Carolina, Mary, and Louisa.

Sir Robert Walpole, May 3, 1739.

SIR,

SIR, we ought to look back to what former Princes and Parliaments have done. I will take the consideration only from the glorious æra of the Revolution, and I will state it fairly and fully. The Civil List was not granted to King William for life till the year 1698, when 700,000 l. a year was settled on him. The distractions of his Government, and of all Europe at that period, are well known. His most generous views for the public were thwarted at home, during the greater part of his Reign, by the Tories. Queen Anne had the same annuity settled on her. She gave yearly 100,000 l. for carrying on the war, a war against France, besides 200,000 l. at least towards the building of Blenheim-House, and above 100,000 l. for the support of the poor Palatines. It is on the Journals of May 13, 1715, and in the following. "Resolved, " That the sum of 700,000 l. *per annum* was settled upon his " late Majesty King William during life, for the support of his " Majesty's household, and other his necessary occasions; and, " at the time of his Majesty's demise, after the deduction of " 3700 l. a week, that was applied to the public uses, was the " produce of the Civil List Revenues, that were continued " and settled upon her late Majesty Queen Anne during her " life." The deduction for public services at 3700 l. a week, or 192,400 l. a year, from that part of the Civil List Revenue called the hereditary and temporary Excise, was first made in the last year of King William. Notwithstanding this deduction, the Civil List Funds produced in that very year 709,420 l. In the first of Queen Anne, the same funds with the same deductions were settled on her for life, and declared to be for raising 700,000 l. a year for the support of her household, and the dignity of her Government. In the ninth of her Reign the old Post-Office Act was repealed, and a new General Post-Office with higher rates were established; in consideration of which, another deduction was made from the Civil List Revenue of 700 l. a week, or 36,400 l. a year, and both these deductions have ever since been continued.

M 2

George

George the Ist had the same Revenue settled upon him as Queen Anne; but if 300,000*l.* paid him by the Royal Exchange and London Assurance Companies, and a million granted in 1726 towards paying his debts, are included, his income will appear to have been nearly 800,000*l. per annum.* In the first speech to his Parliament he took notice, "That it was his happiness to see a Prince of Wales, who may, in due time, succeed to the Throne, and to see him blessed with many children." Yet the establishment of the Civil List, at the beginning of that Reign, was only settled at 700,000*l.* a year. It was not till after the great expences consequent on the rebellion of the Earl of Mar, and the other perjured Scots, who, although they had taken the oaths of allegiance to his Government, traitorously waged open and impious war against a mild and just Sovereign, that the Parliament paid the King's debts. In the Reign of George the Ist, the Prince of Wales had an Establishment of 100,000*l. per annum.*

George the II^d had a very numerous family, and 800,000*l.* was at first settled upon him, with whatever surplus might arise from the duties and allowances composing the Civil List Revenue. In 1726, that part of the hereditary and temporary Excise, which consisted of Duties on Spirituous Liquors, was taken from the Civil List, in consideration of which 70,000*l.* was transferred to it from the Aggregate Fund. The income of George the II^d, including 115,000*l.* granted in 1729, and 456,733*l.* in 1747, towards making good the deficiencies which had arisen in the Civil List Duties, was 810,749*l. per annum* for thirty-three years. His late Majesty likewise had in his reign a Scottish Rebellion, carried on by many of the same traitors who had been pardoned by his father. The expence of that Rebellion to the King and Kingdom was enormous; for it was not confined to the extremities of the Island, but raged in the heart of the Kingdom, and the rebels advanced to within a hundred miles of the capital. Such an event, Sir,

no

not unforeseen, because foretold, was a just ground for the Parliament's discharging a debt, contracted by securing to us every thing dear to men and Englishmen.

The establishment of the present King, at the yearly rent-charge to the nation of 800,000*l.* was a measure, at the time, equally pleasing both to the Prince and People. The Minister boasted, that there was not a possibility of any future dispute about the hereditary Revenues, or concerning accounts suspected to be false, wilfully erroneous, or deceitful, kept back or anticipated, to serve a particular purpose. I am aware, Sir, that the Civil List Revenues have been increasing for many years. The mean annual produce for the five last years of George the II^d was 829,150*l.* and for the first six years of his present Majesty it would have been, had the establishment in the late reign continued 894,000*l.* In 1775 it would have been 1,019,450*l.* Near 90,000*l.* *per annum* of this great increase has been produced by an increase in the Post-Office revenue, occasioned chiefly by the late alteration in the manner of franking, and by the falling of the cross posts to the public by the death of Mr. Allen: but these profits would probably, at least certainly ought to have been reserved to the public, had the establishment in the late reign been continued. At the foot of one of the accounts on our table, it is stated, "The amount of 800,000*l.* granted to his Majesty, from Oct. 25, 1760, to Jan. 5, 1777, is 12,965,517*l.* 4*s.* 9*d.* $\frac{1}{4}$. "The produce as above exceeds the annuity by 2,381,241*l.* 9*s.* 1*d.* $\frac{1}{4}$. But Parliament granted to pay off the Civil List debt on Jan. 5, 1769, out of the supplies for the year 1769, 513,511*l.* which being deducted, shews the gain to the public to be 1,867,730*l.* 9*s.* 1*d.* $\frac{1}{4}$." The bargain concluded for the public, was of an annuity to the King of a clear 800,000*l.* subject to no deductions or contingencies for his life, on a solemn promise of that being made to bear all the expences of the Civil List and the Royal Household. It was a fair compact of finance between the King and the subject, rati-

fied by both parties. The most explicit assurances were given by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in the King's name, that no more should be asked; and that now his Majesty could never be under the disagreeable necessity of importuning this House with messages of personal concern. I have, Sir, carefully examined the accounts laid before the House by his Majesty's command, the eight folio books, and the other papers; and I will venture to say, they are as loose, unsatisfactory, perplexed, and unintelligible, as those delivered in by the Noble Lord with the blue ribbon in 1770, a year after the former demand to pay the debts on the Civil List; and more loose, unsatisfactory, perplexed, and unintelligible, no accounts can be.

Mr. Wilkes, April 16, 1777.

OUR funded debt is two hundred and thirty millions, and our unfunded debt will amount to thirty-eight millions, without the bottom of the war expences being wound up, besides nine millions Navy Bills, and other debts, that will make the whole amount to the enormous sum of two hundred and ninety millions; the yearly interest of which would take fourteen millions to discharge: now our national estate, including Malt and Land-Tax, and the whole of the Sinking Fund, amounts only to thirteen millions two hundred thousand pounds; so that there will remain eight hundred thousand pounds to be provided annually to make good the interest. This is a very serious situation, and such as must give every friend to his country great pain to observe; but at the same time it is highly necessary, that some means or other should be suggested and taken, in order to extricate us from the difficulties in which our present circumstances involve us. One way of lightening our burthens certainly is, by reducing our Peace Establishments even lower than they stood at the beginning of the war. To such a proposition I have not the smallest objection; but still something more must be done to give the country effectual relief, which can only arise from paying off a part of the national

tional debt. I wish, therefore, to call the attention of the House to this point, and to shew them how much might be done by the application of a single million yearly. According to a calculation made by that accurate calculator Dr. Price, it appears, that by the laying by of a million annually, and sacredly and religiously applying it to pay off a part of the national debt, provided the three per cents. are changed to four per cents. (which are much more easily paid off than the three per cents.) two hundred and sixty-seven millions might be paid off in sixty years; so that his present Majesty (if his life should last to about the same length that many of his ancestors had lived to) will in his life-time have the comfort of seeing his people relieved from all the burthens and expences brought upon them by the American war; and the Heir Apparent, whose reign it is to be hoped will be a long one, will live to see the whole of the debt cleared. According to the calculations of Baron Mazeres, it appears, that if the plan of laying by a million a year was adopted and pursued for twenty years, and the country then under the necessity of desisting from it, that those twenty millions, with the money provided to pay the interest of that part of the national debt, that should be paid off from time to time, appropriated to the same purpose, would in fifty-seven years discharge the greatest part of the debt. Mr. Sinclair has very sensibly and clearly shewn in his book what might be done, by putting in practice such a scheme as I have mentioned; and, in order to carry the plan into effect, Commissioners ought to be specially appointed.

Mr. Dempster, June 23, 1784.

COMMERCE AND REVENUE,

AS I had the honour to move for the House to resolve itself into this Committee, I think it incumbent upon me to open to you what was then intended to be proposed, as the subject of your consideration. We are now in a Committee for considering of the most proper methods, for the better security and improvement of the duties and revenues already charged upon and payable from tobacco and wines : this can be done in no way so proper or effectual, as that of preventing for the future those frauds, by which the public revenues have been so much injured in times past. I know, that whoever attempts to remedy frauds, attempts a thing that must be very disagreeable to all those who have been guilty of them, or who expect a benefit by such in time to come. This, Sir, I am fully sensible of, and from this have sprung all those clamours, which have been raised without doors, against what I am now to propose to you. The smugglers, the fraudulent dealers, and those who have for many years been enriching themselves by cheating their country, foresaw, that if the scheme I am now to propose took effect, their profitable trade would be at an end ; this gave them the alarm, and from them I am persuaded it is, that all those clamours have originally proceeded.

In this it is certain, that they have been most strenuously assisted and supported by another set of people, who, from motives much worse, and of much more dangerous consequence to their country, are fond of improving every opportunity that offers, for stirring up the people of Great-Britain to mutiny and sedition. But, Sir, notwithstanding all the clamours that such wicked and deceitful men have been able to raise, as the scheme I have to propose will be a great improvement to the public revenue, an improvement of 2 or 300,000*l. per annum*, and perhaps more, and as it will likewise be of great advantage

to the fair trader, I thought it my duty, not only as being in the station I am in, but also as being a Member of this House, to lay it before you; for no such clamours shall ever deter me from doing what I think is my duty, or from proposing any thing that I am convinced will be of such signal benefit to the revenue, and to the trade of my country.

It has been most industriously spread abroad, that the scheme I am now to propose, was a scheme for a General Excise; but I do aver no such scheme ever entered into my head, nor, for what I know, into the head of any man I am acquainted with. My thoughts were always confined solely to those two branches of the revenue, arising from the duties on wine and tobacco; and it was the frequent and repeated advices I had of the notorious frauds committed in those branches of the revenue, and the clamours even of some of the Merchants themselves, that made me turn my thoughts particularly towards considering those two branches, in order to find out, if possible, some remedy for the growing evil. What I am now going to propose will, I believe, if agreed to, be an effectual remedy; but if I now fail in what I am to propose, it will be the last attempt of this kind that I shall ever make: I believe it will be the last that will ever be made, either by me, or by any that shall succeed me in the station I am now in.

At present, I shall lay before you only the case as it now stands, with respect to the tobacco trade, and the revenue arising therefrom. And here it will be necessary first to consider the condition of our planters of tobacco in America. If we can believe them, if we can give any credit to what they themselves say, we must conclude that they are reduced almost to the last extremity; they are reduced even almost to a state of despair, by the many frauds that have been committed in that trade, by the heavy duties which the importers of tobacco are obliged to pay upon importation, and by the ill usage they have met with from their factors and correspondents here in England; who, from being their Servants, are now become their Lords and Masters.

Masters. These poor people have sent home many representations of the bad state of their affairs, and have lately sent over a Gentleman with a Remonstrance, setting forth their grievances, and praying for some speedy relief. This they may obtain by means of the scheme I intend now to propose; and I believe it is from this scheme only that they can expect any relief.

The next thing we are to consider, is the state of the tobacco-trade, with regard to the fair trader. The man who deals honourably and fairly with the public, as well as with private men; the man who honestly pays all those duties which the public is justly entitled to, finds himself prevented and forestalled, almost in every market within the island, by the smuggler and the fraudulent dealer: and even as to our foreign trade in tobacco, those who have no regard to honour, to religion, or to the welfare of their country, but are every day contriving ways and means for cheating the public by perjuries and false entries, are the greatest gainers: and it will always be so, unless we can fall upon some way of putting it out of their power to carry on any such frauds for the future.

And lastly, we ought to consider the great loss sustained by the public, by means of the frauds committed in the tobacco-trade, and the addition that must certainly be made to the public revenue, if those frauds can be prevented in time to come. By this addition we may be enabled to relieve the nation from some of those taxes, which it has laboured under so many years; whereas, as the case now stands, the innocent and the honest part of the nation are charged with taxes, which they would be free from, if the fraudulent dealers and the smugglers could be any way obliged to pay that, which is justly due by them to the public. This will, I am convinced, be the effect of the scheme I am to propose to you: and whoever, therefore, views it in its proper light, must see the planters, the fair traders, and the public, ranged on one side in favour of it; and none but the unfair traders and the tobacco-factors on the other.

I shall

I shall beg leave to mention to you some of those frauds which have come to my knowledge : the evidence I have had of them is to me very convincing ; but in such cases, Gentlemen ought always to consider what evidence it is impossible to bring, what evidence it is, by the nature of the thing, unreasonable to expect.

A particular instance of fraud came lately to my knowledge by mere accident. One Midford, who had been a considerable tobacco-merchant in the city, happened to fail, at a time when he owed a large sum of money upon bond to the Crown ; whereupon an extent was issued out immediately against him, and thereby the Government got possession of all his books, by which the fraud he had been guilty of was discovered : for it appeared, as may be seen by one of his books I have in my hand, that upon the column where the false quantities, which had been entered at the importation, by collusion between him and the Officer, by which he paid or bonded the duty payable upon importation, a slip of paper had been so artfully pasted on that it could not be discovered ; and upon this slip of paper were written the real quantities which were entered, because he was obliged to produce the same book when that tobacco was entered for exportation : but then, upon exportation, the tobacco was entered and weighed according to the quantities marked upon this slip of paper so artfully pasted on, as I have mentioned, by which he got a drawback, or his bonds returned, to near double the value of what he had actually paid duty for upon importation. Yet this Midford was as honest a man, and as fair a trader, as any in the city of London. I desire not to be misunderstood ; I mean, that before he failed, before these frauds came to be discovered, he was always reckoned as honest a man, and as fair a trader, as any in the city of London, or in any part of the nation.

After this, he mentioned the several frauds following : That of re-landing the tobacco after it was shipped off for exportation ; that of socking of tobacco, which was a cant-word used for stealing

stealing and smuggling it out of the ships, after their arrival in the river, before they were unloaded at the custom-house; that of stripping the stalks, and afterwards splitting and pressing them by an engine contrived for that purpose, and then exporting them; that of giving bonds for the duty payable upon importation, whereby the Government had lost several large sums by the failure of payment of such bonds; that of the rich moneyed men making prompt payments, by which the public was obliged to allow them ten *per cent.* discount as to the duties; and by entering the tobacco soon after for exportation, they drew back the whole duties; so that Government actually lost ten *per cent.* upon all the tobacco that had been so entered.

These frauds are notorious, most of them are known to the whole world; and as the Laws of the Customs have been found ineffectual for preventing of such frauds, therefore, it is proposed to add the Laws of Excise to the Laws of the Customs, and by means of both it is probable, I may say certain, that all such frauds will be prevented in time to come.

By the several subsidies and imposts now payable upon tobacco, by several Acts of Parliament made for that purpose, it appears, that the duties now payable upon tobacco on importation, amount to 6 $\frac{1}{2}$ d. per pound weight; all which must be paid down in ready money, by the Merchant, upon importation thereof, with the allowance of ten *per cent.* upon prompt payment; or otherwise there must be bonds given, with sufficient sureties for payment of the money; which is often a great loss to the public, and is always a great inconvenience to the Merchant importer; whereas, by what I am to propose, the whole duties to be paid for the future, will amount to no more than 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ d. per pound weight, and this duty not to be paid till the tobacco comes to be sold for home consumption; so that if the Merchant exports his tobacco, he will be quite free from all payment of duty, or giving bond, or finding out proper sureties for joining in such bond, he will have nothing to do but to re-load his tobacco on board a ship for exportation, without

without being at the trouble to attend for having his bonds cancelled, or for taking out debentures for the drawbacks; all which, I conceive, must be a great ease to the fair trader; and to every such trader the preventing of frauds must be a great advantage; because it will put all the tobacco traders in Britain upon the same footing: which is but just and equal, and what ought certainly to be accomplished, if it be possible.

Now, in order to make this ease effectual to the fair trader, and to contribute to his advantage, by preventing as much as possible any frauds in time to come, I propose, as I have said, to join the Laws of Excise to those of the Customs, and to leave the one penny, or rather three farthings *per* pound, called the farther subsidy, to be still charged at the Custom-house, upon the importation of any tobacco; which three farthings shall be payable to his Majesty's Civil List as heretofore: and I propose, that all tobacco for the future, after being weighed at the Custom-house, and charged with the said three farthings *per* pound, shall be lodged in a warehouse or warehouses, to be appointed by the Commissioners of Excise for that purpose; of which warehouse the Merchant importer shall have one lock and key, and the warehouse-keeper to be appointed by the said Commissioners shall have another; in order that the tobacco may lie safe in that warehouse, till the Merchant finds a market for it, either for exportation or for home-consumption: thus, if his market be for exportation, he may apply to his warehouse-keeper, and take out as much for that purpose as he has occasion for; which, when weighed at the Custom-house, shall be discharged of three farthings *per* pound, with which it was charged upon importation; so that the Merchant may then export it without any further trouble: but if his market be for home-consumption, that he shall then pay the three farthings charged upon it at the Custom-house upon importation; and that then, upon calling his warehouse-keeper, he may deliver it to the buyer, on paying an inland-duty of 4d. *per* pound weight, to the proper officer appointed to receive the same.

And

And whereas all the penalties and forfeitures to become due, by the laws now in being, for regulating the collecting of the duties on tobacco, or at least all that part of them which is not given to the informers, now belonging to the Crown ; I propose that all such penalties and forfeitures, so far as they formerly belonged to the Crown, shall for the future belong to the public, and be applicable to the same uses to which the said duties shall be made applicable by Parliament : and for that purpose, I have his Majesty's commands to acquaint this House, that he, out of his great regard for the public good, with pleasure consents that they shall be so applied : which is a condescension in his Majesty, that I hope every Gentleman in this House is fully sensible of, and will fully acknowledge.

I know there has been an objection made ; I expect to hear it again made in this House, against what I now propose. The objection is this ; that a great many of his Majesty's subjects will be liable to be tried in a multitude of cases, by the Commissioners of Excise, from whom there is no appeal, but to Commissioners of Appeal, or to Justices of the Peace in the country, all named by the King, and removeable at pleasure ; from whom the appellants cannot expect to meet with justice or redress. I am far from thinking there is any ground for this complaint ; I am far from thinking that any man ever had just reason to say that he was wronged, or unjustly dealt with, either by the Commissioners of Appeal, or by the Justices of Peace at their quarter-sessions : but, in order to obviate any objection of this nature, I propose that all appeals in this case, as well as in all other cases relating to the Excise, shall for the future be heard and determined by two or three of the Judges, to be named by his Majesty, out of the twelve Judges belonging to Westminster-hall ; and that in the country, all appeals, from the first sentence of his Majesty's Justices of Peace, shall be to the Judge of Assize upon the next circuit which shall come into that county ; who shall in all cases proceed to hear and determine such appeals in the most summary way, without formality

formality of proceedings in courts of law or equity. From such Judges, and from such a manner of proceeding, every man must expect to meet with the utmost dispatch, and with the most impartial justice: and therefore I must think, that what I now propose can be no inconvenience to those, who may thereby be subjected to the Laws of Excise; but that if there was formerly any ground of complaint, it may be a great relief to those who are already subjected to such laws.

This is the scheme which has been represented in such a dreadful and terrible light: this is the monster, that many-headed monster, which was to devour the people, and to commit such ravages over the whole nation: how justly it has been represented in such a light, I shall leave to this Committee, and to the whole world without doors to judge; I have said, I will say it again, that whatever apprehensions and terrors people may have been brought under, from false and malicious representations of what they neither did nor could possibly know or understand, I am firmly persuaded, when they do come to know and fully to understand the scheme which I have now had the honour to open to you, they will view it in another light; and that if it has the good fortune to be approved of by Parliament, and comes to take effect, the people will soon feel the happy consequences thereof; and when they feel those good effects, they will no longer think those people their friends who have so grossly imposed on their understanding.

I look upon it as a most innocent scheme; I am convinced it can be hurtful to none but smugglers and unfair traders; I am certain it will be of great benefit and advantage to the public revenue; and if I had thought otherwise of it, I never would have ventured to have proposed it in this place: therefore I shall now beg leave to move that it may be resolved, That it is the opinion of this Committee, that the subsidy and additional duty upon tobacco, of the British Plantations, granted by an Act of the 12th of King Charles II, and the impost thereon, granted by an Act of the first of King James II, and

and also the one-third subsidy thereon, granted by an Act of the second of Queen Anne, amounting in the whole to 5 $\frac{1}{4}$ d. per pound, for several terms of years in the said respective Acts mentioned, and which have since been continued and made perpetual, subject to redemption by Parliament, shall from and after the 24th day of June, 1733, cease and determine.

Sir Robert Walpole, March 14, 1733.

WHEN I first heard of this scheme I was in the country, and there I must say, that it had been represented in such a light, as created a general dislike to it, and raised great apprehensions in the minds of most people. It was represented as a scheme for introducing a general Excise; such a scheme I own I would not allow myself to think was contrived or approved of by any Gentleman in Administration. I did imagine that all those in the Administration were very well convinced, that a general Excise was what the People of England would never quietly submit to; and therefore did not believe, that any of them ever would countenance a scheme which had the least tendency that way. But now after having heard it opened, and fully explained by the Honourable Gentleman (Sir Robert Walpole) on the floor, I cannot but think that it is a wide step towards establishing a general Excise, and therefore I must be excused assenting to it.

How far it relates to trade, with which it certainly has a very close connection, I shall leave to be explained by others more conversant in those affairs; nor will I take upon me to say how far it may be a remedy for the frauds mentioned by the Honourable Gentleman; but there is another concern which I always shall, while I have the honour to sit in this House, have a particular eye to, and that is, the Liberty of my Country. The danger with which this scheme seems to threaten many of my fellow-subjects, is alone of sufficient force to make me give my negative to the Question. Let Gentlemen but reflect, let them but cast their eyes back on the several laws that have been made

since the Revolution, they will there find, that there has been already more power vested in the Crown, than may be thought altogether consistent with the Constitution of a free Country; and therefore I hope this House will never think of adding to that power, which there may be some ground to suspect is already too far extended.

The Laws of Excise have always been looked upon as most grievous to the subject. All those already subjected to such Laws, are, in my opinion, so far deprived of their Liberty; and since by this scheme, a great many more of his Majesty's faithful subjects are to be subjected to those arbitrary Laws, let the advantages accruing to the public be ever so great or many, they will be purchased at too dear a rate, if they are purchased at the expence of the Liberty of the meanest of his Majesty's subjects; for even the meanest man in the nation, has as natural and good a right to his Liberty, as the greatest man in this, or any other kingdom.

Let us but take a view of the neighbouring nations in Europe; they were all once free; the people of every one of them had once as many Liberties and Privileges to boast of as we have now; but at present they are most of them reduced to a state of Slavery; they have no Liberty, no Property, no Law, nor any thing they can depend on. Let us examine their histories, let us enquire into the methods by which they are deprived of their Liberties, and we shall find a very near resemblance to the schemes now proposed to us. Almost in every country in the world, the Liberties of the People have been destroyed, under pretence of preserving or rescuing the People from some great evil, to which it was pretended they were exposed. This is the very case now before us; in order to enable the Crown to prevent some little frauds, pretended to have been committed in the ancient method of collecting the public revenue, it is proposed to us to put such a power in the hands of the Crown, as may enable some future Prince to enslave the whole nation. This is really the light in which this

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scheme appears to me ; but to the Honourable Gentleman who proposed it to us, I am persuaded it appears in a quite different light, otherwise I am certain he would never have proposed it to this Committee. However, since the generality of the nation have already shewn a great dislike to it, I hope the Honourable Gentleman may be prevailed on to delay it till another Session of Parliament : in such a delay there can be no danger, there can be no great loss to the Public, more especially since the money to be thereby raised, is not so much as proposed to be applied to the current service of the present year. If it be delayed till another Session of Parliament, Gentlemen will then have time to consider it fully, and to consult with their Constituents about it ; by that time it may possibly appear in a quite different light both to me and many other Gentlemen without doors as well as within ; and then, if upon examination it appears to be a good thing, as some Gentlemen now seem to believe, it will, without doubt, be approved of by the generality of those without, as well as by the majority of those within.

But I hope those Gentlemen who have now so good an opinion of the scheme, will not think of thrusting it down people's throats, when they see that the generality of the nation have an opinion of it quite different from what they have ; such a Resolution, such an attempt, might produce consequences which I tremble to think of : and this is another motive which is of great weight to me, I have the honour to know his Majesty, his Royal Person I have formerly had the honour to approach, and know him to be a Prince of so much goodness, that were this scheme represented to him in this light, he never would approve of it ; to him it will always be a sufficient reason against any proposition, that the generality of the people have shewn their dislike to it. I love his Majesty, I have a sincere and a dutiful respect for him, and all the Royal Family ; and therefore I shall always be afraid of any thing that may alienate the affections of many of his Majesty's faithful subjects, which

I believe would be the certain consequence of the establishment of this scheme; for which reasons, if the Question be now pushed, I shall most heartily give my negative to it.

Sir Paul Methuen, March 14, 1733.

THE prosperity of this nation, Sir, or at least our security, depends upon the tranquillity of our neighbours: while they are at peace, they will always consume more of our manufactures than when they are involved in blood and confusion; and consequently we shall always, in times of peace, have a greater demand for the manufactures of our country than in time of war. Besides, while they continue at peace, the Balance of Power can be in no danger; but the events of war no nation can depend on; and therefore this nation, amongst the rest, may be deeply affected by the extraordinary success of any one Power in Europe. Let us not therefore grudge a trifling expence, when it may evidently contribute towards restoring peace among our neighbours, upon which our own prosperity and security does and always must depend.

Our house is not yet on fire, but our neighbour's is all on a flame; and then certainly it is time for us to prepare the engines necessary for preserving our own. These are a powerful fleet, and a sufficient body of regular well-disciplined troops, ready to march at the first word of command. This, Sir, will give weight to his Majesty's Councils, it will make all the parties concerned give a due regard and attention to what may be proposed by his Majesty's Ministers for restoring the peace of Europe; for a Minister, whose equipage consists of a large body of good troops, will always be better hearkened to, than one whose equipage consists only of a great number of fine pages and useless footmen.

Sir Robert Walpole, Feb. 14, 1735.

As this day seems to be a day of paradoxes, amongst the rest, we have been told one with respect to our trade. We are

told, Sir, that the prosperity of this nation depends upon the tranquillity of our neighbours; and that in times of peace, there is always a greater demand for the manufactures and produce of this country than in time of war. This, Sir, is so far from being a true maxim in trade, that the direct contrary is true. The chief part of the produce of this country, consists in the necessaries, and not the luxuries of life; and consequently our neighbours will always consume as much of such sort of things in time of war as in time of peace. But the difference is, that when their heads are not distracted, nor their hands diverted, by any foreign or domestic war, they have time to apply themselves to tillage; they have time to apply themselves to manufactures of all kinds; they have leisure to think of, and to improve all the arts of peace; and by so doing, they furnish themselves at home with a great many of those necessaries which, in time of war, they are obliged to purchase of us. This is not only evident in theory, but is confirmed by experience; for our trade has suffered more by the domestic improvements made by our neighbours, during the last long tranquillity in Europe, than it has done by any other means; except the heavy duties we have laid upon ourselves, and the great trouble, and many fees, and many perquisites we have subjected our Merchants to, both in importing and exporting their goods and merchandize.

Mr. Pulteney, Feb. 14, 1735.

Our great King Edward III. shewed such a regard for our trade and navigation, that upon a complaint from our Merchants of their having been plundered by the Spanish pirates or guarda costas of those days, he immediately fitted out a fleet, and went in person to revenge the depredations that had been committed upon his subjects; by which he restored the freedom of our commerce, and added a naval triumph, to the many triumphs he had before obtained at land. The protection of trade and navigation has always been one of the chief

chief concerns of all great Kings and all wise nations. Even the Romans, who could never be said to be a trading people, shewed a great regard for it, as appears from the reproof Cicero gave them in his days, for neglecting to suppress the pirates, and to assert the honour of their flag.

Mr. Pulteney, March 30, 1738.

OUR travellers, Sir, who make but very superficial inquiries into the manners or customs of any country they pass through, may perhaps imagine the people of France or Holland, are more heavily or more oppressedly taxed, than the people of this kingdom, because they hear the people complain there as they do here; but any Gentleman who understands these things, and has made a proper inquiry, may soon be convinced of the contrary; and as for the other countries of Europe, they have not, it's true, such numbers of rich Merchants, masters of manufacturers, and master tradesmen, as we have in this country, which is the reason that many of their poor live in idleness, or starve for mere want, because there are few or no rich Masters or Merchants in the country, that have money to employ them; but in all countries, where the poor have any employment, they are pretty nearly equally poor; they neither get, nor expect more than a comfortable subsistence by their daily labour: and if you enhance the means of that subsistence by taxes on the necessities and conveniencies of life, their Masters must increase their wages; so that all taxes fall at last upon the Masters, foreign or domestic, who must pay for that increase of wages in the price of goods they purchase: but the difference is, that a tax laid directly upon the Master, only prevents his growing rich so fast, or makes him live less luxuriously, but does not enhance the price of your manufactures: whereas a tax laid upon those things, that are necessary for the support of the poor, enhances the price of labour, and consequently raises the price of all your manufactures both for domestic and foreign sale, which at last ruins your trade. There-

fore, if the poor' of this kingdom be more heavily taxed than the poor of any other country of Europe, it is what ought to be remedied as soon as possible ; it is what will give that country a great advantage over us, if they should ever begin to apply themselves to trade, which every country of Europe is now aiming at as much as they can.

Sir John Barnard, March 21, 1737.

D E F E N C E.

D E F E N C E.

‘ I STAND up to agree in some part with the Honourable Gentleman who spoke last : if we are at present in any unhappy situation, and if it be but thought, by any Gentleman in this House, that that situation is any ways owing to the mismanagement of those in Administration, in my opinion, whoever thinks so, ought to move for this House’s going into such an inquiry ; they ought to move for the House’s going into a Committee on the State of the Nation, and upon the foot of such an inquiry, I will willingly join issue with the Honourable Gentleman, or any other Gentleman in this House. Whenever the House shall resolve upon going into such a Committee, I promise, that so far as lies in my power, nothing shall be refused that is thought proper or necessary for giving the House all the information that can be wished or desired. But as that time is not yet come, I must think that the Motion now under consideration is very irregular, and seems calculated rather for giving Gentlemen an opportunity of declaiming against those, who have the honour of serving the Crown, than for procuring any proper information to the House, or any advantage to the country.

‘ It is usual for some people to make Motions, rather to fix unpopular things on others, than to have any information for themselves : they make Motions in order to make a figure in the Votes, which are sent to all parts of the nation, and to serve some particular ends of their own : when a negative is put upon any such Motion, they are then ready to cry out, “ we would have relieved you, we would have extricated you from all the difficulties you labour under, but we were by power denied the means of doing it.” This is a piece of management ; it is a sort of parliamentary play, which has always been practised by those who oppose the measures of Ad-

ministration. I remember it as long as I remember Parliaments, and have by my own experience been acquainted with it: I can remember Motions made with no other view but to have a negative put upon them; and particularly at the beginning of a Session, the language amongst such Gentlemen has always been, "We must give them no rest, but make Motion after Motion; if they agree in any Motion we make, it will distress them; and if they put a negative upon every one, it will render them odious amongst the People."

"This, I say, has always been the constant practice of those who are resolved, at any rate, to oppose the Administration: but I must take notice, that to say that any Motion in Parliament is refused by power, is, in my opinion, a very unparliamentary way of speaking: when any Motion is made, every Gentleman is at liberty to debate with freedom upon it, and to agree or disagree as he thinks reasonable: if it be rejected, it must be by a Majority of the House, and becomes an act of this House; and to say, that what is the act of the House, is an act of power, is not, I think, speaking in the language of Parliament."

Sir Robert Walpole, Jan. 23, 1734.

My honourable friend was pleased to inveigh very severely against the luxury and vice that reigns too generally amongst us. I know not from what this luxury and vice proceeds; but proceed from what it will, I am sure it does not proceed from any example set by the Royal Family: for I am persuaded that every Gentleman who hears me, is sensible that no nation was ever blest with a Royal Family that has given such eminent instances of frugality and temperance, as the Family that is now upon the Throne. If a People, Sir, grown wanton with liberty and riches, shall degenerate into luxury, is a Prince or his Ministers to be blamed for that? Or if the People is tainted with discontent and dissatisfaction, are we to endeavour to cure it by giving up the only means of restrain-

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ing them? Yet this, Sir, is the very thing for which some Gentlemen have argued so strenuously since the opening of this debate. It has been allowed on all hands, that had it not been for our standing forces, the nation must have, ere this time, run into confusion from that spirit of dissatisfaction that has broke loose among the People. But, say some Gentlemen, that spirit is occasioned from the oppression of the Government. But they have not been pleased to give us any instance of such oppression; they have given us no instance of an invasion upon the liberty and property of any subject; they have not given us one instance of any encroachment of the military upon the civil power, or of one attack that has been made by the Administration to subvert the freedom of Parliament. There is nothing more common, Sir, than to raise a clamour upon the topics of bribery, corruption, and venality; and nothing more easy than to make the People believe, that when an Administration continues long in the same hands, it can only be by these means. But this is a misfortune that has attended the best Administrations in all ages and in all countries. The very success that Minister meets with, is improved by his enemies to his prejudice. If a Majority in this House concur with his measures, it must be the effects of corruption. If he has the favour of the Prince, he owes it to flattery and misrepresenting the state of the nation. Does the kingdom under his Administration enjoy a profound peace and extended commerce, this is attributed to the Minister's sacrificing something still more valuable than these advantages in order to procure them. So that, Sir, the very well-being of a state, gives a handle to clamour against the Minister: whereas, in reality, his success in the Parliament may be owing to the justness of his measures; the favour he is in with his Prince, to his integrity; and the increase of the national wealth and power, to his vigilance and the firmness of his resolutions. Sir, I shall make no particular application of what I have said here; only one thing

thing I will be bold to affirm, that had the clamours that have been raised in Great-Britain these eighteen years past against the Administration been well-founded, we must before this time have been the most miserable, the most beggarly, and the most abject People under the sun.

Sir Robert Walpole, Feb. 3, 1738.

I THINK a man is an honest man, who votes according to what his conscience tells him the present situation of things requires; and an honest man, Sir, if he sees the circumstances which induced him to vote in favour of a Resolution last year altered, or if he finds that he himself has been mistaken in the apprehension of these circumstances; I say, Sir, an honest man will, in either of these cases, vote this Session directly contrary to what he voted before: if ever I voted for a standing army, Sir, in time of peace, it was when my conscience told me, that the preservation of our liberties required it. But, Sir, though at that time, perhaps, I was convinced that our keeping up a standing army for one year was necessary, it does not follow that I act inconsistently, if I don't vote for a perpetuity of that army. Therefore, though a Gentleman has voted for every Question, for every job of the Ministry; though his whole life has been but one continued vote on their sides; yet he ought neither to be ashamed nor afraid to oppose them, as soon as his own judgment, or the situation of things is altered. This is acting upon no other principles, Sir, but those of an honest man, and a lover of his country: and, as the distinction between Whigs and Tories is now in effect abolished, I hope soon to see our People know no other denominations of party amongst us besides those of Court and Country. The Honourable Gentleman talks of the establishment of the Government, and of the Administration; but, Sir, I know of no Establishment, I know of no Government, I know of no Administration that ought to be kept up, but for the preservation of the
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Liberties of the People: for it is not two-pence matter to me, whether the Prince's name under whom I am to be enslaved, is Thomas, James, or Richard; I am sure I shall never be enslaved under a George.

William Pulteney, Esq; Feb. 3, 1738.

THOSE employed in the Administration of affairs, are always in the most ticklish situation. If they propose to make provisions against danger, by which provisions the People must be put to an expence, they then are charged with raising imaginary dangers, in order from thence to take an opportunity to load the People with new Taxes: and their misfortune is, that the more careful they have been in time past, the argument grows every day more strongly against them; because people begin at last to believe, that the dangers which were never felt were imaginary, though in reality they were prevented only by the provisions that were made against them. However many people may come at last to be confirmed in this erroneous opinion, by which the Ministers may be at last refused those provisions that are actually necessary; and, if by such refusal, any signal misfortune should befall the nation, the Ministers would be sure to be loaded with the blame of it, though they had done all that was in their power to warn us of the danger.

I cannot really comprehend, Sir, what sort of information it is that Gentlemen want. Would they have his Majesty send to tell us, that there is a bloody war carried on by France, Spain, and Sardinia, against the Emperor? Surely they do not expect that his Majesty should send us a particular Message, in order to acquaint us with a piece of news that is known to the whole world!

Sir Robert Walpole, Feb. 14, 1735.

I WAS a little surprized to hear it said by the Honourable Gentleman who spoke last, that this Motion's being opposed by

by Ministers and Placemen is a strong argument in its favour. In my opinion, this is a sort of begging the Question. Before we can suppose this to be an argument in favour of the Motion for excluding Placemen, we must suppose, that Ministers and Placemen oppose it, not because they think it wrong, but because that they are Ministers and Placemen, which is the very Question now in debate. I do not believe, that ever any any Minister or Placeman opposed, or supported a Question in this House, contrary to his private sentiments, and only because he was a Minister or Placeman. I am sure their conduct of late years has given us no room to think so; nor can we ever have room to think so, as long as none but Gentlemen of credit and honour are employed in the Administration, or in any place of honour and profit under the Crown. If mere upstarts, or persons of no fortune or credit were employed, and by illegal methods brought into this House, for by fair means they could not, there might be some room for making such a supposition; and then there would be some cause for bringing in such a Bill as is now proposed: but when I look round me, and consider the particular circumstances of these Gentlemen now here, who have the honour to be at the same time in the service of the Crown, I must look upon the danger now pretended to be so real and imminent, to be as chimerical a danger as the most luxuriant fancy can invent.

I shall agree with the Honourable Gentlemen who seem so fond of this Bill, that if the Crown could gain an absolute and uncontrollable power over all, or a majority of the elections in the kingdom, every Parliament thus chosen by the power would be under the direction of the Crown, and in this case our Constitution would be at an end; but this I think impossible. Whilst the Crown pursues right measures, whilst none but Gentlemen of good credit and fortune are employed in the Administration, or in any superior Post or Office under the Administration, the Crown will certainly have a great influence both in Parliament and at Elections: but this proceeds from
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the wisdom and uprightness of its measures, and from the weight of those that are employed; and it would certainly cease as soon as the Crown began to pursue contrary measures; because we must suppose the Administration would then certainly be deserted, and opposed by all; or most Gentlemen of any fortune or credit in their country, would soon unite in measures in making a sacrifice of themselves, as well as their country, which is a supposition that cannot, I think, be made nor pretended by any man whose head is sound and heart sincere.

In all Questions, Sir, *which do not admit of demonstration*, there must be a variety of opinions; and as Questions of a political nature are less capable of demonstration than any other, it is natural to see a difference of sentiments in every country like this, where the People have not only a power of judging, but a liberty to talk and write against the measures pursued by Government: this is natural, and even necessary in every country where the People are free: and as every man is fond of his own opinion, and fully convinced of his having reason on his side, he is apt to imagine, that those who differ from him must be governed by some prejudice, or by some selfish consideration. From hence it is, that all those who disapprove of the Measures of the Government conclude, that the approbation of those who differ from them, proceeds from the influence of some lucrative Post they are in possession or expectation of; and on the other hand, those that approve of and support the measures pursued by the Government, are apt to conclude, that the opposition is entirely owing to party prejudice, or to malice and resentment. For my part, I shall always endeavour to keep in the middle course, and to believe that both are in the wrong: and therefore I shall always be against any alteration in our Constitution, when I think that the alteration proposed is founded upon one or other of these mistakes. I should be as much against restraining the Liberties of the People, in order to prevent that influence which is
supposed

supposed to proceed from party-prejudice, malice, and resentment, as shall be against restraining the power or free choice of the Crown, in order to prevent that influence which is supposed to proceed from the disposal of places or preferments. There may, perhaps, I believe, there always will be a little of each in the nation, but never can be of any dangerous consequence to our constitution: on the contrary, they serve as a balance to each other; so that by removing either without removing the other at the same time, the constitution will run a great risk of being overturned.

There are many causes, Sir, which naturally raise a party against the best and wisest Administration. In this life it is impossible for us to be completely happy. All men feel some wants, pressures, or misfortunes; and very few are willing to impute them to their own folly, or to any mistake in their own conduct. To such men, the Administration is in politics, what the Devil is in religion; it is the author of all their misdeeds, and the cause of all their sufferings: this naturally breeds in them a bad opinion of the Administration, and then, of course, they not only condemn, but oppose all its measures. This must raise a great many enemies to the Administration in every country; and their number will be considerably increased by those that are disappointed of the honours and preferments they expected, and justly, as they thought, deserved; as well as by those that wish for a change in the Administration, for no other reason but because they hope for a share in the next. In all countries it is honourable to have a share in the Government of one's country: in rich countries, it is profitable as well as honourable; and as there are but a very few, in any country, that can have a share of the Government, and still fewer that can have such a share as, they think, they deserve, there must be many candidates for every title of honour, or post of profit, that is to be disposed of. Of these candidates, one only can be chosen, and all the rest will, of course, think they have had injustice done them; for few men are so modest, as to think such

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a disappointment owing to their own want of merit, or to the superior merit of their rival; and from thence they will begin to entertain a secret animosity, nay, perhaps, they will declare an open enmity to those at the head of the Administration.

By these two sorts of men united together, there will always be a considerable party, in every country, ready to condemn and vilify the wisest measures that can be pursued by the Administration: and, as in every free country, there are different parties, as in this country there are at present, and, I believe, always will be different parties, the parties that are by their profession and principles opposite to the party in power, will be ready to find fault with every thing done by the Administration. In this country, I say, Sir, there are, and, I believe, always will be different parties. There are at present, and will be, as long as our present happy establishment endures, three different parties in this kingdom: the Jacobites of one side, the Republicans of the other, which I may call the two extremes; and the party for supporting our present happy establishment, which may be justly called the proper mean between these two extremes.

Thus, Sir, we see what a numerous party our Administration must always have to struggle with. All these sorts of men, the discontented, the disappointed, the Jacobites, and the Republicans, will always be ready to condemn and oppose the measures of the Administration, let them be never so wise, let them be never so just; and by their arguments, they will often be able to prevail with some well-meaning and unthinking men, or at least to stagger them in their opinions. With regard to Parliaments, and the choice of Members of Parliaments, our Administration has no defence against this formidable union of parties; but by the wisdom of their measures, to engage most Gentlemen of interest and fortune in their interest. Whilst the Administration pursues right measures, such Gentlemen will be ready to join with them; and by this means the Administration will always have a prevailing influence, both in Parliament, and at elections: for when a majority of those who have the best fortunes,

tunes, and greatest interest in their respective counties, are friends to the Administration, it is not at all surprising that an Administration, by means of such friends, should have a prevailing influence at elections, as well as in Parliament. But such friends, or at least a great number of such, no Administration can have, that pursues measures inconsistent with the good of the community in general.

I shall grant, Sir, that a title of honour, or a lucrative post or employment, may be of some service in prevailing with a Gentleman to judge favourable of the Government's measures in all cases, where he is wavering in his opinion; but a bad Government can never, by this way, gain many friends: even a good Government can never gain near so many friends, as it will lose by causeless discontents and just disappointments: and if you should take away from the Crown the chief advantage it can reap by the disposal of posts and employments, not only a good Administration, but even the Crown itself, may sink under the weight of party-prejudice, supported by causeless discontents and just disappointment. Therefore, to support the Crown against the disadvantages and opposition which the wisest and best Administration must always have to struggle with, I think you ought to leave it in the power of the Crown to dispose of all posts and employments in the same manner they have been hitherto, without any bad effects, disposed of.

Sir Robert Walpole, Jan. 29, 1739.

COMMON fame may be a good foundation for a parliamentary inquiry; but that it always ought to be esteemed such, is what I cannot agree to. A parliamentary inquiry, Sir, must always be attended with many and great inconveniencies. In the first place, it must always raise a great ferment in the nation; and when it relates to foreign affairs, it generally disoblige some of our allies, or disturbs some of the negociations that may then be on foot for the benefit of our trade, or for preserving the tranquillity of Europe. In the next place, it possesses the thoughts

of our Ministers so much, as every inquiry must relate to some part of their conduct, that they have no time to mind any thing else; so that all our foreign affairs, and all projects for domestic utility, must be at a stand during that inquiry. And in the third place, it takes up a great deal of the time of this House, which never ought to be employed but in matters of the utmost importance to the nation, or to some particular persons, who can have relief no way but by Act of Parliament.

For this reason, Sir, common fame ought not to be made the foundation of a parliamentary inquiry, unless it be grounded upon some proofs, or at least upon very strong presumptions, that something very weak or very wicked has been transacted; and that by such an inquiry the nation may meet with a proper redress, without being thereby exposed to a greater evil. If otherwise, Sir, if we were to inquire into every public transaction, of which a bad report might be artfully raised, we should every Session have such a multitude of inquiries, that we could never do any other business: for it would always be in the power of the dissaffected or disappointed to invert facts, and by asserting these facts openly and boldly, they might raise a general bad report against every measure an Administration could engage in. This is an engine which has been often played against Ministers in all ages, and in all countries; and in this age and country it may now be played with greater safety than ever it was in any other country; for by our old laws, even in this country, it was most severely punished. By a law of the great and wise King Alfred, the author and spreader of false rumours among the people was to have his tongue cut out, if he could not redeem it by paying the value then put by the law upon his head. By a law of Edward the First, called Westminster the First, the spreaders of false reports, whereby discord might arise between the King and his people, or the great men of the realm, were to be imprisoned till they produced their author; consequently, if they could produce no author, they were to be held as the inventors, and to be punished according

to common law, by fine and imprisonment; and this very law was revived and re-enacted in the reign of Edward the III^d.

Thus, Sir, we see, that even in this country, we had very severe laws made against this crime, and that by some of the best and wisest of our Kings: and in Scotland, before the Union, this very crime was a species of high-treason, which they called *Leising-making*; and upon which, though by a most extraordinary stretch, the Representative of one of the greatest families in that kingdom, was tried and attainted of high treason, some time before the Revolution, as is well known by several Gentlemen that hear me. But why should I say we had very severe laws against this crime? We have them still; for they stand as yet unrepealed, though by the lenity of this Government none of them have of late years been carried into execution. If they were, I believe few of our Pamphleteers, Journalists, or Coffee-house Politicians, could long escape punishment: and if this were the case, some Gentlemen of this House would not have so often an occasion to talk of common fame, or general reports, which are often artfully raised, and industriously spread, on purpose to give a handle for disturbing the Government, and distressing the Administration, by setting on foot a parliamentary inquiry.

Right Hon. Henry Pelham, Jan. 31, 1749.

WHAT do their Lordships insinuate, that I have been the author of the present measures against *America*? and it is I that direct them? I should be proud to own them if it were, because I think them wise, politic, and equitable: but surely they will permit me to repeat again, that I have been a nominal Cabinet Minister part of the last reign, and the whole of the present; that I was an efficient Cabinet Minister during part of both periods; but that since the time before alluded to in this debate, I have had no concern or participation whatever in his Majesty's Councils. Threats are thrown out, and inquiries predicted: I heartily wish they may be speedy: I am prepared for them, and
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put their intended authors to the most utter defiance. It has been urged against me as a crime to-day, that I have courted popularity. I never did *court* it, but I have always studied to *deserve* it. Popularity will always fly the pursuers; she must follow. I do not mean to say that I despise it; on the contrary, I sincerely wish for it, if not purchased at too dear a price, at the expence of my *conscience* and my *duty*. If a faithful discharge of one, and execution of the other, be the means of procuring it, I hope I shall always be a warm candidate for popular fame. I have hitherto, to the best of my abilities, acted on that plan, and I hope I shall persevere to the end. I have seen much of Courts, Parliaments, and Cabinets, and have been a frequent witness to the means used to acquire popularity, and the base and mean purposes to which that popularity has been afterwards employed. I have been in Cabinets, where the great struggle has not been to advance the public interest; not by coalition and mutual assistance to strengthen the hands of Government, but by cabals, jealousy, and mutual distrust, to thwart each others designs, and so circumvent each other, in order to obtain power and pre-eminence. I have been no less careful to observe the effects of popularity, where it has been courted and gained for particular purposes; but when every engagement was abandoned which led to its attainment, when the keeping of them become no longer necessary to the views of self-interest and ambition, I am threatened! I dare the authors of those threats to put any one of them in execution. I am ready to meet their charges, and am prepared for the event; either to cover my adversaries with shame and disgrace, or in the fall, risque the remnant of a life nearly drawing to an end, and consequently not worth being solicitous about.

Lord Mansfield, Feb. 7, 1775.

I EVER esteemed the India alliances, at best, a necessary evil. I ever believed their services to be overvalued; sometimes insignificant, often barbarous, always capricious; and that the

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employment of them was only justifiable, when, by being united to a regular army, they could be kept under controul, and made subservient to a general system.

Upon this principle I heartily concurred with that gallant and humane General, Sir Guy Carleton, in the year 1776, to decline the offers and solicitations of the Indians to be then employed separately: the impossibility of completing the preparations for passing the regular troops over the Lakes, made it impossible to employ them conjunctively.

In that year, Sir, it was my lot, by delegation from Sir Guy Carleton, who was then at Quebec, to preside at one of the greatest councils with the Indians that had been held at Montreal: many Gentlemen here knew, that the ceremony preceding the taking up the hatchet, is, to offer to the representative of the power they mean to serve the pipe of war. It was pressed upon me by the Chiefs present; and it was in my power, by a single whiff of tobacco, to have given flame and explosion to a dozen nations. I never felt greater satisfaction than in being able to fulfil the instructions I was charged with, for restraining the impetuous passions of these people: it was a secondary satisfaction, at my return to England in the winter, to justify the conduct of Sir Guy Carleton in this respect; though the justification was very unpopular, amongst those—I mean not to particularize Ministers, or Ministers of Ministers—but amongst those men, who in their zeal against the Colonists, had adopted the reasoning, that “*partial severity was general mercy*,” provided by carrying terrors it conduced to finishing the war. How just soever this principle may be, my mind is not of a texture for carrying it into effect; and I returned into Canada the following spring, when I succeeded to the command, determined to be the *soldier*, not the *executioner* of the State.

I found care had been already taken by General Carleton, upon the same principles of humanity which always direct his conduct, to officer the Indians with Gentlemen selected from the

the British troops, upon a distinction of their temper and judgment, as well as upon that of their valour, and in much greater number than ever was destined to that service before. To these precautions I added that of a favourite priest, who had more controul over the passions of the Indians than all their Chiefs put together; and I trust the expence put upon Government to engage that Gentleman's assistance through the course of the campaign, will not be esteemed an improper article in my accounts.

Sir, with these assurances, I was able to enforce obedience to the injunctions of my speech at the great council, upon assembling the army, which has been made public. Barbarity was prevented; so much so, that in one instance, two wounded provincial Officers were brought off in the midst of fire, upon the backs of Indians; and a Captain and his whole detachment, placed in ambuscade, were brought prisoners to my camp by Indians, without a man hurt: though it is evident they were placed for the special purpose of destroying me, upon a reconnoitering party, and I was at that time very popular with the Indians.

I could produce many more instances of the kind, to shew that every possible exertion of humanity was used; and that the case of Miss *Mecree* excepted, which was accident, not premeditated cruelty. My design was to excite obedience, first by encouragement, and next by the *dread*, not the *commission* of severity;—" *to speak daggers, but use none.*"

General Burgoyne, May 26, 1778.

THE Honourable Gentleman (Alderman Sawbridge) has attacked me, on my activity to require reversions and emoluments. In answer to this, it is a very natural thing for people without doors, and people who do not inquire into the truth of assertions thrown out in Parliament, to be led away with an idea that the attacks made upon me on that score are well founded. Let Gentlemen, however, as I have been called upon to speak

to the charge, only see the small degree of truth that belongs to it. I have been in a most laborious and very expensive office for twelve years, without asking for a single emolument, either for myself or my family: the last year his Majesty was graciously pleased to send for me, and present me with the place I now hold, the Wardenship of the Cinque Ports. I accepted it, but it is well known, that I refused to accept it with the lucrative salary which the Noble Person who held it before me received for it; the salary which I receive, and expressly at my own desire receive, is that lower salary which had been paid previous to the office having been bestowed on my predecessor; I really do not know what the income of it is exactly, because I have not inquired what it is, but I believe it to be about a thousand a year. I have, however, told his Majesty that I am ready to resign it, whenever I am called upon for that purpose; and that readiness I shall continue to adhere to. Another charge too of rapaciousness, which has been mentioned on a former occasion, is, that I have procured a reversionship, for the lives of two of my sons, in the Customs. The charge is not true that I sought the reversionship, though it is true that I accepted it. Let Gentlemen consider this reversionship, it is the very same that had been given to Mr. Pelham on his first coming into government, and being appointed to the very office which I now hold. It will be worth a thousand a year, and is granted on the lives of two of my younger sons. The third benefit my family has received, is a place which lately fell vacant, in the gift of the Treasury, and is of so trifling a value, that several of my predecessors in office have thought it beneath the acceptance of any part of their family; because they looked much higher, and to far greater emoluments. The place is worth 500*l.* a year, and as I thought it sufficient for my son, he has, with the consent of my brethren at the Board, been appointed to it. This is all the benefit that I and my family have reaped, in consequence of my holding the office I now possess. I repeat it, that I have not asked for, or sought after, any one of my

my employments. I am ready to resign the Wardenship of the Cinque Ports ; and when I go out of office, (which I assure the Honourable Gentleman I am and long have been as desirous of quitting, as he can possibly be of having me dismissed) after my twelve years laborious service, my family will rest in possession of fifteen hundred a year. This, every Gentleman must know, however greater the merits of my predecessors in office may have been (and that they were much greater, no man is more ready to allow than myself) is infinitely and out of all comparison less than any one of them have received. I trust Gentlemen will not think I have shewn a very avaricious disposition, or have been eager to grasp at reversions or emoluments, as has been so often asserted, when it is recollected, that the whole I am possessed of is fifteen hundred pounds a year for my children, and that mine is a pretty numerous family. [At these words his Lordship struck his breast, and burst into a flood of tears, from the casual recollection that one of his sons lay dead at that moment. The House touched at the circumstance, called for the question, but his Lordship recovering himself desired leave to go on.] No part of my conduct, while I have been in office, warrants the charge of avarice : naked I came into the world, and naked I shall go out of the world : I was not a rich man when I was appointed Chancellor of the Exchequer, nor shall I go out of office a rich man : and I defy any one to prove, that I have, in the smallest instance, acted with a view to aggrandize myself, or any one that belongs to me ; or that enriching myself, or those that belong to me, has ever been my favourite object.

Lord North, June 21, 1779.

A MINISTER ought not to be a Minister, after he is suspected ; he should be like *Cæsar's* wife, not only free from guilt, but even from suspicion. If the House should withdraw their confidence from me, it would be my duty, without waiting for an Address for my removal, to wait upon my Sovereign,

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and

and delivering up to him the Seal of my office, say—" Sir, I
 " have long served you with diligence, with zeal, and with
 " fidelity, but success has not crowned my endeavours: your
 " Parliament have withdrawn from me their confidence, and
 " all my declarations to them are suspected; therefore, Sir, let
 " me resign to you those employments, which I ought not to
 " keep longer than I can be serviceable to your Majesty and
 " your subjects; and beg you will bestow them upon some
 " other, who, with greater success, though not with greater
 " zeal or fidelity, may give more satisfaction to your Majesty
 " and your Parliament."

Lord North, Feb. 27, 1782.

I AM sorry to differ in many points from my Honourable Friend who spoke last, who undoubtedly may be said to be independent, as far as a person standing singular in his opinion is independent of every person who has argued on either side of the question. My Honourable Friend has conceived that a Right Honourable Gentleman on the floor (Mr. Fox) intends to cram the India Bill, under another name, down the throats of the House of Lords. The Honourable Gentleman is mistaken in calling him the Right Honourable Secretary, for sorry I am to say, that to the misfortune of this country, it is a name which no longer belongs to him. But I will call him by a name which I trust will ever belong to him, a name which it is my pride to boast of since I knew him best; I will henceforth call him by the name of my Right Honourable Friend! by that word I mean in future to describe him, and I hope that by that name he will be in future known in the House. Our intimate connection was founded in principles of honour; when the great points on which we differed were no more, we thought we might act together with cordiality and without inconsistency. We were not mistaken; we tried the experiment and it succeeded; no meanness, no dishonour, no jealousy discovered itself; all was inviolable adherence to honour

honour and good faith on one part ; all was confidence on the other. No mean concessions were made on either side. I appeal to my Right Honourable Friend, if ever I sacrificed any one opinion which I formerly seriously held upon principle, unless where reason and argument might have pointed out the propriety of it : and in justice to my Right Honourable Friend I must declare, that he never sacrificed to me any principle which he ever held when in opposition to my government. The necessity of the State called for that Coalition, which has been so often called a cursed Coalition ; nay, the very circumstances of the present day demonstrate that necessity ; for where could an Administration be formed without a Coalition ? There were at present but two Cabinet Ministers ; and if Coalition was a cursed thing, then this Ministry of two men is a cursed Ministry, for it is formed in a Coalition of two persons who differed formerly on essential points. The difference, however, of the two Coalitions is this : The Coalition between my Right Honourable Friend and myself, was a Coalition of whole parties blended into one, for the purpose of forming a stable and permanent Government : whereas the Coalition between the present First Lord of the Treasury and the Lord President [Earl Gower] is a Coalition of shreds, of ends and remnants ; a Coalition of small parts of parties, but not of the parties themselves. Why then is it the fashion to call the one a cursed Coalition, and yet take no notice of the other ? I cannot tell, unless it is that one is sufficiently strong to form a strong Government, while the former cannot muster more as yet than two Cabinet Ministers. The experience of time has justified the Coalition, and rendered it a blessing to the country. When Parliament put an end to my Administration by the Address against the American war, it was succeeded by another which appeared to be strong ; but it carried in its own bosom the seeds of its own weakness, in the disunion which appeared in several parts of it ; which soon shewed itself by their splitting asunder, and a secession of a part of it from the

the Cabinet: the next Administration was but weak, because it was ill connected; and it had lost the support of those who formerly acted with it: the members of it therefore fell off one after another, till losing the confidence of the House, the poor remnant of it was obliged to yield to the voice of Parliament and retire. From this experience it appeared necessary, for the good of the State, that a permanent Government should be formed, and it was clear that it could not possibly be formed; unless a Coalition should take place among those, who though once enemies upon points which could no longer come into debate, might act together very cordially in every other respect: such a Coalition was formed; but then it was charged with having seized upon Government: this is indeed a charge that I do not understand, for the public waited for six weeks for a Ministry; and every means were tried for a new one, without the assistance of the Coalition; but failing in every attempt, the Ministers all quitted the Cabinet before the Coalition were sent for. The Cabinet was then empty; so that if we seized upon it, it was by marching in after the garrison which ought to have defended it had fled; and who as they were going out, cried, "What a terrible cursed thing is this Coalition, that is driving us from our situations." But if we became possessed of Government, we are at worst charged with having carried it by storm, bravely, in the face of the enemy, not by sap; we carried on our advances regularly and above ground, in view of the foe; not by mining in the dark, and blowing up the fort before the garrison knew there was an intention to attack it. It has been said on a former day, that a starling ought to be brought, placed in this House, and taught to speak the words, "Coalition! Coalition! cursed Coalition!" Now, for my part, I think, that while there is in this House an Honourable Gentleman who never fails, let what will be the subject of debate, to take an opportunity to curse the Coalition, I think there will be no occasion for the starling: and while he continues to speak by rote, and without any

any fixed idea, I think what he says will make just as much impression as if the starling himself was to utter his words. [Here the House could scarcely give the Noble Lord an opportunity to proceed, they fell into so violent a fit of laughter.] As to the Coalition, and the abuse which was so often thrown upon it, they always bring to my mind two persons for whom I felt no inconsiderable share of concern; these were two men who were shut up in the Eddystone Light-house to mind the fire. They were both of different principles, and therefore though they were shut in from all intercourse with the rest of mankind, and though they might by their conversation have amused one another, yet they never exchanged a word with each other for six weeks; and they had rather let the fire go out, and see all the navy of England dashed to pieces under them, than that one should consent to give up the most trivial point to the other.—[Here the House was a considerable time in another fit of laughter.] The enemies of the Coalition would have had my Honourable Friend and me resemble the two men in the Light-house; but we have acted more wisely for the public good; we considered the safety of the public our principal care and duty; and in order to save the ship of State from running ashore or dashing against the rocks, we all agreed, at all events, that the fire in the Light-house should not be extinguished; but that let who would stir it, it was to be kept in: thus what some affected to call a curse, was in reality a blessing to the nation. I will not charge the Right Honourable Gentleman at present at the head of his Majesty's affairs with being an enemy to Coalitions; on the contrary he likes them so well, that he has formed one himself with the Noble Lord who sits with him in the Cabinet. The Right Honourable Gentleman has endeavoured to imitate our Coalition, but he has bungled the business; for, as I said before, he has coalesced with the remnant of parties, and not with the parties themselves: therefore I may apply to them the expression of the Roman Orator, *Placuisse, sed non tetigisse*. But to return from
my

my digression, my Honourable Friend behind me (Governor Johnstone) says, that my Right Honourable Friend means to cram down the throats of the House of Lords, a Bill which they had already rejected: but surely he cannot be in earnest, for he knows my Right Honourable Friend is no longer in a situation to cram any thing down their throats; and the Honourable Member over the way (Mr. Banks) says, that a Bill totally different from that which was rejected, in as much as it is free from all those objections which are said to have made so many enemies to the Bill that is lost, is to be presented by the new Minister: and therefore as one person has it not in his power to present the same Bill again, and another person will present a totally different one, there is no danger that the old Bill will be crammed down the throats of the House of Lords; and consequently there is no danger that the event should take place, which in my Honourable Friend's opinion, would justify a dissolution of the present Parliament. My Honourable Friend has been mistaken in another point: he says, that my Right Honourable Friend said, before he resigned, that he would bring in again the same Bill. This is, indeed, a capital mistake; for my Right Honourable Friend did not resign, he was turned out; I was turned out; we were all turned out: not the merit of having voted against the Bill, could preserve the Lord President of the Council from the mortification of being turned out with all his friends. As to the assurances given to the Committee on the part of the Right Honourable Gentleman now at the head of his Majesty's affairs, that no dissolution or prorogation will take place through his advice, I am very well inclined to say, that in his honour and integrity I have a great reliance; but what security can he give that secret influence in Lords of the Bedchamber will not defeat his intentions, and produce a dissolution not only without his advice but even contrary to it?—I value highly the character of that Right Honourable Gentleman; and though he is my political enemy, still I always feel myself disposed to treat him with more respect

respect than I ever experienced from him : but highly as I value that character, I cannot trust to it upon the present occasion, because the events to which that character is pledged, may not be within the controul of the Right Honourable Member. At present there are only two Ministers in the Cabinet ; but when the number is compleated, who can answer to the House of Commons that a dissolution may not be proposed in the Cabinet, the Right Honourable Gentleman out-voted, and the question carried ? This is upon the supposition that the event will depend upon the Cabinet ; but the difficulty will be still greater, if the Committee will reflect on the power of secret influence, which can put an end to the strongest Administration, as has been experienced within these few days. I therefore must declare, that as the Address is couched in the strongest terms of respect, duty, affection and loyalty to his Majesty, I think it ought to be carried, as the only effectual means of preventing those calamities which would flow from a dissolution of Parliament in the present critical situation of affairs.

Lord North, Dec. 22, 1783.

THE last House of Commons acted contrary to the opinion of those whom they represented, and attempted to subvert the Constitution, by an infraction of Charters, which, if effected, would at once have convulsed the empire, and thrown every thing into anarchy and confusion. But his Majesty, like a parent, anxious for the safety and prosperity of his children, has listened to the voice of his people, and exercised his undoubted Prerogative by a dissolution of Parliament. This measure immediately overturns the dangerous plans of an abandoned faction, who have already stretched their power to an alarming length, and panted for universal dominion. They attempted to seize on the effects, trade, and territory of the East-India Company, whose Charter had always been considered

ed as sufficiently binding to answer the emergency of any time ; but his Majesty, besides discomfiting the dark manœuvres of those enemies of the Constitution, has made an excellent choice of another Ministry, whose zeal and patriotism justifies the prudence of his measures, and proves how dearly he has the interest of his people at heart. I cannot but presage the happiest effects from the late dissolution of Parliament ; and flatter myself, that the new House of Commons will gratify the wishes of the people. In the present Minister, the fondest hopes of the people are reposed ; he is a person whose character merits public patronage—he has consecrated that period of early life, which by others has been commonly squandered away in idle frolic, in youthful dissipation, to profitable study, and to the service of his country.—He is not one of those characters, who, having dissipated their fortune, ruined their constitution, and prostituted their powers, have entered these walls for the purpose of political traffic, for the purpose of repairing their finances, or from motives of ambition and aggrandisement. He has not come to offer the dregs of his being to the service of his country ; he has consecrated to it the first-fruits of existence. There is therefore every thing in his character to conciliate the confidence of the people ; notwithstanding the calumnies which have been raised and propagated against him, this he has fortunately obtained. I congratulate the House on the event. It is a presage auspicious to the interests of the country, as it tends to ensure the preservation and continuance of their privileges, which have been attempted to be violated. My Right Honourable Friend has been accused of being the champion of one branch of the Legislature, in opposition to the other ; of the aristocratical influence of the kingdom, in opposition to the interests of the House of Commons ; but the nation knows, that these assertions are unfounded. My Right Honourable Friend is not the champion of the House of Peers ; he is not the champion of the Prerogative ; he is not the champion of the

the House of Commons, but the CHAMPION of the CONSTITUTION!

Mr. Hamilton, May 24, 1784.

MANY of those connected with Administration, are perpetually holding out the idea that I have been the cause of all the calamities of the country by promoting the American war. Sir, I deny that to be true; I found the American war when I came into Administration; I did not create it, it was the war of the country, and approved of by the people at large. Sir, had Parliament been reformed, they would not have expressed more clearly than the unreformed Parliament did, the opinion of their constituents on that subject. But, Sir, I desire once for all, that Gentlemen will desist from those unfounded assertions, that I was the author of those calamities. If they are of that opinion, let them come forward with a charge; I am ready to meet it; I call for it; nay, Sir, I demand it as a right. Sir, there can be no reason for withholding it now. If I was protected before, I am not protected now. Sir, the Minister has every thing that can enable him to carry on the prosecution against me; he has a House of Commons to accuse, he has a House of Lords to judge; he is master of all the written evidence against me. And as to parole testimony, those who were my friends, those who were in my secrets, those whom I received into my utmost confidence, from whom I concealed nothing, are now the friends of the Right Honourable Gentleman, Sir; and I dare say their love of justice and regard for the public, will make them fit and useful witnesses upon such an occasion. Yet, Sir, with all these advantages on the part of the Minister, of accuser, judge, written and parole testimony, I do not shrink from, but court the inquiry; but this I must insist upon, that if the matter is not inquired into, it shall not be argued upon as if proved.

Lord North, June 17, 1784.

THE

THE conduct of the Chancellor of the Exchequer has been attacked without any reason whatsoever; for that Gentleman has acted with the greatest candour respecting the new Taxes. The complaints of the poorest individual have been listened to with the utmost attention and tenderness; and at present there is without doors a deputation from the Hatters, whose case has been attended to with the same regard as that of the first Peer in the land. The Right Honourable Chancellor of the Exchequer has conducted himself with great philanthropy and candour; for he has, with a liberality which will ever do him honour, relinquished the Tax upon Coals, because he found that it was particularly obnoxious to the People. Considering these facts, therefore, it can hardly be insinuated, in the most distant manner, that the complaints of the People have not been attended to: and to my knowledge there are many others, whose cases are at present in contemplation. It must be evident to every Gentleman of this House, that the exigencies of the State must be provided for; and I imagine, that all will confess, the Right Honourable Gentleman alluded to has acted with great caution and circumspection in respect to the new Taxes; and has discharged the trust reposed in him with fidelity to his Sovereign and his Country. There are several other Taxes, besides that on coals, which, I could inform the House, he intends to abandon, and substitute other Duties in their place, equally productive, I hope, but more consonant to the disposition of the People. The propriety, however, of the alterations alluded to, will, on a future day, come before the House, when Gentlemen may assent or object to the measures; but I assure the House, that it is the intention of the present Administration, to conduct themselves with that propriety and decorum which will put malevolence at defiance; and while they discharge their duty with honour and fidelity to their country, they will at the same time take care, that their operations and resolutions will give vigour and energy to their measures.

Mr. Rose, July 15, 1784.

WITH

WITH respect to the fatal consequences to be expected from the increase of Indian wealth and influence in this House, and in this Country, I will quickly remove the apprehensions of the House and the Public, by opposing a few simple facts to unmeaning and unfounded assertions. Much has been said of the influence of Mr. Hastings in this House and in this nation. I solemnly deny the fact, if it is meant to convey an insinuation of corrupt or improper influence: Mr. Hastings is as unconnected with the present as with the late Ministers. All I ask on the part of Mr. Hastings is justice, and I want neither favour nor protection from any man. Much also has been said of the influence of East-Indians in general in this House. On a former occasion I partly refuted a calumny of this kind, by the best possible mode, by an appeal to facts. I now hold in my hand a paper which contains an exact list of all the civil servants of the Company, appointed to Bengal in the last twenty-two years; and I hope that, with the remarks, will be received as part of my speech. They are in number five hundred and eight—of these, thirty-seven only have returned to England; one hundred and fifty are dead, and three hundred and twenty-one now, I hope, are alive there. Every Gentleman knows that Bengal is the place for acquiring fortunes; and if the House will peruse the whole of this paper, calmly and coolly, they will be convinced that there is not the smallest foundation to apprehend those dreadful consequences which the Right Honourable Gentleman dreads, from the vast wealth and influence of Mr. Hastings, and other East-India Gentlemen.—I shall beg the assistance of the Honourable Gentleman, [Mr. Francis, who nodded assent] to refute the ridiculous stories that are propagated. I know that they have not the smallest foundation in truth. The following paper is authentic.

A List of the Gentlemen appointed in the Civil Service of the East-India Company in Bengal, from 1762 to 1784; specifying the number that have returned to England, who died in the country, or are now resident there.

Number appoint- ed.	Year.	Returned home.	In Ben- gal.	Dead.
28	1762	7	4	17
14	1763	5	5	4
16	1764	3	6	7
34	1765	5	8	21
20	1766	3	5	12
3	1767	1	—	2
35	1768	5	16	14
48	1769	5	22	22
24	1770	—	14	10
33	1771	3	17	13
41	1772	—	26	15
16	1773-4	—	14	2
28	1775	—	24	4
5	1776	—	3	2
22	1777	—	20	2
24	1778	—	22	2
25	1779	1	23	1
26	1780	—	26	—
28	1781	—	28	—
1	1782	—	1	—
35	1783	—	35	—
508		37	321	150

Names

Names of the Gentlemen who have been appointed to Bengal in the two and twenty years, and have returned to England.

John Bathoe
 Isaac Sage
 Alexander Higginson
 B. G. Wright
 Edward Baber
 Charles Gering
 William Harwood
 Alexander Campbell
 Evan Law
 Edward Golding
 William Luffington
 C. W. B. Rouse
 G. Ducarrell
 W. B. Martin
 Thomas Hinchman
 Gideon Johnstone
 Thomas Pattle
 W. Thackray
 John Hogarth

Robert Colville
 William Bensley
 John Shakespear
 Edward Parry
 L. Darell
 Richard Sumner
 Frederick Stuart
 Charles Cox
 Edward Smith
 Richard Griffith
 J. P. Apriol
 J. Fydell
 J. Baugh
 C. Fleetwood
 J. Cator
 H. S. Chandler
 George Lucas
 Richard Fligham

There is not a more mistaken idea, than that which has been so industriously circulated and believed, of the rapid and enormous fortunes made by the Company's servants in Bengal. This list is warranted to be accurate, and it proves, that of five hundred and eight civil servants, appointed in the last twenty-two years, thirty-seven only have returned to this country; one hundred and fifty are gone from whence they can never return; and, according to every probable calculation, not thirty-seven of the three hundred and twenty-one now in Bengal, will return in the next ten years, with fortunes acquired in India: of the thirty-seven who have returned, not a

man has brought home an enormous fortune; many of them less than twenty thousand pounds, some of them not a shilling; nor has one fortune, to my knowledge, been rapidly acquired; and of the whole number, two only are Members of this House.

The fortunes that have been acquired by military Gentlemen, who have gone out, or been appointed Cadets or Officers, in Bengal, in the last twenty-two years, are still more inconsiderable. In that time, above one thousand two hundred Officers have been appointed in Bengal, but not thirty of the one thousand two hundred have returned with any fortunes at all; and two, Captain Wathenton and myself, have the honour to sit in this House. Of this number, I know only five who have brought home above twenty thousand pounds; and many have returned with less than five thousand pounds. About thirty Officers have since returned, being disabled by wounds or ill health, and have now a very bare subsistence from Lord Clive's military fund.

That large fortunes have been acquired in Bengal no man will doubt; but the time is long since past. At the first revolution, in 1756, upon the English acquiring power in Bengal, and in consequence of the battle of Plassey, some very enormous fortunes were made.

Again, in the first acquisition of the Duannee, when the entire government of a great kingdom devolved upon a very few English Gentlemen, rapid and enormous fortunes were made by two or three of them; nor was it possible it should be otherwise.

Our Commanders in Chief too, in those days, General Smith and Sir Robert Barker, acquired very large fortunes from the power and influence they enjoyed, by being constantly at Allanabad with the King, or in the Vizier's country.

Again by the Treaty of 1775, with the present Vizier, the entire management of Oude fell (as Mr. Hastings foretold it would) into the hands of the resident at his Court. This

was

was naturally the source of great influence, and great emolument, to two English Gentlemen not yet returned to England.

It is a circumstance worthy of remark, that of all the civil servants that have gone out in the last twelve years, that is, since Mr. Hastings became Governor, only one has returned, and that Gentleman never profited six-pence by his appointment; for he quitted Bengal either before it arrived, or a very few months after, with an unblemished reputation. He returned with his relation Mr. Francis.

It is equally worthy of remark, that not a single Gentleman who has been in the Governor-General's family, civil or military, has returned to England with any fortune, myself excepted; and I certainly did not acquire a fortune in Mr. Hastings's family: I brought with me, or left behind me, about seven thousand pounds, being all that I acquired in sixteen years.

If such is the state of fortunes acquired by Gentlemen appointed to Bengal for these last two and twenty years, it will be found upon investigation, that the fortunes acquired at Madras and Bombay, by Gentlemen of the same standing, are still more inconsiderable. They are fewer in number, and I do not suppose that thirty Gentlemen, who went out in or near 1762, have returned to England from both Presidencies. This, however, is capable of proof; but as Bengal has been called the garden of Eden, I confine myself to that spot. Enormous as were the fortunes acquired in Bengal at the battle of Plassey, by which an empire was conquered for Great-Britain. And at our acquisition of the Duannee, they did not amount to so much as was acquired by individuals here, by one of the Noble Lord's Loans, during the late calamitous and unfortunate war. I shall be truly happy, if it should be my good fortune, by preserving that sacred regard to truth, from which I have never yet deviated, to remove from the minds of the Public those prejudices that have been instilled into them by the bold assertions of men, who have said, and unsaid, just as it answered

their political purposes ; and who, when they were in the plenitude of power, never dared to do what they ought to have done, if they really thought Mr. Hastings a delinquent ; that is, to have brought in a Bill for his removal, upon some one specific charge. Instead of this, what is it they did?—Their leader accused him of crimes, for which, if he had been guilty, his life would have been too poor a sacrifice ; he then declared, he meant nothing personal against him ; and in the end, this Mr. Hastings, this notorious delinquent, was offered a full and free pardon for all his offences, provided his friends would tacitly submit to see the Company, his benefactors and preservers, deprived of their rights, and plundered of their property.

Major Scott, July 16, 1784.

E L O Q U E N C E.

I BELIEVE most Gentlemen, as well as myself, whose expectations were raised when the Hon. Gentleman (Sir Robert Walpole) stood up, have met with a very great disappointment. That Gentleman, from whom we had reason to expect something that would have been of weight in the present debate, has not only told us, that we are to have no reason for what we are desired this day to agree to, but has given us very little hopes of having, at any other time, that information, which one would think a British Parliament might expect. Are we to vote powerful fleets and numerous armies; are we to lay new and great burthens on the people, and all this without being told any reasons for what we are desired to do? What satisfaction can we give our constituents, if they should ask us, why we have augmented our standing army, which must always be dangerous to the liberties of our country? Why we have consented to the increasing the public charge, which is already heavier than the people can bear? Really to this most material and reasonable question, I know as yet of no other answer we can give, but only that his Majesty has told us in his Speech, that there is a war broke out in Europe, in which we have no manner of concern; and his Ministers have told us, that we ought to be afraid of the armies and fleets raised and fitted out by our neighbours, because they are under an absolute necessity of employing all the armies they can raise, and all the fleets they can fit out, in those parts of Europe which are most remote from us. We have zeal, Sir, I hope we have all a great deal of affection and zeal for his Majesty's Person and Government; but do not let us allow his Majesty's Ministers, or even his Majesty himself, to expect such a blind zeal from his Parliament: it is inconsistent with the dignity of Parliament; and I am sure that Parliaments, thirty or forty years ago, would hardly have been persuaded

to have shewn so much complaisance to the Ministers of the Crown.

What has been observed by some Gentlemen, I own, Sir, weighs greatly with me. From the demand now before us we have reason to conclude, that 13,000 men may be the number intended to be always kept up within this island, even in times of the greatest peace and tranquillity; and that the augmentation now required, is done with a view only, that when such times shall again come, those in the Administration may have an opportunity to pretend great merit, in reducing the 13,000 men now proposed to be added. We all know what fears and jealousies the people have entertained at the continuing this army, during the last years of perfect peace and tranquillity both at home and abroad: and if that measure should be again attempted when those days of peace return, every man must then conclude, that the army is kept up, not for defending us against our foreign enemies, but for the safety of those who have rendered themselves odious among the people, and for defending them against the resentment of an injured and a plundered nation. If this should ever happen to be our unfortunate condition, the people will certainly make a struggle for the preservation of their ancient constitution. This will certainly be the case; I know it must be the case; and when it is, I hope those who shall bring us under such hard circumstances will find, that even this army of 13,000 will not be able to stand against the people of England. I have a great opinion of many Gentlemen who have commands in the army; and if such a case should happen, while they have any command, I make no doubt but they would behave as their predecessors did at the Revolution; I dare say, that most of them would soon be found of the people's side of the question.

If we are, Sir, to have any share in the war, the addition of 13,000 men is but a bauble; and if we are to have no share, why should we bring any additional expence upon the people? The Hon. Gentleman would not say positively that we were engaged,

gaged, or not engaged, or that we were, or were not to be engaged, but that we might be engaged relatively and consequentially: and this refined quibbling, Sir, is, it seems, all the satisfaction, all the reasons he will vouchsafe to give Gentlemen, for agreeing to the demand now made upon them. Is an English House of Commons to take this as a reason for breaking in upon their constitution, and for loading their constituents with taxes? Surely, Sir, let our condition be never so bad, and I believe it is bad enough, if the advice of Parliament is wanted on that occasion, if their assistance be desired, they ought to have a full information of the present circumstances of the nation, and they ought to have sufficient reasons for the demand that is made. But it seems we are, for the future, to have no other reason given us for complying with any demand that comes from the Crown, but only because it is asked: and if any Gentleman scruples to take that as a sufficient reason, he is, it seems, always to be told, that his not agreeing readily to the demand, will be looked upon as a want of respect to the Crown: but, for God's sake, let us have likewise some regard to ourselves and to our fellow-subjects, without which I am sure we have no business here, nor can the nation ever reap any benefit from our meeting in this place.

Mr. William Pulteney, Jan. 23, 1734.

GOVERNMENT, Sir, is an evil, which the perverse nature of some has obliged all to submit to. Mankind, for the sake of preserving their lives, and the fruits of their labour, against the invasions of the wicked and rapacious, have been obliged to form themselves into societies, and to promise obedience to the Civil Magistrate: but that which was intended for protecting the people of the society, is often made use of for their oppression; and instead of being a bridle upon the inclinations of the wicked, it often serves to strengthen their hands, by tying up those of the innocent. To prevent this fatal effect, many sorts of Governments have been invented by men, all of which may be

be resolved into these three, to wit, the Monarchical, the Aristocratical, or the Democratical: for every form of Government must either be a Monarchy, an Aristocracy, or a Democracy; or it must be a mixture of some two of these, or of all the three.

By experience, Sir, it has been found, that when the supreme Power is lodged either in a sole Monarch, or in a set of Nobles, it often deviates into tyranny; and that when it is lodged in the people in general, there is no possibility of preventing it from running into anarchy; and the next step which follows is commonly a Monarchical, or Aristocratical Tyranny; especially if the people of the society be numerous, and their dominions extensive. For this reason, many various sorts of mixtures have been contrived by Lawgivers: but of all the mixtures that ever were contrived, that of an equal mixture of the three is, I believe, the best and most lasting. How our ancestors, the Germans, hit upon this mixture; whether it proceeded from their experience, or from their natural sagacity, I shall not pretend to determine; but it is certain, that from the earliest accounts we have of them, this appears to have been the form of Government generally established among them. The supreme Power among them was always lodged in an Assembly of their King or General, their Nobles or Chiefs of Families, and their People or Soldiers in general. In this Assembly all matters of great importance were considered and determined; the King and Nobles proposed and resolved, and the People consented or disapproved. The powers and privileges of these three branches of their Legislature, were not, perhaps, so distinctly ascertained as they are by the present form of our Constitution; or if they were, no certain account of them has been handed down to us: but it is plain that the same spirit, upon which our present Constitution is founded, was the prevailing spirit in their form of Government; and this spirit may be traced from the beginning of our history to this very day.

The spirit I mean, Sir, is, to have in our form of Government such an equal mixture of the Monarchical, Aristocratical, and
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Democratical forms of Government, that each may prove a proper counterpoise to the other, in such a manner, as that all these three constituent Powers may continue equal and independent. If they do, any one of them may, and always will, be a guard for our Constitution and for our People, against the violence and oppression of both, or either of the other two. If our King should resolve to make himself absolute, or if he and his Ministers should begin to oppress the People, both this and the other House would certainly join together in opposing such schemes: if the other House should begin to set themselves up as sovereign and arbitrary masters of our Government, the King and this House would certainly join against them: and if this House, as perhaps has been the case, should begin to set ourselves up as masters, the King and the House of Lords would as certainly join against us, and probably, by means of a dissolution and new election, be able to prevent any fatal consequences. Again, if any two of these branches of our Legislature should join together in any scheme for oppressing the People, they could not carry their scheme effectually into execution without the concurrence of the third: but, on the contrary, that third branch of our Legislature, with the assistance of the People, would probably be able, not only to disappoint, but to punish the authors of such a scheme.

Therefore, Sir, while our Constitution remains entire, while the three constituent parts of our form of Government remain equal and independent, our People can never be oppressed, nor can a barefaced arbitrary power ever be established. From hence one may see, that from our Constitution, considered in itself, without any undue influence, we can have nothing to apprehend; the only danger we are exposed to is, that of its dissolution: and for this reason we ought to consider carefully, and guard watchfully against all those methods by which it may be overturned. The only methods by which our Constitution can be overturned, and consequently the only evils we have to guard against is, lest any one of the branches of our Legislature should
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get the absolute direction of the other two; and left any one, by a dissolution or discontinuance of the other two, should be able to assume to itself an absolute and arbitrary power. As the power of calling, proroguing, and dissolving the Parliament is lodged intirely in the Crown; as the execution of our Laws is now more fully and extensively lodged in the Crown, than it was by the ancient form of our Constitution; and as his Majesty is provided with a very large revenue for life, I cannot think there is the least danger, that either House of Parliament will become able to prescribe to the other and to the King: therefore we are at present in no danger of either House of Parliament ever getting the absolute direction of the other two branches of our Legislature, as was once the case of this nation.

But, Sir, that the Crown may be able to get the absolute direction of both Houses of Parliament, and may consequently make both intirely dependant upon the King, or rather upon the King's Ministers, for the time being, I must think we are at present in some danger: nay, I must say, I think we are in such danger, that I am afraid nothing preserves us from it but his Majesty's known wisdom, justice, and moderation. I have, I confess, such a bad opinion of mankind, that I believe the generality of them will sacrifice the public good for their private advantage, often for a very trifling private advantage; especially when they can do it, without bringing immediately infamy and reproach upon themselves. This, I am sorry to say it, is my opinion of the generality of mankind: and considering what vast sums of money, and what a vast number of lucrative posts and employments, of all sorts and' sizes, the Crown has to bestow yearly, and what extensive powers have been put into the hands of the Crown, by the many Penal Laws lately enacted, I am much afraid, that if his Majesty would allow his Ministers to apply them towards managing and purchasing votes at elections, or even in Parliament, it would soon come to be in the power of the Crown to direct both Houses of Parliament: for if the voting at elections, or in Parliament, from corrupt considerations,

tions, should once come to be frequent, the frequency of the crime would extenuate the guilt, and the multitude of criminals would smother that reproach, which now so deservedly attends such an infamous practice.

Lord Noel Somerset, Feb. 3, 1738.

I AM unable to offer any thing that has not been said by the Honourable Gentleman (Mr. Lyttelton) who made you the Motion for an Address of Congratulation to the King, on account of the nuptials of the Prince of Wales with the Princess of Saxe-Gotha, in a manner much more suitable to the dignity and importance of this great occasion. But, Sir, as I am really affected with the prospect of the blessings to be derived to my country from this so desirable, and so long-desired measure, the marriage of his Royal Highness the Prince of Wales, I cannot forbear troubling you with a few words, to express my joy, and to mingle my humble offering, inconsiderable as it is, with this great oblation of thanks and congratulation to his Majesty.

How great soever the joy of the public may be, and very great it certainly is, in receiving this benefit from his Majesty, it must be inferior to that high satisfaction which he himself enjoys in bestowing it: and if I may be allowed to suppose, that to a royal mind any thing can transcend the pleasure of gratifying the impatient wishes of a loyal people, it can only be the paternal delight of tenderly indulging the most dutiful application, and most humble request of a submissive obedient son. I mention, Sir, his Royal Highness's having asked a marriage; because something is in justice due to him, for having asked what we are so strongly bound by all the ties of duty and of gratitude, to return to his Majesty our most humble acknowledgments for having granted.

The marriage of a Prince of Wales, Sir, has at all times been a matter of the highest importance to the public welfare, to present, and to future generations: but at no time has it

ever been a more important, a more dear consideration, than at this day; if a character at once amiable and respectable, can embellish and even dignify the elevated rank of a Prince of Wales. Were it not a sort of presumption to follow so great a Person through his hours of retirement, to view him in the milder light of domestic life, we should find him busied in the noble exercise of humanity, benevolence, and of every social virtue. But, Sir, how pleasing, how captivating soever such a scene may be, yet, as it is a private one, I fear I should offend the delicacy of that virtue I so ardently desire to do justice to, should I offer it to the consideration of this House. But, Sir, filial duty to his Royal Parents, a generous love for Liberty, and a just reverence for the British Constitution, these are public virtues, and cannot escape the applause and benedictions of the Public. They are virtues, Sir, which render his Royal Highness not only a notable ornament, but a firm support, if any could possibly be necessary, of that Throne so greatly filled by his Royal Father.

I have been led to say thus much of his Royal Highness's character, because it is the consideration of that character which, above all things, enforces the justice and goodness of his Majesty in the measure now before you; a measure which the nation thought could never come too soon, because it brings with it the promise of an additional strength to the Protestant succession in his Majesty's illustrious and Royal House. The spirit of Liberty dictated that succession, the same spirit now rejoices in the prospect of its being perpetuated to the latest posterity: it rejoices in the wise and happy choice, which his Majesty has been pleased to make of a Princess so amiably distinguished in herself, so illustrious in the merit of her family; the glory of whose great ancestor it is, to have sacrificed himself to the noblest cause for which a Prince can draw his sword, the cause of Liberty and the Protestant Religion. Such, Sir, is the marriage, for which our most humble acknowledgments are due to his Majesty, and may it afford the comfort of seeing

the Royal Family (numerous as I thank God it is) still growing and rising up in a third generation: a Family, Sir, which I most sincerely wish may be as immortal as those Liberties and that Constitution which it came to maintain.

Mr. William Pitt, April 14, 1736.

THOUGH charity obliges us to believe, that all men are sincere, till the contrary evidently appears; and though decency often obliges us to avoid telling them they are not so, yet one cannot help a suspicion arising in one's breast, when we find Lords professing their readiness to join in an inquiry, or in exerting our birth-right of being the great Counsellors of the Crown, and yet upon all occasions opposing it; and in support of their opposition offering such arguments, as, if they were admitted, would render it impossible for this House ever to inquire into the conduct of past measures, or offer any advice in relation to future. The Noble Lord (Lord Isla) says, we ought never to offer our advice in affairs relative to peace or war; that is to say, in any foreign affairs whatsoever, unless called upon by the King to do so. My Lords, I know nothing else we can have occasion to offer our advice in, unless it be, whether the King shall go to the play or the opera, whether he shall shew mercy to a thief, or order him to be hanged, or something of equal importance; for in all domestic affairs of great importance, our King, thank God! is limited by the laws, and ought not to transgress them, even though this House should advise him to do so. And as to our being called upon, we know from experience, that though this House be the hereditary great Council of the Crown, yet our advice is very seldom asked in a serious manner. Kings, my Lords, are generally for consulting with such as are of their own chusing, and these are often such as have no dignity, privilege, or right, by their birth. We know the greatest empire that ever was on earth, was once governed by the sole advice of a freed slave; and one of the greatest empires now in being, by the advice of a Cabinet

Cabinet Council of Eunuchs, and such as they shall chuse for their Privy Council; therefore, if we never offer our advice but when it is seriously asked by the Crown, I am afraid we shall very seldom exert that privilege, which is our birth-right.

How this House has of late years come to be so much suspected of blabbing, I do not know; but it is a *very new doctrine* to say, that nothing can be communicated to this House, without making it public. The very first instance of our being refused any papers we thought necessary for our information, for fear it should thereby be made public, was in the year 1721: since that time, indeed, it has been commonly and frequently practised; and yet whatever secrets our Ministers may have had since that time, I do not think the nation had ever any fewer in any equal period of time.

Earl of Chesterfield, Dec. 1, 1740.

I AM sorry to observe, that it is now become a common topic of debate here, as well as in our conversation without doors, that public praise ought to be despised, and the opinion of the giddy multitude altogether disregarded: This, my Lords, is a most terrible symptom, if Mr. Addison be right in his observation; for in one of his Spectators I remember he observes, *We then only despise commendation, when we cease to deserve it.* As I am acquainted with the Noble Lord (Lord Iffa) who spoke last, I am convinced he will never cease to deserve commendation; but I was really in pain, when I heard him endeavouring to persuade your Lordships to despise the opinions, the suspicions, and the clamours of the people without doors: I say I was in pain, lest some of those who are not acquainted with his Lordship, should think of this observation, which I am sure is very unjust, when applied to him. The desire of fame, the desire of applause, is one of the most exalted, and one of the most useful affections of the human mind. It is so closely connected with our nature, that I believe no man can intirely rid

rid himself of it ; and therefore no man will pretend to despise the reproaches or the suspicions of his countrymen, but he that is conscious of their being just. A man of steady resolution will not allow himself to be carried away with every new opinion that prevails among the people, nor will he do what is wrong, in order to gain a popular applause ; but surely he will not allow his character to lie under suspicion amongst his countrymen, if he can by any means clear it up. The multitude may sometimes be artfully led into a wrong way of thinking, or they may be induced to clamour without reason ; but it is not the part of a good citizen to despise that opinion, or that clamour ; it is his duty to endeavour to set the people right, and if the opinion or clamour be against himself, for the sake of his own character, as well as in duty to the public, he ought to take the most proper and the most speedy method for his justification.

This, my Lords, is the duty of every private man, and much more is it the duty of a Magistrate or Minister. Even in absolute governments the Ministers ought to take all proper methods for gaining the affections and esteem of the people, and consequently for removing every suspicion and clamour that may happen to arise against them : but in a free government, this is not only the duty of the Ministers and Magistrates, but they are under an absolute necessity to do so, if they have a mind to continue in their office : for the distinguishing and sole sign of a people's being free, is that of their being governed by those laws and those men they approve of. If a law comes to be thought inconvenient or oppressive, by the majority of a free people, it will be repealed ; if a Magistrate or Minister comes to be hated or despised by the majority of a free people, he will be removed ; and therefore, if in any country a law stands unrepealed for some time after it begins to be disapproved by a majority of the people, or if a Magistrate or Minister continues in office for some time after he begins to be generally hated or despised, that government is not a free government, that Peo-

ple have no pretence to call themselves a free people. For this reason, I am surprized to hear it said, that our Ministers despise the clamours of the people, or that they do not desire your Lordships assistance for allaying those clamours. My Lords, if they despise those clamours, if they do not desire to take the most proper and the most speedy method for allaying them, which is by an impartial parliamentary inquiry, I will affirm they have, or at least they think they have, found out another method of governing, another method of preserving their power, than that which is the only method in a free country, I mean the esteem and affections of the generality of the people; and if they have any such thoughts, I hope they will soon find themselves disappointed.

Earl of Halifax, Dec. 1, 1740.

I AM not only against some particular Clauses of this Bill, but against the whole contexture of it; and though, my Lords, Bills of this nature have been canvassed in both Houses by men of far greater abilities and experience than I can pretend to, yet I should think myself highly-blameable, if I did not, as far as in me lies, oppose a Bill which strikes directly at the root of the constitution, and is an infringement both of the liberties of the people, and the prerogative of the Crown. In the sequel of what I shall offer to your Lordships, I think, I can plainly make out this assertion; but should I be mistaken, my Lords, I will venture to say, my head, not my heart, will be in fault.

To weigh the merits of this Bill, it will be necessary to take it from its birth, consider its parents, and how and upon what occasions it has appeared. My Lords, this blessed plant was sown by party and faction; it was nursed by fury and discontent; loss of *English* liberty was its fruit. It was the first step by which *Oliver Cromwell*, and some few others, mounted up above the liberty of mankind. It was framed to divide and destroy the bulwark of our constitution, the Parliament: and surely, my Lords, it would be very extraordinary, if Parliaments again
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should cherish this cankerworm, which since its birth never has dared to appear, but when a distempered air hovered round us, and, like sudden and intense darkness, was the forerunner of a storm.

My Lords, the very preamble of this Bill sets up a standard of division between the Crown and the people; it declares their interest separate, and of consequence they must draw separately; which is a doctrine quite different from what I have been taught from my cradle. I am sure, it is a most melancholy doctrine; for a State divided against itself can never stand long.

But, my Lords, to be more particular, let us consider (should this become an Act) what effect it would have, first by excluding all but some few of the most important places from the House of Commons, and afterwards by excluding the army.

First then, with regard to those places of importance which it does not exclude, and those lesser which it excludes, I shall only beg leave of your Lordships to put a few questions; if then we exclude all but those of the greatest trust, and where the very being of public affairs is centered, how shall we in the next age find men capable of filling them? For by taking away the lesser, we take away the proper steps to the greater: how are those who are young and inexperienced, to acquire a knowledge in business, so as to be able to transact affairs, on the well or ill conducting of which depends the public good, or the misery of this whole nation? My Lords, how shall we find men fit for these important posts? It is an undeniable fact, that business makes men of business; the greatest natural capacity a man was ever blessed with, can never teach him the intricate road, form, and *routine* of public officers; practice must do it, and practice alone. If then the means of practice be cut off, how must young men arrive at this knowledge? It must be by inspiration, or by one single way else, which is, by the great men of the present age turning School-masters, keeping a school for foreign and domestic politics. I am apprehensive they will not easily be induced to turn pedagogues; not to mention that they themselves

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may not, perhaps, wish to have the market overstocked. What then must be the consequence? Young men of fortune and rank cannot accept of places; when by accepting them they are to be deemed unfit for serving their country in Parliament, and to have the ignominious mark of slavery set on them; and without accepting which, they cannot arrive at a knowledge of business fit to be trusted with the public affairs. What will be the effect? Men of no fortune, no rank in the State, who have first drudged through the lower and mean offices, must have those of the greatest trust and profit, as being the only persons capable of filling them: and it is too much to be feared, that the complaisance of such (who owe all they possess to the Crown) will be boundless, and that the King will have bad Counsellors, and the nation be ill served.

My Lords, with regard to the Officers of the Army, I think the same argument is still stronger, as the misfortunes which will flow from it are of a more immediate and a more dangerous consequence, and the danger without remedy. This Bill will exclude all young men of fortune from the army, for the same reason it will from all civil employments. Your Gentry, your Nobility, deprived of all laudable ambitious views, will sink, like *Italians*, into a slothful idleness. But, my Lords, I must beg leave to remind you of this nation's being saved from slavery, by having men of property in the army: for God's sake, do not let us ruin that great barrier of our liberty. It may be said, we do not stand in need of an army; we are an island, have a most powerful fleet, so that an army is both useless and dangerous. I shall not enter into all that may be said in answer to that complicated assertion; but only beg leave to put a case, and it is a case, as the affairs of *Europe* stand, must happen once in twenty years; and I hope our liberty will be upon a sounder foundation than to be hazarded every twenty years: within that space of time, you must, in all probability, raise a considerable army, either to defend your own possessions, or preserve the balance of power in *Europe*; which are equally

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and absolutely necessary. When this army has done what you raised them for, you will think it necessary likewise to disband them, and ease yourself and the people of so costly a burden; but your Lordships, perhaps, will find the disbanding them more difficult than the raising them. I am apt to believe, that a Vote of either House, how rhetorically soever it may be expressed, will not persuade them it is for their interest to lose their bread, when by keeping together, you and all you have is entirely at their mercy: and, my Lords, at such a season, should a Prince, less a father of his people than his present Majesty, should a Prince of more ambition than honest intentions, fill the Throne, it would be in his power, with such an army, to become as absolute as the King of *France*. My Lords, by what I have offered to you, it plainly appears to me, that nothing can keep and confirm your liberties but having the Officers, at least, men of property, who have a stake in the country, and whose interest is the same with ours. It was by an army of hirelings, debtors, renegados, and such like, that *Rome* at last fell a victim to the ambition of one man.

It may, perhaps, be said in excuse for this Bill, that men of too small fortunes have employments and seats in Parliament; have you not an Act of Qualification? If that is not observed, why will you imagine this will? I should think it would not; for tho' it is an extraordinary thing to say so, it would be contrary to the interest of the Crown, contrary to the interest of every particular, and contrary to the interest of the nation in general. But if the sum limited in the Qualification Bill is not already sufficient, increase it; that is the only way which will answer what is in vain expected from this Bill. But, my Lords, to conclude, what a compliment would it be to his Majesty, to say, you are not fit to be trusted with what your ancestors have always hitherto enjoyed, the power of disposing of places and judging of merit? We will, by a public Act, shew we mistrust you: what a compliment will it be to those the people chuse, to say, we will not trust your integrity, because the people chuse you their Representatives?

representatives? Is this the means to endear a people to their Prince, a Prince to his people, or mankind to one another?

Lord Raymond, April 6, 1742.

I SHOULD imagine, my Lords, that when a King of the House of *Hanover* surveys his navies, reviews his troops, or examines his revenue, beholds the splendour of his Court, or contemplates the extent of his dominions, he cannot but sometimes, however unwillingly, compare his present state with that of his ancestors; and that when he gives audience to the Ambassadors of Princes, who, perhaps, never heard of *Hanover*, and directs the payment of sums, dearly purchased, and reflects, as surely he sometimes will, that all these honours and riches, this reverence from foreign powers, and his domestic splendour, are the gratuitous and voluntary gifts of the mighty people of *Great-Britain*; he should find his heart overflowing with unlimited gratitude, and should be ready to sacrifice to the happiness of his benefactors, not only every petty interest, or accidental inclination, but even his repose, his safety, or his life: that he should be ready to ease them of every burthen before they complained, and to aid them with all his power, before they requested his assistance; that he should consider his *British* kingdom a kind of nursery for troops, to be employed without harrassing his more valuable subjects.

It might be at least hoped, my Lords, that the Princes of the House of *Hanover* might have the same regard to this nation, as to Kings from whom they never received any benefit, and whom they ought in reality always to have considered as enemies, yet even from such levy-money was not always required, or, if required, was not always received.

There was once a time, my Lords, before any of this race wore the Crown of *Great-Britain*, when the great *French* Monarch, Lewis XIV. being under a necessity of hiring auxiliary troops, applied to the Duke of *Hanover*, as a Prince whose necessities would naturally incline him to set the lives of his

subjects

subjects at a cheap rate : the Duke, pleased with an opportunity of trafficking with so wealthy a Monarch, readily promised a supply of troops, and demanded levy-money to be paid him, that he might be enabled to ~~raise~~ them; but *Hanoverian* reputation was not then raised so high, as that the *French* King should trust him with his money. *Lewis* suspected, and made no scruple of declaring his suspicion, that the demand of levy-money was only a pretence to obtain a sum which would never afterwards be repaid, and for which no troops would be obtained; and therefore with his usual prudence insisted, that the troops should first march and then be paid. Thus for some time the Treaty was at a stand; but the King being equally in want of men as the Duke of money, and perceiving, perhaps, that it was really impracticable for so indigent a Prince to raise troops without some pecuniary assistance, offered him at length a small sum, which was gladly accepted, though much below the original demand. The troops were engaged in the service of *France*; and the Duke of *Hanover* thought himself happy, in being able to amuse himself at his leisure with the rattle of the money.

Such, my Lords, were the conditions on which the troops of *Hanover* were furnished in former times; and surely what could then be produced by the love of money, or the awe of a superior power, might now be expected as the effect of gratitude and kindness.

Earl of Sandwich, Feb. 1, 1742.

I KNOW not how successfully I may repeat assertions in this House, for which I have been formerly censured and committed to the Tower, and which few other Members have hitherto maintained; but I rise with confidence, that I shall be at least acknowledged to act consistently with myself in seconding the noble person, (Lord Somers) who has made the Motion now before you, for addressing his Majesty, not to engage these kingdoms in a war for the preservation of his foreign domi-

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nions : and I am convinced, that many who differ from me in opinion, would be glad to boast of resembling my steadiness of conduct.

But steadiness, Sir, is the effect only of integrity; he that speaks always what he thinks, and endeavours by diligent inquiry to think aright before he ventures to declare his sentiments; he that follows in his searches no leader but reason, nor expects any reward from them but the advantage of discovering truth, and the pleasure of communicating it, will not easily change his opinion; because it will seldom be easy to shew, that he who has honestly inquired after truth has failed to attain it.

For my part, I am neither ashamed nor afraid to affirm, that thirty years have made no change in any of my political opinions; I am now grown old in this House, but that experience which is the consequence of age, has only confirmed the principles with which I entered it many years ago: time has verified the predictions which I formerly uttered, and I have seen my conjectures ripened into knowledge.

I should be therefore without excuse, if either terror could affright, or the hope of advantage allure me from the declaration of my opinions; opinions which I was not deterred from asserting, when the prospect of a longer life than I can now expect might have added to the temptations of ambition, or aggravated the terrors of poverty and disgrace; opinions, for which I would willingly have suffered the severest censures, even when I had enforced them only in compliance with reason, without the infallible certainty of experience.

Of truth it has always been observed, Sir, that every day adds to its establishment, and that falsehoods, however specious, however supported by power, or established by confederacies, are unable to stand before the stroke of time: against the inconveniencies and vexations of long life may be set the pleasure of discovering truth, perhaps the only pleasure that age affords. Nor is it a slight satisfaction to a man not utterly infatuated

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or depraved, to find opportunities of rectifying his notions, and regulating his conduct by new lights.

But much greater is the happiness of that man, to whom every day brings a new proof of the reasonableness of his former determinations, and who finds, by the most unerring tests, that his life has been spent in promoting doctrines beneficial to mankind. This, Sir, is the happiness which I now enjoy, and for which those who never shall attain it, must look for an equivalent in lucrative employments, honorary titles, pompous equipages, and splendid palaces.

These, Sir, are the advantages which are to be gained by a seasonable variation of principles, and by a ready compliance with the prevailing fashion of opinions; advantages, indeed, which I cannot envy when they are purchased at so high a price, but of which age and observation has too frequently shewn me the unbounded influence; and to which I cannot deny, that I have ascribed the instability of conduct and inconsistency of assertions, which I have discovered in many men, whose abilities I have no reason to depreciate, and of whom I cannot believe they would easily distinguish truth, were not falsehood recommended to them by the glittering ornaments of wealth and power.

If there are in this new Parliament any men devoted to their private interest, and who prefer the gratification of their passions, to the safety and happiness of their country; who can riot without remorse in the plunder of their Constituents; who can forget the anguish of guilt in the noise of a feast, the pomp of a drawing room, or the arms of a strumpet, and think expensive wickedness, and the gaieties of folly, equivalent to the fair fame of fidelity, and the peace of virtue, to them I shall speak to no purpose: for I am far from imagining any language in my power can gain those to truth, who have resigned their hearts to avarice or ambition, or to prevail upon men to change opinions, which they have indeed never believed, though they are hired to assert them. For there is a
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degree of wickedness, which no reproof or argument can reclaim, as there is a degree of stupidity which no instruction can enlighten.

If my country, Sir, has been so unfortunate as once more to commit her interest to those who propose to themselves no advantage from their trust but that of selling it, I may, perhaps, fall once more under censure for declaring my opinion, and be once more treated as a criminal for asserting what they who punish me cannot deny; for maintaining the inconsistency of *Hanoverian* maxims with the happiness of this kingdom, and for preserving the caution which was so strongly inculcated by the patriots that drew up the act of settlement, and gave the present Royal Family their title to the Throne.

These men, Sir, whose wisdom cannot be disputed, and whose zeal for his Majesty's service and family was equal to their knowledge, thought it requisite to provide some security against the prejudices of birth and education. They were far from imagining, that they were calling to the Throne a race of beings exalted above the frailties of humanity, or exempted by any peculiar privileges from error or from ignorance.

They knew that every man was habitually, if not naturally fond of his own nation; and that he was inclined to enrich it and defend it at the expence of another, even, perhaps, of that to which he is indebted for much higher degrees of greatness, wealth, and power; for every thing which makes one state of life preferable to another, (and which, therefore, if reason could prevail over prejudice, and every action were regulated by strict justice) might claim more regard than that corner of the earth in which he only happened to be born.

They knew, Sir, that confidence was not always returned, that we must willingly trust those whom we have longest known, and caress those with most fondness, whose inclinations we find by experience to correspond with our own, without regard to particular circumstances which may entitle others to greater regard, or higher degrees of credit, or of kindness.

Against

Against these prejudices, which their sagacity enabled them to foresee, their integrity incited them to secure to us, by provisions which every man then thought equitable and wise, because no man was then hired to espouse a contrary opinion.

To obviate the disposition which a foreign race of Princes might have to trust their original subjects, it was enacted, That none of them should be capable of any place of trust or profit in these kingdoms. And to hinder our Monarchs from transferring the revenues of *Great-Britain* to Hanover, and enriching it with the commerce of our traders and the labours of our husbandmen; from raising taxes to augment the splendour of a petty Court, and increasing the garrisons of their mountains, by misapplying that money which this nation should raise for its own defence, it was provided, That the King of *Great-Britain* should never return to his native dominions, but reside always in this kingdom, without any other care than that of gaining the affections of his British subjects, preserving their rights, and increasing their power.

Mr. Shippen, Oct. 14, 1741.

ALL that can be said, Sir, against forfeitures for treason, must proceed from mistaking or misrepresenting the nature of punishments, and the ends for which they have been introduced into society. Punishment is said to be *malum passionis, quod infligitur ob malum actionis*; and therefore, in its own nature, it must be confined to the person of the criminal; for whoever pretends to inflict a punishment upon an innocent person, cannot properly be said to punish: on the contrary, he deserves to be punished, because in so doing he commits a crime, or a *malum actionis*, and for that reason ought to have a *malum actionis* inflicted upon him: however, there are many misfortunes, losses, and inconveniencies, which innocent men are subject to by the nature of things, and may be exposed to by the laws of society, for the preservation and welfare of the society. As there are many diseases that descend from the parent to the child,

child, it is a misfortune for a child to be born of parents afflicted with such diseases: it is a misfortune for a child to be born of parents that are poor and indigent; but these misfortunes are not to be called punishments, because they are, by the nature of things, inflicted upon innocent persons. There are others, as I have said, which innocent men may be exposed to by the laws of society: such were the confinements which leprous or unclean persons were exposed to by the Jewish law; and such are those confinements which people are subjected to by our law, who are infected, or under suspicion of being infected with the plague: such, likewise, are the misfortunes which attend children who are born of slaves, in countries where *slavery* is established: such were the incapacities of children born of *Plebeians*, in the ancient Roman Commonwealth, who could not intermarry with the *Patricians*, nor be advanced to any of the chief posts in the Government: and such are the misfortunes attending children born in this country of parents who happen to be convicted of High-Treason; because, by their attainder, they are divested of every thing that belonged to them; and therefore the children are in the same state, as if they had been born of poor and indigent parents. But none of these misfortunes can be said to be punishments, nor were ever called so, by those who understand any thing of the laws of nature or nations.

Both the learned *Grotius* and the learned *Puffendorff* are clear upon this subject. The former, in treating of what he calls the communication of punishments, in order to show, that an innocent man ought not to be made to suffer for the crime of the guilty, distinguishes between that damage or loss, which a man may suffer directly, and that which he may suffer consequentially. A man suffers directly, he says, when any thing is taken directly from him, which properly belonged to him; and he suffers consequentially, when he loses what he has a conditional right to, by the failure of the condition upon which he was to have it: and forfeitures he expressly mentions as a damage
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or loss of this last sort; because children have but a conditional right to their father's estate, that is, provided the father dies possessed of it. For this reason, that learned Gentleman says, that forfeiture is no punishment upon the children, but only a damage which they suffer, not directly, but consequentially, by the crime of the father, which prevented the existing of that condition upon which they were to have had his estate; and after having thus distinguished, he concludes, that no man who is perfectly innocent can be punished for the crime of any other man.

The learned *Puffendorff* again treats this subject in the same manner, and almost in the very same words. He distinguishes between a damage suffered directly and consequentially. "The first is, says he, when a man is deprived of that he has already a proper right to; the second, when that condition is intercepted, without which he could not enjoy such a right. Thus, when the estate the parents were possessed of is forfeited, the children also feel the loss of it: but, however, this is not a punishment properly, with respect to the children, because they cannot come to the inheritance of their father's estate, unless the father preserves it for them till he dies; and therefore the confiscation, or forfeiture, only intercepts the condition, without which, the children can have no right to the father's estate."

To the opinion of these two learned moderns, Sir, I shall add the opinion of a very famous man among the ancients, I mean *Marcus Tullius Cicero*; who, in one of his letters to *Brutus*, approves of the forfeiture of *Lepidus*, and says, it was as just to reduce his children to a state of want and misery, as it was in the Athenians to reduce the children of *Themistocles* to that wretched state; to which he adds, that this was an ancient and general custom in all commonwealths: from whence, I think, I may infer, that the forfeiture of traitors was a law which prevailed among the *Romans*, long before the establishment of their empire: and that this law was established among

among the Jews, even in King *David's* time, is evident from the story of *Mephibosheth* and his servant *Ziba*; for from thence we find, that the estate of Saul had been forfeited, but was restored to *Mephibosheth*, for his father Jonathan's sake; and was again taken from him by a new forfeiture, on a false suggestion of *Ziba's*.

Having thus shewn, Sir, that the forfeiture of a guilty father cannot be looked on as a punishment upon the innocent children, it can no way be said to be inconsistent with religion, especially that precept delivered to the Jews, which forbids punishing the father for the son's iniquity, or the son for the father's. That law was certainly meant against subjecting either the one or the other, directly to any loss, damage, or inconvenience, for the crime of the other, and not against that consequential damage which is brought upon the son by the forfeiture of the father: and, as I have shewn that forfeitures have been approved of by the most learned Lawyers, both ancient and modern, and were established in the *Jewish, Grecian, and Roman Commonwealths*, no Gentleman can, I think, have the confidence to aver, that they were, or are, inconsistent with natural justice, or the liberties of a free People.

The next thing I am to shew, Sir, is, that they are consonant to the laws of this kingdom, both ancient and modern. Here, indeed, I am at some loss what Gentlemen may mean by our ancient Laws; and therefore, that I may not be accused of any neglect, I shall go as far back as I can. I think I may be very sure, that no man can tell what our Laws were, or whether we had any, before the Romans came amongst us. If Gentlemen mean, by our ancient Laws, the Laws which prevailed amongst us whilst we were subject to the *Romans*, then certainly the Law of Forfeiture for treason was established, because it was then a part of the *Roman Law*. If we come to the Laws of the Saxons, and say, that these were the ancient Laws of the kingdom, I think the point may be as positively determined in favour of Forfeitures; for that the feudal customs prevailed amongst

amongst the Saxons, as well as among their other northern neighbours, is, in my opinion, clear to a demonstration : and it is certain, that by the Feudal Law, the forfeiture of the estate was the certain consequence of any breach of fealty in the tenant or vassal. If we refer to the fragments still remaining of the Saxon Laws that were established in this kingdom, the point will be as clear in my favour. It is very true, that from these fragments it appears, that fines, or mulcts, were the punishments inflicted upon most crimes ; but still there were some that were punishable with death, or forfeiture of estate, and sometimes with both. By a Law of King Ina's it is expressly enacted, that whoever fights in the King's palace shall lose his inheritance : *Hæreditatem perdat*, are the words of the Law. And, by a Law of the famous King Alfred's, it is enacted in these words, *Si quis vitæ Regis infidietur, per se, vel per ultores mercede conductos, vel servos suos, vita privetur Et omnibus quæ possidit.*

Thus, Sir, it is evident, that the forfeitures were in use amongst the Saxons, and that they have been constantly in use since the conquest, not only in treasons, but in felonies, so far as relates to goods and chattels, no man can deny ; therefore they must be allowed to be consonant to our laws, both modern and ancient : and that they are not inconsistent with the freedom of our Constitution, experience itself must bear witness ; for we have hitherto preserved our Constitution entire, and I doubt much if we should be able to do the same, should forfeitures of all kinds be abolished : for it is certain, that nothing can be of more dangerous consequences to the liberties of a free people, than frequent civil wars. The first civil war that happened among the Romans, was that which they called the *Sociale Bellum*, or the war begun by the several people and cities in Italy, whom the Romans, that is to say, the citizens of Rome, would not admit to an equal share in the Government with themselves. How long did they preserve their liberties after the commencement of the civil war ? Not much above sixty years ; for this war began about the year 660 after the building

ing of their city, which was their æra; and Augustus Cæsar, after the battle of *Actium*, was confirmed in the absolute Government of that vast empire in the year 725 of the same æra. And even in this kingdom, a civil war has more than once put an end to the freedom of our Constitution; for the civil war between the Houses of York and Lancaster, established what I may very properly call an absolute Government in the person of Henry the VIIIth; and the civil war between Charles the Ist and his Parliament, established an absolute Government in the person of *Oliver Cromwell*. It is true, as our Constitution is more perfect, and better contrived than that of the Roman ever was, it has hitherto always recovered itself; but considering the change in the manners of our People; if it should hereafter be overturned by a civil war, I am afraid it will never recover: therefore there is nothing we ought to guard more cautiously against than a civil war. The execution of a traitor is a fleeting example which is soon forgot; but the misfortunes of his posterity is a permanent example, which many have continually before their eyes: and as this permanent example certainly contributes to the preventing of civil wars, it must, in my opinion, contribute to the security of the happy Constitution we now live under.

Whether we should ever allow the punishments which produce these permanent examples to be abolished, is a question, Sir, that I shall not take upon me to determine, nor is there any necessity for my giving my opinion upon it at present; but this I am very sure of, that we should not allow these punishments to be abolished, during the life of either of the Pretender's sons; because while they live, there will always be too many amongst us infected with an itch of rebellion; and all Politicians, as well as Lawyers agree, that the greater likelihood there is that a crime of any particular sort will be committed, the more severe ought the punishment to be; for the terror of the punishment ought, if possible, to be made superior to the itch of committing the crime; and as that itch,

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or inclination, will be stronger and more general during the lives of the Pretender's two sons, than we can suppose it to be afterwards, we must have, during that period, more severe punishments upon treason, than may be afterwards necessary to be continued. I am therefore strongly in favour of the Bill, for preventing all correspondence between his Majesty's subjects and the Pretender's sons.

Sir Dudley Ryder, Attorney-General, May 3, 1744.

THE Honourable Gentleman (Sir Dudley Ryder) who spoke first in the debate, and distinguished himself so greatly by his long and laboured speech, has laid down these two propositions, upon which he has built his whole argument, *That this clause is consistent with natural justice; and, that it is consistent with our ancient and modern constitution.* Yet, notwithstanding all that he has said, I must take the liberty to maintain the contrary.

As to natural justice, no one principle can strike the mind of man more strongly, at the very first view, than that the innocent ought not to suffer for the guilty; and *that every man should suffer only for his own fault.* Can there be a man so absurd in this, or any other assembly in the world, as to deny this proposition? —To deny this, is to violate the fundamental laws of all society, to be ignorant of the true nature of punishments, and of the only title men have to inflict any severities upon each other.—The rights of mankind, in a state of nature, still subsist in a society; they ought to subsist; they ought to be abridged in none, farther than is absolutely necessary for the preservation of society. It is in vain, it is nonsense to say, that the safety of society can subsist in, can be advanced or preserved only by the ruin of the innocent widow, of the harmless infant, and of thousands yet unborn.

How then does the learned Gentleman attempt to palliate the force of this principle? *He owns the principle, and he says, if any man will convince him that this clause can deprive any one innocent person, either of his natural or legal rights, he will be*

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against it himself. But, says he, no man has a right to any property, but by the laws of the society under which he lives; and the laws of his country give no right to the child till the death of the parent. Sir, the Gentleman has made but two mistakes in this argument; but they are unluckily such as overturn the whole.—For first, every man may learn from his own breast, that by the laws of nature, all mankind ought to succeed to their ancestors; they are entitled to expect it by the order of all things, and as a kind of retribution from their parents, for their being the authors of their existence, which, without any inheritance, is a state of the utmost wretchedness.—And as to the laws of this country, the very law which we are now about to repeal, has created this property in the child, and the child is actually vested in this right, by the very laws of the society in which we live. The fine reasonings of *Puffendorff*, or *Grotius*, have therefore nothing to do in this question. The Gentleman supports his argument by authorities, which, putting the case as it really stands, all rather make against him: he applies the reasonings of *Puffendorff* and *Grotius* upon any other case to this case, which totally and fundamentally differs from that upon which they argued.

Cicero too is brought in to support this cruel opinion: a letter of his to *Brutus* is quoted upon us, in which he justifies the severities used to *Lepidus* and his posterity. But I dare venture to say, there is not one Gentleman in this House, who knows any thing of *Cicero*, or of his writings, who does not know, that this very letter, which is to be put upon us as an irresistible authority, is no authority at all; for it is generally, if not universally allowed to be a spurious letter, not wrote by *Cicero*, but wrote for *Cicero*, many hundred years after *Cicero* was departed out of this world. And, in truth, had he wrote this letter, it would have had very little weight with me. *Cicero* was, indeed, a great orator; he made long and fine speeches; he is thought to have been greatly learned in the laws of his country; but he was a notorious time-server, a thorough man

of party, and, with all that, a coward. Would it be any wonder then, when *Lepidus* was ruined, if he, in his familiar correspondence, had expressed himself with bitterness against *Lepidus* and all that belonged to him? Would it be any wonder, if such a man had rejoiced and exulted in the misfortune of his adversary; or if his fears had carried him even to wish destruction and extirpation to a family, whose recovery might have proved the ruin of him and his! But, after all this, *Cicero* is an author who should be quoted with some care; for, whether from these reasons, or any other, as his public conduct was a scene of contradictions, so he contradicts himself in his writings too. Of this, I recollect an instance to the very point: In his book *De Natura Deorum*, he positively says, that no man could bear to live in a country, where the son and the grandson should be punished for the crimes of their grandfather and father. If, therefore, I should allow the Honourable Gentleman, that his letter to *Brutus* was (as it is not) a genuine letter, which would be the best authority? *Cicero*, in a familiar letter, in an ungarded, heated, fearful state? Or *Cicero* in his study, writing upon the most serious subject, and upon the express subject; and using the utmost care, and the utmost reflection, to deliver down a system of religion or morality to future ages?

The learned Gentleman then goes on to inform us, that the laws of Greece bore hard upon the innocent; and that the children of *Themistocles* were disinherited and banished for the crimes of their father. First, as to this, there is no example upon earth will ever weigh with a reasonable man to do that which is, in itself, either cruel or unjust. And next, as to the laws of Greece, the Gentleman means, and must mean chiefly, the laws of the *Athenians*; for of the laws of the other Grecian states we know but little; and as to these laws of the *Athenians*, they have been universally considered, in all ages, as the most severe and unjust that ever any people ever lived under, excepting those of their neighbours, the *Macedo-*

nians and the *Persians*, who extirpated whole families for the crime of one single offender. But even here, as to *Themistocles*, the learned Gentleman is again mistaken; for the children of *Themistocles* were not banished for their father's crime. *Themistocles* was accused of a misprision of treason, in not divulging what he knew of the conspiracy of *Pausanias* against the Greeks in favour of the *Persians*. Whether he was guilty of this crime or not, did never appear; for he was never tried for it. He fled, his children fled to him, and so became *participes crimines*. They abandoned their own country, and were therefore punished for their own fault; they retired to *Persia*, and made themselves subject to another State, where they obtained distinguished privileges and great estates. *Plutarch* particularly tells us this, and that their descendants particularly enjoyed these privileges in *Magnesia* which they received of *Xerxes*, even in his own time, which was near six hundred years after.

I now come to speak of our ancient and modern Constitution, with which the Honourable Gentleman says this clause is perfectly consistent. Perhaps I may be thought too venturous, when I contest this point with a Gentleman so eminent in his profession; but, Sir, I think I am well founded in maintaining the contrary. As to our Constitution, we seldom hear it talked of with common sense. You may find, in what men commonly call our Constitution, arguments and examples for any thing you will. Nothing is so vague and unsettled as our Constitution was for many centuries. If a man stands up for the prerogative, he may quote you powerful precedents from the reigns of Richard the II^d, and other Princes like him: another man, to enforce popular and romantic projects of reformation, may quote upon you things equally extravagant on another side, by turning his eye upon our histories in times when popular fury has overborne this Government. For my own part, therefore, I never knew how to ascertain the Constitution of this Country in any degree, but in two periods; the *Saxon* times before the Conquest; the present *Æra* since the

the Revolution. The intervening space between these two was all confusion ; a *chaos* of contradictions in the regulations of this State ; an eternal struggle for uncertain power between the *Barons* and the Crown, the Crown and the people, of the people against both.

Lord Perceval, May 3, 1744.

MEN will always be more governed by their passions than their reason ; and it is so difficult to foresee and determine what is most for the public good, that men are apt to determine that to be the most for the public good, which best suits with their own private views and passions. This is the cause, that where the people have too great a share of the Government in their hands, the peace of the State must always be disturbed with parties and factions : and as the vulgar, great as well as small, have generally very little foresight, and are violent in the pursuit of every passion, this always, at last, furnishes the leader of some party or faction, with means to overturn the constitution of their Government, and to usurp to himself a sole and arbitrary power.

I could demonstrate this theorem, Sir, from observations upon the history of almost all the Commonwealths that ever had a being, and are now no more ; but as the Roman History is best known, and most adapted to this purpose, I shall confine my observations to this history alone. After the expulsion of their Kings, and the establishment of a republican form of government, the people got, it is true, immediately, a very great share in the government, by the law that introduced an appeal to the people ; for which the chief promoter got the name of *Publicola*. By this, and by the election of their annual Magistrates, the people had, I say, a very great share of the government : but for many years it was in appearance only ; for the Senate and chief *Patricians*, even after the Tribunes of the people were instituted, had so much influence among the people, that they preserved in their own hands the whole of the Administration, by getting the people to chuse

such Magistrates as they directed, and to make such decrees upon appeals as they thought proper and just : but the people, spirited up by popular leaders, were every day aiming at getting more and more power into their hands ; and by the same means the influence of the Senate and the chief *Patricians*, grew every day less and less. The first conquest the people made upon the Senate, was that of obtaining the establishment of the Tribunes, with most extraordinary powers : and the next they made was, the obtaining a law for the allowing of marriages between *Patricians* and *Plebeians*. About the same time, they got introduced the custom of chusing Military Tribunes in the place of Consuls, because the *Patricians* would not allow that any *Plebeian* could be chosen a Consul, whereas a *Plebeian* might be chosen a Military Tribune ; and by means of this dispute, the Commonwealth came to be governed for many years by Military Tribunes instead of Consuls ; though such was the modesty of the people, that for above fifty years after this sort of magistracy was first introduced, no *Plebeian* could get himself chosen a Military Tribune. But the greatest conquest which the People of Rome ever obtained over the Senate and *Patricians*, was the law for rendering a *Plebeian* capable of being chosen a Consul ; for from that time the influence of the Senate diminished very fast, and the people began to grow every day more licentious.

Thus, Sir, a way being opened for popular leaders, whether *Patrician* or *Plebeian*, to arrive at the chief dignities and magistracies of the State, and the people having got almost entirely into their own hands the conferring of those honours, and repeating them as often as they pleased, a popular leader at last put an end to the liberties of the people for a time ; and soon after him, another popular leader put an end to them for ever. When I say this, every Gentleman must suppose, I mean *Gaius Marius*, and *Julius Cæsar*, names well known to those who are versed in the Roman History. *Marius*, though of mean extraction, even among the *Plebeians*, raised himself to such

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favour among the people of Rome, by his success in war, and by patronizing every popular law proposed, that he was chosen Consul for *three years successively*, which enabled him to continue himself by force or corruption in the same high office for three years more, in spite of all that the Nobles of Rome could do against him. I say Nobles, Sir; for by admitting *Plebeians* into all high offices, the distinction between *Patricians* and *Plebeians* had by this time begun to be forgot, and the distinction that came in its place, was that of the *Nobles* and the *People*. It is true, the *Nobles*, by the help of *Sylla's* army, got the better of *Marius*, and drove him into exile in Africa; but the very next year, *Sylla* being gone with his army into Greece, against *Mithridates*, *Marius* returned, and joining with *Cinna*, after a terrible slaughter of the Nobles, he seized upon the city and government by an armed force, which his party held by the same means after his death, till *Sylla* returned with his army from Asia; and after several victories, destroyed all the heads of that party, and restored what was called the party of the Nobles, reserving, however, to himself a dictatorial power.

Did these misfortunes, Sir, render the people of Rome more wise? Did they from thence learn not to aim at more power than they knew how to make use of, or not to put more confidence in their pretended *patriots* than they deserved? No, Sir, presently after *Sylla's* death, *Julius Cæsar*, though he was of noble extraction, put himself at the head of the popular party, and patronized every proposition that tended to increase the power of the people: because from the experience of what happened in *Sylla's* time, he saw, that that was the only party that would support him in, as well as raise him to arbitrary power. By patronizing *Agrarian*, and such other laws, he recommended himself to great favour amongst the people; and as he knew that military glory and a good army were necessary to raise him to the highest pinnacle of power, he made use of that favour for obtaining the government of *Transalpine Gaul*; to which he got, by the same favour, the province of *Cisalpine Gaul* after-

wards added ; though every wise man at Rome saw, that it was dangerous to join these two commands together ; because the first furnished him of course with a great army, and the second with an easy access to Rome itself, in a condition to seize upon the government of his country : but the populace could not see this danger, nor could they penetrate into his design of involving his country in a war with the Gauls, or of desiring to continue for several years in the command of these two provinces : whereas his design in both, was perceived by the Senate and great men at Rome. They saw, that by involving his country in war, his design was to recommend himself to the populace by his military glory ; and that by desiring to continue long in the same command, he designed to model his army, so as to make it the army of *Julius Caesar*, and not the army of the Commonwealth of Rome.

All this, I say, Sir, was foreseen by the Senate and great men of Rome ; but they neither could recall him, nor call him to an account for unnecessarily involving his country in a war, without the consent of the people : and they were so blinded by his military exploits, and the favour he had formerly gained among them, that it was not possible to make them see the danger, or consent to recall a General, who was every day sending them accounts of victories gained against their ancient and most formidable enemies. There he staid, there he fought successfully, till he made the army his own ; and then, instead of dismissing his army, as was required by the Senate, he marched with it to Rome, and conquered his country. So blind were the people to their own interest, so ready to assist their favourite, in overturning the liberties of their country, that the Tribunes they had chosen declared against the Senate, and having fled from Rome, took shelter in the camp of *Caesar*. So it was, Sir, in the Commonwealth of Rome ; so it will be in all Commonwealths where the people are vested with too much power. They are extravagant in their favours, as well as resentments, which makes it easy for a favourite to obtain
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so much power from them, or such a long possession of power, as enables him to strip them of all manner of power whatsoever : therefore, in every free State, it is absolutely necessary, for the preservation of its freedom, to have a Senate or Assembly of Nobles, or Chief Magistrates, vested with a power to give a check to the extravagancies of the people.

Right Hon. Henry Pelham, Feb. 12, 1744.

I HAVE been charged with giving birth to sedition in America. They have spoken their sentiments with freedom against this unhappy Act, and that freedom has become their crime. Sorry I am to hear the liberty of speech in this House, imputed as a crime. But the imputation shall not discourage me. It is a liberty I mean to exercise. No Gentleman ought to be afraid to exercise it. It is a liberty by which the Gentleman (Mr. Grenville) who calumniates it, might have profited. He ought to have desisted from his project. The Gentleman tells us America is obstinate; America is almost in open rebellion. I rejoice that America has resisted. Three millions of people, so dead to all the feelings of liberty, as voluntarily to submit to be slaves, would have been fit instruments to make slaves of the rest. I come not here armed at all points, with law cases and Acts of Parliament, with the Statute Book doubled down in dogs-ears, to defend the cause of liberty : if I had, I myself would have cited the two cases of Chester and Durham. I would have cited them to have shewn, that even under any arbitrary reigns, Parliaments were ashamed of taxing a people without their consent, and allowed them Representatives. Why did the Gentleman confine himself to Chester and Durham? He might have taken a higher example in Wales; Wales that never was taxed by Parliament till it was incorporated. I would not debate a particular point of law with the Gentleman : I know his abilities. I have been obliged to his diligent researches. But, for the defence of liberty upon a general principle, upon a constitutional principle, it is a ground on which
I stand

I stand firm ; on which I dare meet any man. The Gentleman tells us of many that are taxed, and are not represented. The India Company, Merchants, Stock-holders, Manufacturers. Surely many of these are represented in other capacities, as owners of land, or as freemen of boroughs. It is a misfortune that more are not actually represented. But they are all inhabitants, and as such are virtually represented. Many have it in their option to be actually represented. They have connections with those that elect, and they have influence over them. The Gentleman mentioned the Stock-holders : I hope he does not reckon the debts of the nation as a part of the national estate. Since the accession of King William, many Ministers, some of great, others of more moderate abilities, have taken the lead of Government.

When I had the honour to serve his Majesty, there were not wanting some, to propose to me to burn my fingers with an American Stamp Act. With the enemy at their back, with our bayonets at their breasts, in the day of their distress, perhaps the Americans would have submitted to the imposition ; but it would have been taking an ungenerous and unjust advantage. The Gentleman boasts of his bounties to America ! Are not these bounties intended finally for the benefit of this kingdom ? If they are not, he has misapplied the national treasures. I am no Courtier of America, I stand up for this kingdom. I maintain that the Parliament has a right to bind, to restrain *America*. Our legislative power over America is sovereign and supreme. When it ceases to be sovereign and supreme, I would advise every Gentleman to sell his lands, if he can, and embark for that country. When two countries are connected together, like England and her Colonies, without being incorporated, the one must necessarily govern ; the greater must rule the less ; but so rule it, as not to contradict the fundamental principles that are common to both.

If the Gentleman does not understand the difference between *internal* and *external* taxes, I cannot help it ; but there is a plain distinction,

distinction between taxes levied for the purposes of raising a revenue, and duties imposed for the regulation of trade, for the accommodation of the subject; although in the consequences, some revenue might incidentally arise from the latter.

The Gentleman asks, when were the Colonies emancipated? But I desire to know, when they were made slaves? But I dwell not upon words. When I had the honour of serving his Majesty, I availed myself of the means of information which I derived from my office: I speak, therefore, from knowledge. My materials were good. I was at pains to collect, to digest, to consider them; and I will be bold to affirm, that the profits to Great-Britain from the trade of the Colonies, through all its branches, is two millions a year. This is the fund that carried you triumphantly through the last war. The estates that were rented at two thousand pounds a year, threescore years ago, are at three thousand pounds at present. Those estates sold then from fifteen to eighteen years purchase; the same may be now sold for thirty. You owe this to *America*. This is the price that *America* pays you for her protection. And shall a miserable *Financier* come with a boast, that he can fetch a pepper-corn into the Exchequer, to the loss of millions to the nation? I dare not say how much higher these profits may be augmented. Omitting the immense increase of people by natural propagation in the Northern Colonies, and the migration from every part of Europe, I am convinced the whole commercial system of *America* may be altered to advantage. You have prohibited where you ought to have encouraged, and you have encouraged where you ought to have prohibited. Improper restraints have been laid on the Continent in favour of the Islands. You have but two nations to trade with in *America*. Would you had *twenty*! Let Acts of Parliament in consequence of Treaties remain; but let not an English Minister become a Custom-House Officer for Spain, or for any foreign power. Much is wrong, much may be amended for the general good of the whole.

Does

Does the Gentleman complain that he has been misrepresented in the public prints? It is a common misfortune. In the Spanish affair of the last war, I was abused in all the newspapers, for having advised his Majesty to violate the law of nations respecting Spain. The abuse was industriously circulated even in hand-bills. If Administration did not propagate the abuse, *Administration never contradicted it*. I will not say what advice I did give to the King. My advice is in writing signed by myself, in the possession of the Crown. But I will say what advice I did not give the King: I did not advise him to violate any of the laws of nations.

As to the report of the Gentleman's preventing, in some way, the trade for bullion with the Spaniards, it was spoken of so confidently, that I own I am one of those that did believe it to be true.

The Gentleman must not wonder he was not contradicted, when, as the Minister, he asserted the right of Parliament to tax *America*. I know not how it is, but there is a modesty in this House which does not chuse to contradict a Minister. I wish Gentlemen would get the better of this modesty. If they do not, perhaps, the collective body may begin to abate of its respect for the representative. Lord *Bacon* had told me, that a great question would not fail of being agitated at one time or another. I was willing to agitate that at the proper season, the *German war*; my *German war* they called it. Every Session I called out, has any body any objections to the German war? Nobody would object to it; one Gentleman only objected, since removed to the Upper House by succession to an ancient Barony, (meaning *Lord Le Despencer*, formerly *Sir Francis Dashwood*) he told me, "he did not like a *German war*." I honoured the man for it, and was sorry when he was turned out of his post.

A great deal has been said out of doors, of the power, of the strength of *America*. It is a topic that ought to be cautiously meddled with. In a good cause, on a sound bottom, the

the force of this country can crush America to atoms. I know the valour of your troops. I know the skill of your Officers. There is not a company of foot that has served in America, out of which you may not pick a man of sufficient knowledge and experience, to make a Governor of a colony there. But on this ground, on the Stamp-Act, when so many here will think it a crying injustice, I am one who will lift up my hands against it.

In such a cause your success would be hazardous.—America, if she fell, would fall like a strong man. She would embrace the pillars of the State, and pull down the Constitution along with her. Is this your boasted peace? Not to sheath the sword in its scabbard, but to sheath it in the bowels of your countrymen? Will you quarrel with yourselves, now the whole House of Bourbon is united against you? While France disturbs your fisheries in Newfoundland, embarrasses your trade to Africa, and with-holds from your subjects in Canada their property stipulated by Treaty; while the ransom for *Manillas* is denied by Spain, and its gallant conqueror basely traduced into a mean plunderer, a Gentleman (Colonel Draper) whose noble and generous spirit would do honour to the proudest grandee of the country. The Americans have not acted in all things with prudence and temper. They have been wronged. They have been driven to madness by injustice. Will you punish them for the madness you have occasioned? Rather let prudence and temper come first from this side. I will undertake for America that she will follow the example. There are two lines in a ballad of *Prior's*, of a man's behaviour to his wife, so applicable to you and your Colonies, that I cannot help repeating them:

‘ Be to her faults a little blind,

‘ Be to her virtues very kind.’

Mr. Pitt, Dec. 17, 1765.

I HERE

I **H**ERE in my place, as a representative of the nation, require and demand a full and impartial inquiry into the causes of the miscarriage of the northern army, in an expedition from Canada.

It is a great national object. The crisis of the time emphatically requires it. The existence of the British Empire depends upon the exertions of the military, and the best foundation for public spirit is public justice. In addition to the natural animation, which, as Britons, the army possess, place before their eyes that secondary spring and comptroller of human actions, reward and punishment. Let the first and most glorious reward, the honest applause of the country, be obtained by a scrutiny into truth, for those who deserve it: on the contrary, if there has been delinquency, let the spirit of *Marius* preside in the punishment.

“ The hand of fate is over us, and heaven

“ Exacts severity from all our thoughts.”

If there has been disobedience; if unauthorized by circumstances, if *uncompelled by orders*, (for I will never shrink from that plea) a General has rashly advanced upon an enemy, and engaged against insurmountable odds, the discipline of the State should strike, though it were a favourite son.

“ *I, Lister, deliga ad palum.*”

These, Sir, are the means to excite true ambition in your leaders, these are the means to keep them in due restraint; this was the system of the glorious Patriot (Lord Chatham) whose obsequies ye now celebrate; and, could his ashes awaken, they would burst their cerements to support it.

As for myself, if I am guilty, I fear I am deeply guilty; an army lost! the sanguine expectation of the kingdom disappointed! a foreign war caused, or the commencement of it accelerated! an effusion of as brave blood as ever run in British veins shed! and the severest family distresses combined with public calamity! If this mass of miseries be, indeed, the consequence of my misconduct, vain will be the extenuation I can
plead

plead of my personal sufferings, fatigue and hardship, laborious days and sleepless nights, ill health and trying situations; poor and insufficient will be such atonement in the judgment of my country, or perhaps in the eyes of God—yet, with this dreadful alternative in view, I provoke a trial—give me inquiry—I put the interests that hang most emphatically by the heart-strings of man—my fortune—my honour—my head—I had almost said my salvation, upon the test.

But, Sir, it is a consolation to me to think that I shall be, even in surmise, the only culprit—Whatever fate may attend the General who led the army to Saratoga, their behaviour at that memorable spot must entitle them to the thanks of their country. Sir, it was a calamitous, it was an awful, but it was an honourable hour—during the suspense of the answer from the General of the enemy, to the refusal made by me of complying with the ignominious conditions he had proposed, the countenance of the troops beggars description—a patient fortitude, a sort of stern resignation, that no pencil nor language can reach, sat on every brow. I am confident every breast was prepared to devote its last drop of blood, rather than suffer a precedent to stand upon the British annals of an ignoble surrender.

Sir, an important subject of enquiry still remains. The transactions at Cambridge, and the cause of the detention of troops. If I there have been guilty, let me there also be the only sufferer.

Sir, there is a famous story in ancient history that bears some analogy to my circumstances; and when allusions tend to excite men's minds to exertions of virtue or policy, I shall never think them pedantic or misplaced. The event I mean happened in an age when Roman virtue was at its height. It was that wherein *Marius* devoted his son, and the first *Decius* devoted himself. A Roman army, shut up by the Samnites at Caudium, were obliged to surrender their arms, and to submit to the more ignominious condition of passing under the yoke of

of the enemy. The Consul who had commanded them, proposed in the Senate, to break the treaty whereby the army was lost to the State, and to make him in person the expiation, by sending him bound to the enemy to suffer death at their hands. In one point of view the present case extremely differs from the example; because, by the Treaty of Saratoga, the army was saved to the State. It is the non-compliance with public faith that alone can lose it—and here the parallel will hold; if I have been instrumental to the loss of those brave troops *since* the Treaty, I am as culpable as if I had lost them *by* the Treaty, and ought to be the sacrifice to redeem them. Sir, this reference may appear vain-glorious. It may be doubted, whether there exists in these times, public spirit seriously to emulate such examples. I perhaps should find myself unequal; but others who are most ready to judge me so, must at least give credit to one motive for stating the parallel—*That I am too conscious of innocence to apprehend there is the least risk of being exposed to the trial.*

General Burgoyne, May 26, 1778.

You have now two wars before you, of which you must chuse one, for both you *cannot* support; the war against America has hitherto been carried on against her alone, unassisted by any ally whatever; notwithstanding she stood alone, you have been obliged uniformly to increase your exertions, and to push your efforts in the end to the extent of your power, without being able to bring it to any issue: you have exerted all your force hitherto without effect, and you cannot now divide a force found already inadequate to its object: my opinion is for withdrawing your forces from America entirely, for a defensive war you never can think of there of any sort: a defensive war would ruin this nation at any time, and in any circumstances; offensive war is pointed out as proper for this country; our situation points it out, and the spirit of the nation impels us to *attack* rather than *defence*: attack
France

France then, for she is your object: the nature of the wars is quite different; the war against America is against your own countrymen, you have stopped me from saying against your fellow subjects; that against France is against your inveterate enemy and rival: every blow you strike in America is against yourselves; it is against all idea of reconciliation, and against your own interest, though you should be able, as you never will, to force them to submit: every stroke against France is of advantage to you; the more you lower the scale in which France lays in the balance, the more your own rises, and the more the Americans will be detached from her as useless to them: even your victories over America are in favour of France, from what they must cost you in men and money; your victories over France will be felt by her ally; America must be conquered in France, France never can be conquered in America. The war of the Americans is a war of *passion*; it is of such a nature as to be supported by the most powerful virtues, love of liberty and of their country; and at the same time by those passions in the human heart which give courage, strength, and perseverance to man; the spirit of revenge for the injuries you have done them, of retaliation for the hardships you have inflicted on them, and of opposition to the unjust powers you have exercised over them; every thing combines to animate them to this war, and such a war is without end: for whatever obstinacy enthusiasm ever inspired man with, you will now find it in America; no matter what gives birth to that enthusiasm, whether the name of religion or of liberty, the effects are the same; it inspires a spirit that is unconquerable and solicitous to undergo difficulty, danger, and hardship: and as long as there is a man in America, a being formed such as we are, you will have him present himself against you in the field. The war of France is a war of another sort; the war of France is a war of interest it: was her interest first induced her to engage in it, and it is by that interest that she will measure its continuance: turn your face at once against her, attack her wherever she is

exposed, crush her commerce wherever you can, make her feel heavy and immediate distress throughout the nation, the people will soon cry out to their government: whilst the advantages she promises herself are remote and uncertain, inflict present evils and distresses upon her subjects, the people will become discontented and clamorous, she will find it a bad bargain having entered into this business, and you will force her to desert an ally that brings so much trouble, and distress, and misfortune, the advantages of whose alliance may never take effect; or if they should be subject always to disturbance from this country, which it always ought to be, and which I know you are able to give if you once get your hands clear of America. What is become of the antient spirit of this nation? Where is that national spirit that ever did honour to this country? Have the present Ministers spent that too with almost the last shilling of your money? Are they not ashamed of the temporizing conduct they have used towards France? Her correspondence with America has been *clandestine*, compare that with their conduct towards Holland some time ago—but it is the characteristic of little minds to exact in little things, whilst they shrink from their rights in great ones.—The conduct of France is called *clandestine*; look back but a year ago to a letter from one of your Secretaries of State to Holland, “*it is with surprise and indignation*” your conduct is seen—in something done by a petty Governor of an island—while they affect to call the measures of France *clandestine*: this is the way that Ministers support the character of the nation, and the national honour and glory: but look again how that same Holland is spoke of to-day, even in your correspondence with her your littleness appears,

*Pauper & exul uterque,
Projecit ampullas; & sesquipedalia verba.*

From this you may judge of your situation, from this you may know what a state you are reduced to: how will the
French

French party in Holland exult over you and grow strong; she will never continue your ally when you meanly crouch to France, and do not dare to stir in your defence: but it is nothing extraordinary that she should not, whilst you keep the Ministers you have; no power in Europe is blind; there is none blind enough to ally itself with weakness, and become partner in bankruptcy; there is no one blind enough to ally themselves to obstinacy, absurdity, and imbecility.

Mr. Fox, Nov. 26, 1778.

THERE is not in the whole history of this country, a period that resembles the present, except the reign of the unfortunate Henry the VIth. His family, like that of his present Majesty, did not claim the Crown as their hereditary right; it was by revolutions they both obtained it. Henry was an amiable and pious Prince, so is his present Majesty: Henry was the son of the most renowned Monarch that ever sat upon the Throne; George was the grandson of a Hero; Henry lost all his father's conquests, and all his hereditary provinces in France: George has already seen the conquests of his grandfather wrested from him in the West-Indies, and his hereditary provinces of America erected into an empire, that disclaimed all connection.

His Majesty set out in life with the brightest prospects that a young man could have wished for: possessed of immense dominions, and the warmest affections of his people, his accession to the Crown was completely flattering both to himself and his subjects. How sadly is the scene reversed! his empire dismembered, his councils distracted, and his people falling off in their affection for his person. I only speak within doors the language that is held without: the people are beginning to murmur, and their patience is not unlimited: they will at last do themselves justice; there certainly will be insurrections: and though it is impossible that the calamities that will attend them can be justified, or compensated by any good that can be obtained by them, yet they certainly will take place.

It cannot be a secret to this House, that the present Sovereign's claim to the Throne of this country was founded only upon the delinquency of the Stuart family; a circumstance that ought never to be out of his Majesty's recollection. It was true, indeed, that the unfortunate race of that name, was universally detested in this country, and therefore his Majesty had little to fear from their pretensions: but he should ever remember, that it was the conduct of wicked and ignorant Ministers that excited that detestation for them. If there should be at this day one of that unfortunate House remaining, what a scope for upbraidings and remonstrance could he not find in the present reign! Could he not say, "You have banished my ancestor from the Throne, and barred the Sceptre from all his progeny for the misconduct of his Ministers; and yet the Ministers of the present reign, are ten times more wicked and more ignorant than those were; and whilst you all agree in giving to your present Sovereign the title of best of Princes, his Ministers have rendered his reign beyond any degree of comparison, the most infamous that ever disgraced this nation." The Minister, though with such a load of national censure and national calamity on his head, has the hardiness to boast of his innocence; but it is not a conscious rectitude of mind that could excuse a Minister from criminality. What he calls innocence may be another name for ignorance, and ignorance in a Minister is a crime of the first magnitude. But the wide ruin that the counsels of Administration have spread through this great empire, and the miserable state to which they have reduced it in the short space in which the present Parliament have been sitting, is so far beyond the natural effects of mere ignorance, that I cannot help adopting the opinion of an Honourable Friend (Mr. J. Townshend) that there is treachery at the bottom of the national councils. His Lordship (Lord North) may flatter himself as much as he pleases in the protection of a majority, or in the security of the law; but when a nation is reduced to such a state of wretchedness and distraction that the laws can afford

afford the people no relief, they will give a Minister who has caused the evil but little protection. What the law of the land could not do, the law of nature would accomplish; the people would inevitably take up arms, and the first characters in the kingdom would be seen in their ranks!

Mr. Fox, Nov. 25, 1779.

THE necessity of my saying something upon the present occasion; is so obvious to the House, that no apology will, I hope, be expected from me in troubling them even at so late an hour, (two o'clock in the morning.) I shall not enter much into a detail, or minute defence, of the particulars of the East-India Bill before you, because few particular objections have been made. The opposition to it consisting only in general reasonings, of little application some, and some totally distant from the point in question.

This Bill has been combated through its past stages upon various principles; but to this moment the House has not heard it canvassed upon its own intrinsic merits. The debate this night has turned chiefly upon two points—*violation of charter*, and *increase of influence*; and upon both these points I shall say a few words.

The Honourable Gentleman, who opened the debate, (Mr. Powys) first demands my attention, not indeed for the wisdom of the observations which fell from him this night, acute and judicious though he is upon most occasions) but from the natural weight of all such characters in this country, the aggregate of whom should, in my opinion, always decide upon public measures: but his ingenuity was never, in my opinion, exerted more ineffectually, upon more mistaken principles, and more inconsistent with the common tenor of his conduct, than in this debate.

The Honourable Gentleman charges me with abandoning that cause, which, he says, in terms of flattery, I had once so successfully asserted. I tell him, in reply, that if he were

to search the history of my life, he would find that the period of it, in which I struggled most for the real, substantial cause of Liberty, is this very moment that I am addressing you. Freedom, according to my conception of it, consists in the safe and sacred possession of a man's property, governed by laws defined and certain ; with many personal privileges, natural, civil, and religious, which he cannot surrender without ruin to himself ; and of which to be deprived by any other power, is despotism. This Bill, instead of subverting, is destined to stabilize these principles ; instead of narrowing the basis of freedom, it tends to enlarge it ; instead of suppressing, its object is to infuse and circulate the spirit of Liberty.

What is the most odious species of tyranny ? Precisely that which this Bill is meant to annihilate. That a handful of men, free themselves, should execute the most base and abominable despotism over millions of their fellow-creatures ; that innocence should be the victim of oppression ; that industry should toil for rapine ; that the harmless labourer should sweat, not for his own benefit, but for the luxury and rapacity of tyrannic depredation. In a word, that thirty millions of men, gifted by Providence with the ordinary endowments of humanity, should groan under a system of despotism, unmatched in all the histories of the world.

What is the end of all government ? Certainly the happiness of the governed.—Others may hold other opinions ; but this is mine, and I proclaim it. What are we to think of a government, whose good fortune is supposed to spring from the calamities of its subjects, whose aggrandisement grows out of the miseries of mankind ? This is the kind of government exercised under the East-India Company upon the natives of Indostan ; and the subversion of that infamous government, is the main object of the Bill in question. But in the progress of accomplishing this end, it is objected that the Charter of the Company should not be violated ; and upon this point, Sir, I shall deliver my opinion without disguise. A Charter is a trust to
one

one or more persons for some given benefit. If this trust be abused, if the benefit be not obtained, and that its failure arises from palpable guilt, or (what in this case is full as bad) from palpable ignorance or mismanagement, will any man gravely say, that trust should not be resumed and delivered to other hands; more especially in the case of the East-India Company, whose manner of executing this trust, whose laxity and languor produced, and tend to produce, consequences diametrically opposite to the ends of confiding that trust, and of the institution for which it was granted?—I beg of Gentlemen to be aware of the lengths to which their arguments upon the intangibility of this Charter may be carried. Every syllable virtually impeaches the establishment by which we sit in this House, in the enjoyment of this freedom, and of every other blessing of our government. These kind of arguments are batteries against the main pillar of the British Constitution. Some men are consistent with their own private opinions, and discover the inheritance of family maxims, when they question the principles of the Revolution; but I have no scruple in subscribing to the articles of that creed which produced it. Sovereigns are sacred, and reverence is due to every King: yet, with all my attachments to the person of a first Magistrate, had I lived in the reign of James the Second, I should most certainly have contributed my efforts, and borne part in those illustrious struggles which vindicated an empire from hereditary servitude, and recorded this valuable doctrine, *that trust abused was revocable*.

No man will tell me, that a trust to a company of merchants, stands upon the solemn and sanctified ground by which a trust is committed to a Monarch; and I am at a loss to reconcile the conduct of men who approve that resumption of violated trust, which rescued and re-established our unparalleled and admirable Constitution with a thousand valuable improvements and advantages at the Revolution, and who, at this moment, rise up the champions of the East-India Com-

pany's Charter, although the incapacity and incompetence of that Company to a due and adequate discharge of the trust deposited in them by that Charter, are themes of ridicule and contempt to all the world: and although, in consequence of their mismanagement, connivance, and imbecillity, combined with the wickedness of their servants, the very name of an Englishman is detested, even to a proverb, through all Asia, and the national character is become degraded and dishonoured. To rescue that name from odium, and redeem this character from disgrace, are some of the objects of the present Bill; and Gentlemen should indeed gravely weigh their opposition to a measure which, with a thousand other points not less valuable, aims at the attainment of these objects.

Those who condemn the present Bill as a violation of the chartered rights of the East-India Company, condemn, on the same ground, I say again, the Revolution, as a violation of the chartered rights of King James II. He, with as much reason, might have claimed the property of dominion; but what was the language of the people? No, you have no property in dominion; dominion was vested in you, as it is in every Chief Magistrate, for the benefit of the community to be governed; it was a sacred trust delegated by compact; you have abused the trust; you have exercised dominion for the purposes of vexation and tyranny—not of comfort, protection, and good order; and we therefore resume the power which was originally ours: we recur to the first principles of all government, the will of the many; and it is our will that you shall no longer abuse your dominion. The case is the same with the East-India Company's government over a territory, as it has been said by Mr. Burke, of 280,000 square miles in extent, nearly equal to all Christian Europe, and containing 30,000,000 of the human race. It matters not whether dominion arises from conquest or from compact. Conquest gives no right to the conqueror to be a tyrant; and it is no violation of right to abolish the authority which is misused.

Having said so much upon the general matter of the Bill, I must beg leave to make a few observations upon the remarks of particular Gentlemen; and first of the learned Gentleman over-against me (Mr. Dundas.) The learned Gentleman has made a long, and, as he always does, an able speech; yet, translated into plain English, and disrobed of the dexterous ambiguity in which it has been enveloped, what does it amount to? To an establishment of the principles upon which this Bill is founded, and an indirect confession of its necessity. He allows the frangibility of Charters, when absolute occasion requires it; and admits that the Charter of the Company should not prevent the adoption of a proper plan for the future government of India, if a proper plan can be achieved upon no other terms. The first of these admissions seems agreeable to the civil maxims of the learned Gentleman's life, so far as a maxim can be traced in a political character, so various and flexible: and to deny the second of these concessions was impossible, even for the learned Gentleman, with a staring reason * upon your table to confront him if he attempted it. The learned Gentleman's Bill, and the Bill before you, are grounded upon the same bottom, of abuse of trust, male-administration, debility, and incapacity in the Company and their servants; but the difference in the remedy is this: the learned Gentleman's Bill opens a door to an influence a hundred times more dangerous than any that can be imputed to this Bill, and deposits in one man an arbitrary power over millions, not in England, where the evil of this corrupt Ministry could not be felt, but in the East-Indies, the scene of every mischief, fraud, and violence. The learned Gentleman's Bill afforded the most extensive latitude for malversation; the Bill before you guards against it with all imaginable precaution. Every line in both the Bills which I have had the honour to introduce, presumes the possibility of bad Administration, for every

* Mr. Dundas's Bill, brought in last year.

word breathes suspicion. This bill supposes that men are but men; it confides in no integrity, it trusts no character; it inculcates the wisdom of a jealousy of power, and annexes responsibility not only to every *action*, but even to the *inaction* of those who are to dispense it. The necessity of these provisions must be evident, when it is known that the different misfortunes of the Company resulted not more from what the servants *did*, than from what the masters did *not*.

To the probable effects of the learned Gentleman's Bill and this, I beg to call the attention of the House. Allowing, for argument's sake, to the Governor General of India, under the first-named Bill, the most unlimited and superior abilities, with soundness of heart and integrity the most unquestionable; what good consequences could be reasonably expected from his extraordinary, extravagant, and unconstitutional power, under the tenure by which he held it? Were his projects the most enlarged, his systems the most wise and excellent which human skill could advise; what fair hope could be entertained of their eventual success, when, perhaps, before he could enter upon the execution of any measure, he may be recalled in consequence of one of those changes in the Administrations of this country, which have been so frequent for a few years, and which some good men wish to see every year? Exactly the same reasons which banish all rational hope of benefit from an Indian Administration under the Bill of the learned Gentleman, justify the duration of the proposed commission. If the dispensers of the plan of governing India, (a place from which the answer of a letter cannot be expected in less than twelve months) have not greater stability in their situations than a British Ministry—adieu to all hopes of rendering our Eastern territories of any real advantage to this country; adieu to every expectation of purging or purifying the Indian system, of reform, of improvement, of reviving confidence, of regulating the trade upon its proper principles, of restoring tranquillity, of re-establishing

ing the natives in comfort, and of securing the perpetuity of these blessings, by the cordial reconciliation of the Indians with their former tyrants upon fixed terms of amity, friendship, and fellowship. I will leave the House and the kingdom to judge which is best calculated to accomplish those salutary ends; the Bill of the learned Gentleman, which leaves all to the discretion of one man, or the Bill before you which depends upon the duty of several men, who are in a state of daily account to this House, of hourly account to the Ministers of the Crown, of occasional account to the Proprietors of East-India stock, and who are allowed sufficient time to practise their plans, unaffected by every political fluctuation.

But the learned Gentleman wishes the appointment of an Indian Secretary of State in preference to these Commissioners: in all the learned Gentleman's ideas on the government of India, the notion of a new Secretary of State for the Indian department springs up, and seems to be cherished with the fondness of consanguinity*; but that scheme strikes me as liable to a thousand times more objections than the plan in agitation. Nay, the learned Gentleman had rather, it seems, the affairs of India were blended with the business of the office which I have the honour to hold. His good disposition towards me upon all occasions cannot be doubted, and his sincerity in this opinion is unquestionable. I beg the House to attend to the reason which the learned Gentleman gives for this preference, and to see the plights to which men, even of his understanding, are reduced, who *must* oppose. He laughs at the responsibility of the Commissioners to this House, who, in his judgment, will find means of soothing, and softening, and meliorating the

* Mr. Dundas's Bill was to have appointed a Secretary of State for the Indian department, and to have made the Governor General despotic in India. If the Earl of Shelburne had continued in power, it was understood that Mr. Dundas was to be the Indian Secretary. Mr. Fox here alluded to this anecdote.

Members into an oblivion of their male-administration. What opinion has the learned Gentleman of a Secretary of State? Does he think *him* so inert, so inactive, so incapable a creature, that with all this vaunted patronage of the seven in his own hands, the same means of soothing, and softening, and meliorating are thrown away upon him. The learned Gentleman has been for some years conversant with Ministers; but his experience has taught him, it seems, to consider Secretaries not only untainted and immaculate, but innocent, harmless, and incapable. In his time, Secretaries were all purity—with every power of corruption in their hands; but so inflexibly attached to rigid rectitude, that no temptation could seduce them to use that power for the purpose of corrupting, or, to use his own words, for soothing, or softening, or meliorating. The learned Gentleman has formed his opinion of the simplicity and inaction of Secretaries, from that golden age of political probity, when his own friends were in power, and when himself was every thing but a Minister. This erroneous humanity of opinion arises in the learned Gentleman's unsuspecting, un sullied nature, as well as in a commerce with only the best and purest Ministers of this country, which has given him so favourable an impression of a Secretary of State, that he thinks this patronage, so dangerous in the hands of seven Commissioners, perfectly safe in *his* hands. I leave to the learned Gentleman that pleasure which his mind must feel under the conviction with which he certainly gives this opinion; but I submit to every man who hears me, what would be the probable comments of the other side of the House, had I proposed either the erection of an Indian Secretary, or the annexation of the Indian business to the office which I hold.

In the assemblage of the learned Gentleman's objections, there is one still more curious than those I have mentioned. He dislikes this Bill, because it establishes an *imperium in imperio*. In the course of opposition to this measure, we have been familiarized

liarized to hear certain sentiments and particular words in this House—but directed, in reality, to *other* places. Taking it, therefore, for granted, that the learned Gentleman has not so despicable an idea of the good sense of the Members, as to expect any more attention within these walls to such a dogma, than has been shewn to the favourite phrase of his Hon. Friend near him, (Mr. William Pitt) who calls a Bill which backs this sinking Company with the credit of the State, a *confiscation* of their *property*, I would wish to ask the learned Gentleman, if he really holds the understanding, even of the multitude, in such contempt, as to imagine this species of argument can have the very slightest effect? The multitude know the fallacy of it as well as the learned Gentleman himself. They know that a dissolution of the East-India Company has been wished for scores of years, by many good people in this country, for the *very reason* that it was an *imperium in imperio*. Yet the learned Gentleman, with infinite gravity of face, tells you he dislikes this Bill, because it establishes this novel and odious principle. Even a glance of this Bill, compared with the present constitution of the Company, manifests the futility of this objection, and proves that the Company is, in its present form, a thousand times more an *imperium in imperio* than the proposed Commissioners. The worst species of Government is that which can run counter to all the ends of its institution with impunity. Such exactly was the East-India Company. No man can say, that the Directors and Proprietors have not, in a thousand instances, merited severe infliction; yet who did ever think of a legal punishment for either body? Now the great feature of this Bill is to render the Commissioners amenable, and to punish them upon delinquency.

The learned Gentleman prides himself that his Bill did not meddle with the commerce of the Company; and another Gentleman, after acknowledging the folly of leaving the government in the hands of the Company, proposes to separate the commerce entirely from the dominion, and leave the former safe and

and untouched to the Company itself. I beg leave to appeal to every Gentleman conversant in the Company's affairs, whether this measure is, in the nature of things, practicable at this moment. That the separation of the commerce from the government of the East may be ultimately brought about, I doubt not; but when Gentlemen reflect upon the immediate state of the Company's affairs, when they reflect that their government was carried on for the sake of their commerce, that both have been blended together for such a series of years; when they review the peculiar, perplexed, and involved state of the eastern territories, their dissimilitude to every system in this part of the globe, and consider the deep and laborious deliberation with which every step for the establishment of a salutary plan of government, in the room of the present odious one, must be taken—the utter impossibility of instantly detaching the governing power from interference with the commercial body, will be clear and indubitable.

A Gentleman has asked, why not choose the Commissioners out of the body of Directors; and why not leave the choice of the Assistant Directors in the Court of Proprietors? That is to say, why not do that which would infallibly undo all you are aiming at? I mean no general disparagement when I say, that the body of the Directors have given memorable proofs, that they are not the sort of people to whom any man can look for the success or salvation of India. Amongst them there are, without doubt, some individuals, respectable both for their knowledge and integrity; but I put it to the candour of Gentlemen, whether they are the species of men whose wisdom, energy, and diligence, would give any promise of emancipating the East-India concerns from their present disasters and disgraces. Indeed, both questions may be answered in two words. Why not choose the Directors, *who have ruined the Company?* Why not leave the power of election in the Proprietors, *who have thwarted every good attempted by the Directors?*

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The last point adverted to by the learned Gentleman relates to *influence*; and upon his remarks, combined with what fell from some others upon the same subject, I beg leave to make a few observations. Much of my life has been employed to diminish the inordinate influence of the Crown. In common, with others, I succeeded, and I glory in it. To support that kind of influence which I formerly subverted, is a deed of which I shall never deserve to be accused. The affirmation with which I first introduced this plan, I now repeat: I re-assert that this Bill as little augments the influence of the Crown, as any measure which can be devised for the government of India, that presents the slightest promise of solid success, and that it tends to increase it in a far less degree than the Bill proposed by the learned Gentleman. The very genius of influence consists in hope or fear; fear of losing what we have, or hope of gaining more. Make these Commissioners removeable at will, and you set all the little passions of human nature afloat. If benefit can be derived from the Bill, you had better burn it than make the duration short of the time necessary to accomplish the plans it is destined for. *That* consideration pointed out the expediency of a fixed period; and in that respect it accords with the principle of the learned Gentleman's Bill; with this superior advantage, that instead of leaving the Commissioners liable to all the influence which springs from the appointment of a Governor-General, removeable at *pleasure*, this Bill invests them with the power for *the time specified*, upon the same tenure that British Judges hold their station, removeable upon delinquency, punishable upon guilt, but fearless of power if they discharge their trust; liable to no seducement, and with full time and authority to execute their functions for the common good of the country, and for their own glory. I beg of the House to attend to this difference, and then judge upon the point of increasing the influence of the Crown, contrasted with the learned Gentleman's Bill.

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The state of accusations against me upon this subject of *influence*, is truly curious. The learned Gentleman, (Mr. Dundas) in strains of emphasis, declares, that this Bill diminishes the influence of the Crown beyond all former attempts; and calls upon those who formerly voted with him in support of that influence, against our efforts to reduce it, and who now sit near me, to join him now in opposing my attempts to diminish that darling influence. He tells them, I *out-herod Herod*; that I am out-doing all my former out-doings; and proclaims me as the merciless and insatiate enemy of the influence of the Crown.

Down sits the learned Gentleman, and up starts an Hon. Gentleman, with a charge against me, upon the same subject, of a nature the direct reverse. I have fought under your banner, cries the Hon. Gentleman, (Mr. Martin) against that fell giant the influence of the Crown; I have bled in that battle which you commanded, and have a claim upon the rights of soldiership. You have conquered through us; and now that victory is in your arms, you turn traitor to our cause, and carry over your powers to the enemy. The fiercest of your former combatants in the cause of influence, falls far short of you at this moment; your attempts in re-erecting this monster, exceed all the exertions of your former foes. This night you will make the influence of the Crown a colossus, that shall bestride the land, and crush every impediment. I impeach you for treachery to your ancient principles—come, come, and divide with us!

This Hon. Gentleman, after a thrust or two at the Coalition, sits down: and whilst the House is perplexing itself to reconcile these wide differences, the Right Hon. Gentleman over the way (Mr. W. Pitt) confounds all past contradictions, by combining, in his own person, these extravagant extremes. He acknowledges that he has digested a paradox; and a paradox well he might call it, for never did a grosser one puzzle the intellects of a public assembly. By a miraculous kind of discern-

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ment he has found out, that the Bill both *increases* and *diminishes* the influence of the Crown.

The Bill diminishes the influence of the Crown, says one: you are wrong, says a second, it increases it: you are both right, says a third, for it both increases and diminishes the influence of the Crown. Now, as most Members have one or other of these opinions upon the subject, the Hon. Gentleman can safely join with all parties upon this point; but few, I trust, will be found to join him.

Thus, Sir, is this Bill combated, and thus am I accused. The nature and substance of these objections, I construe as the strongest comment upon the excellence of the Bill. If a more rational opposition *could* be made to it, no doubt it would. The truth is, it increases the influence of the Crown and the influence of party as little as possible; and if the reform of India, or any other matter, is to be postponed until a scheme be devised, against which ingenuity, or ignorance, or caprice, shall not raise objections, the affairs of human life must stand still.

I beg the House will attend a little to the manner in which the progress of this Bill has been retarded, especially by the Right Hon. Gentleman (Mr. Pitt.) First, the Members were not all in town, and time was desired upon that account. Next, the finances of the East-India Company were mis-stated by me, and time was desired to prove that. The time came, the proofs exhibited, Counsel heard, and yet the issue was, that my former statement, instead of being controverted, became more established by the very proofs which were brought to overturn it. The Hon. Gentleman has misrepresented me to-night again: he has an evident pleasure in it, which indeed I cannot prevent; but I can prevent this House and this country from believing him. He prefers the authority of his own conception (eager enough in all conscience to misunderstand me) of what I said to my own repeated declarations of my own meaning. He supposes a mistake because he wishes it. I never did say the Company were absolute bankrupts to the amount of the debt,

but I said there was immediate necessity of paying that given sum, without any immediate means of providing for it. The account of the Company's circumstances, presented last week, furnished matter of triumph to the Hon. Gentleman for the full space of *three hours*; that is to say, whilst Counsel were at the Bar. I made no objection to the account but this *trifling* one—that 12,000,000*l.* were stated which ought not to appear at all there, and which were placed there only for delusion and fallacy. I never objected to the arithmetic of the account. The sums, I doubt not, were accurately cast up even to a figure: yet the House will recollect, that the Hon. Gentleman, about this very hour of that debate, endeavoured to protract the business to the next day, upon assuring the House that the Company would then support their statement. I refused to accede, because I knew the matter to be mere shifting, and manœuvring for a vote, and that the Company *could not* support their statement. Was I right? The House sees whether I was: the House sees the finance post is now totally abandoned, and for the best reason in the world, because it is no longer tenable. But the Hon. Gentleman is indeed a man of resources; he now gives me a challenge, and I beg the House to remark, that I accept his challenge, and that I prophesy he will no more meet me upon this than upon the former points.

But there is no limit to a youthful and vigorous fancy.—The Right Hon. Gentleman just now, in very serious terms, and with all his habitual gravity, engages, if the House will join in opposing us to-night, that he will digest and methodise a plan, the outline of which he has already conceived. He has nothing *now* to offer; but justly confiding in the fertility of his own imagination, and the future exercise of his faculties, he promises that he *will* bring a plan, *provided* the majority of this House will join him to-night. Now, if ever an idea was thrown out to pick up a stray vote or two in the heel of a debate, by a device, the idea given a while ago by the Hon. Gentleman is precisely such: but if I can augur rightly from the complexion
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of the House, his present will have exactly the same success with all his past stratagems to oppose this Bill *.

His learned Friend, (Mr. Dundas) with singular placidness, without smile or sneer, has said, "as this measure was probably decided upon some time since, the East-India Company, *who could not expect such a blow*, ought to have been informed of the intended project. The Company was evidently unaware of this attack, and, in fairness, should have been apprised of it." Does the learned Gentleman imagine men are in their sober senses, who listen to such cavilling and quibbling opposition? The Company unaware of this attack! The learned Gentleman's own labours, independent of any other intimation, had been an ample warning to the Company to be prepared. Every man in the kingdom, who reads a newspaper, expected something; and the only wonder with the nation was, how it could be so long delayed. The Reports of the Committees alarmed the Public so much, for the honour of the country, and for the salvation of the Company, that all eyes were upon East-India affairs. This sort of observation had indeed much better come from any other man in this House, than from that identical Gentleman.

If these were not sufficient to rouse the attention and diligence of the Company, his Majesty's Speech at the commencement and conclusion of the late Session of Parliament, gave them note of preparation in the most plain and decisive terms. In his opening speech, his Majesty thus speaks to Parliament upon the subject of India:—

"The regulation of a vast territory in Asia, opens a large field for your wisdom, prudence; and foresight: I trust that you will be able to form some fundamental laws which may make their connection with Great-Britain a blessing to India, and that you will take therein proper measures, to give all foreign

* He was right; for the Ministry had an accession of five votes this night, above the former division.

nations, in matters of foreign commerce, an entire and perfect confidence in the probity, punctuality, and good order of our government. You may be assured that whatever depends upon me, shall be executed with a steadiness, which can alone preserve that part of my dominions, or the commerce which arises from it."

The learned Gentleman, who knows more of the dispositions of the Cabinet at that time than I do, can better tell whether any measure of this nature was then intended. The words are very wide, and seem to portend at least something, very important; but whether any thing similar to this measure was meant, as this passage seems to imply, or not, is indifferent to the point in question. This is clear from it, that it gives a very ceremonious warning to the East-India Company; enough surely to expose the weakness and futility of the learned Gentleman's remark. The changes and circumstances of the Cabinet, in the course of the last session, can be the only excuse for the delay of some decisive measure with regard to India: and if in addition to all these, any thing more is requisite to confirm the notoriety of Parliament's being to enter upon the business, the following paragraph of the King's closing Speech, last July, completes the mass of evidence against the learned Gentleman.

Mis Majesty, after intimating a belief that he shall be obliged to call his Parliament together earlier than usual, thus speaks:—

"The consideration of the affairs of the East-Indies will require to be resumed as early as possible, and to be pursued with a serious and unremitting attention." Superadd to all this, the part of the King's opening speech this year upon India; and if the whole do not constitute sufficient testimony that the Company had full notice, nothing can.

Yet, notwithstanding all this, the learned Gentleman accuses us of *surprising* the Company; and his Right Honourable Friend, in hopes his proposal of another Bill may have weight in

in the division—repeats the hacknied charge of *precipitation*, and forces the argument for delay in a taunt, “that we wish to get rid of our torments, by sending this Bill to the other House.” The Honourable Gentleman’s talents are splendid and various; but I assure him, that all his efforts, for the last eight days, have not given me a single torment. Were I to chuse a species of opposition to insure a ministerial tranquillity, it would be the kind of opposition which this Bill has received, in which every thing brought to confute, has tended to confirm, and in which the arguments adduced to expose the weakness, have furnished materials to establish the wisdom of the measure: so impossible is it, without something of a tolerable cause, even for the Right Honourable Gentleman’s abilities to have effect, though his genius may make a flourishing and superior figure in the attempt.

Before I proceed to the other parts of the debate, I wish to say one word upon a remark of the learned Gentleman: he says, that the clause relative to the zemindars was suggested by his observations. God forbid I should detract from the merit, or diminish the desert of any man. Undoubtedly that excellent part of the Regulation Bill derives from the learned Gentleman; and if he were in this House when I introduced the subject of India, he would have known that I did him full and complete justice upon that point.

My Noble Friend (Lord John Cavendish) has said, this Bill does not arise from the poverty of the Company, but that liberal policy and national honour demanded it. Upon the last day this Bill was debated, I confined myself chiefly to the demonstration of the fallacy and imposture of that notable schedule presented by the East-India Company; and having proved its falsehood, I can now with the greater safety declare, that if every shilling of that fictitious property was real and forth coming, a Bill of this nature was not therefore the less necessary. I thought we were fully understood upon this point, from the opening speech in this business, which did not so degrade the

measure as to say it originated in the poverty of the Company, which, as my Noble Friend rightly remarks, was the smallest reason to its adoption, and which opinion is not, as the Right Honourable Gentleman insinuates, “*shifting*,” but recognising and recording the true grounds of the Bill. If any misunderstanding then has hitherto taken place upon this head, it will, I trust, cease henceforth; and so odious a libel upon this country will not pass current, as that sordid motives only induced the government of England to *that* which we were bound to do, as politicians, as Christians, and as men, by every consideration which makes a nation respectable, great, and glorious!

Having vindicated the Bill from this aspersions, and founded it upon that basis which every honest and sensible man in England must approve, I may be allowed to say that some regard may be had even to the mean and mercenary upon this subject (a portion of whom we have here, in common with all other countries.) Will such men endure with temper a constant drain upon this kingdom, for the sake of this monopolizing Corporation? Will those, for instance, who clamour against a two-penny tax, afford, with good humour, million after million to the East-India Company? The Sinking Fund is at this moment a million the worse for the deficiencies of the Company, and as the Noble Lord (Lord John) says, an extent must in three weeks arrest their property, if Parliament does not interpose or enable them to discharge a part of their debt to the Crown. Let those, therefore, who think the commerce ought to be instantly separated from the dominion, (were that at this time possible) and who think it ought to be left wholly in the present hands, reflect, that the formation of a vigorous system of government for India is not more incumbent upon us, than the establishment of the eastern trade upon such principles of solidity and fitness, as shall give some just hopes that the public may be speedily relieved from the monstrous

monstrous pressure of constantly supporting the indigence of the Company.

I have spoke of myself very often in the course of what I have said this night, and must speak still more frequently in the course of what I have to say: the House will see this awkward task is rendered indispensable, infinitely more having been said concerning *me*, during the debate, than concerning the question, which is the proper subject of agitation. The Right Honourable Gentleman (Mr. Pitt) says, that nothing ever happened to give him an impression of my character, or to prevent a mutual confidence. He says rightly; there have been interchanges of civility, and amicable habits between us, in which I trust I have given him no cause to complain. But after pronouncing a brilliant eulogy upon me and my capacity to serve the country, the Honourable Gentleman considers me at the same time the most dangerous man in the kingdom, (Mr. Pitt said across the House, "*dangerous only from this measure.*") To which Mr. Fox instantly made this reply) I call upon the House to attend to the Honourable Gentleman; he thinks me dangerous *only from this measure*, and confesses, that *hitherto* he has seen nothing in my conduct to obliterate his good opinion. Compare this with his opposition during the last and the present session. Let every man reflect, that up to this moment the Honourable Gentleman deemed me worthy of confidence, and competent to my situation in the State. I thank him for the *support* he has afforded to the Minister he thus esteemed, and shall not press the advantage he gives me, farther than leaving to himself to reconcile his practice and his doctrine in the best manner he can.

The Honourable Gentleman could not for one night pass by the *Coalition*, yet I think he might have chosen a fitter time to express his indignation against the Noble Lord (Lord North) than the present moment. An attack upon the Noble Lord in his presence would bear a more liberal colour; and the

cause of his absence now through indisposition, would surely rather disarm than irritate a generous enemy. There are distinctions in hatred, and the direct foes upon such occasions moderate their aversion. The Coalition is, however, a fruitful topic, and the power of traducing it, which the weakest and meanest creatures in the country enjoy and exercise, is of course equally vested in men of rank and parts, though every man of parts and rank would not be apt to participate the privilege. Upon the Coalition, the Honourable Gentleman is welcome to employ his ingenuity, but upon another subject alluded to him, I shall beg leave to advise, nay even to instruct him.

In what system of ethics will the Honourable Gentleman find the precept taught of ripping up old sores, and reviving animosities among individuals, of which the parties themselves retain no memory? This kind of practice may incur a much worse charge than weakness of understanding, and subject a man to much greater imputations than are commonly applied to political mistakes or party violence. The soundness of the heart may be liable to suspicion, and the moral character be in danger of suffering by it, in the opinion of mankind. To cover the heats, and obliterate the sense of former quarrels between two persons, is a very distinguished virtue: to renew the subject of *such* differences, and attempt the revival of *such* disputes, deserves a name which I could give it, if that Hon. Gentleman had not forgotten himself, and fallen into some such deviation. He values himself, I doubt not, too much, again to make a similar slip, and must even feel thankful to me for the counsel I thus take the liberty to give him.

An Honourable Gentleman under the gallery, (Mr. Martin) to whom an abuse of the Coalition seems a sort of luxury, wishes that a starling were at the right hand of the chair to cry out disgraceful Coalition! Sir, upon this subject I shall say but few words:

The calamitous situation of this country required an Administration whose stability could give it a tone of firmness with
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foreign nations, and promise some hope of restoring the faded glories of the country. Such an Administration could not be formed without *some* junction of parties; and if former differences were to be an insurmountable barrier to union, no chance of salvation remained for the country, as it is well known, that four public men could not be found, who had not, at one time or other, taken opposite sides in politics. The great cause of difference between us and the Noble Lord in the blue ribband no longer existed; his personal character stood high; and thinking it safer to trust him than those who had before deceived us, we preferred to unite with the Noble Lord. A similar junction, in 1757, against which a similar clamour was raised, saved the empire from ruin, and raised it above the rivalry of all its enemies. The country, when we came into office, bore not a very auspicious complexion; yet, Sir, I do not despair of seeing it once again resume its consequence in the scale of nations, and make as splendid a figure as ever. Those who have asserted the impossibility of our agreeing with the Noble Lord and his friends, were false prophets; for events have belied their augury. We have differed like men, and like men we have agreed.

A body of the best and honestest men in this House, who serve their country without any other reward than the glory of the disinterested discharge of their public duty, approved that junction, and sanctify the measure by their cordial support.

Such, Sir, is this Coalition, which the state of the country rendered indispensable; and for which the history of every country records a thousand precedents, yet to this the term disgraceful is applied. Is it not extraordinary, then, that Gentlemen should be under such spells of false delusion, as not to see, that if calling it disgraceful makes it so, these epithets operate with equal force against themselves. If the *coalition* be disgraceful, what is the *anti-coalition*? When I see the Right Honourable Gentleman (Mr. Pitt) surrounded by the early objects of his political, nay his hereditary hatred, and hear him
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revile the Coalition, I am lost in the astonishment how men can be so blind to their own situation, as to attempt to wound us in this particular point, possessed as we are of the power of returning the same blow, with the vulnerable part staring us directly in the face. If the Honourable Gentleman under the gallery wishes that a starling were perched upon the right-hand of the chair, I tell him, that the wish is just as reasonable, to have another starling upon the left-hand of the chair, to chirp up *coalition* against *coalition*, and so harmonize their mutual disgrace, if disgrace there be.

With the same consistency, an Honourable Gentleman calls us *deserters*—us! a few cold and disaffected members fall off, then turn about, and, to palliate their own defection, call the body of the army *deserters*! *We* have not deserted; here we are a firm phalanx. Deserted indeed we have been in the moment of disaster, but never dejected, and seldom complaining. Some of those who rose upon our wreck, and who eagerly grasped that power which we had the labour of erecting, now call us deserters. We retort the term with just indignation. Yet whilst they presume we have the attributes of men, they would expect us to have the obduracy of savages. They would have our resentments insatiate, our rancour eternal. In our opinion, an oblivion of useless animosity is much more noble; and in that, the conduct of our accusers goes hand in hand with us. But I beg the House, and I wish the world to observe, that although, like them, we have abandoned our enmities, we have not, like them, relinquished our friendships: but there are a set of men, who, from the mere vanity of having consequence as decisive voters, object to all stable Government; these men hate to see an Administration so fixed, as not to be moveable by their vote. They assume their dignity on the mere negative merit of not accepting places, and in the pride of this self-denial, and the vanity of fancied independence, they object to every system that has a solid basis, because their consequence is unfelt. Of such men I cannot be
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the panegyrist, and I am sorry that some such men are among the most estimable in the House.

An Honourable Gentleman advises me for the future, not to mention the name of the Marquis of Rockingham, who, he says, would never countenance a Bill of this kind. This is, indeed, imposing hard conditions upon those, who have willingly suffered a sort of political martyrdom in the cause of that Noble Lord's principles, those who surrendered pomp and power, rather than remain where his principles ceased to be fashionable, and were withering into contempt. I venerate the name of that Noble Marquis, and shall ever mention it with love and reverence; but at no period of my life with more confidence than at this moment, when I say, that his soul speaks in every line of the Bill before you; for his soul speaks in every measure of virtue, wisdom, humane policy, general justice, and national honour. The name of the Noble Lord who enjoys his fortune has been mentioned in this debate, and will be mentioned again by me; I will tell the Honourable Gentleman, that this Noble Lord, (Earl Fitzwilliam) though not the issue of his loins, inherits, with his property, the principles of that Noble Marquis in all their purity and soundness; and is as incapable as that Noble Marquis himself, or as any man on earth, of countenancing any act which either immediately or ultimately tended to the prejudice of his country, or the injury of the Constitution. I have had the honour of knowing the Noble Earl from an early age. I have observed the motives of his actions: I am endeared to him by every tie of kindred sentiment, and of mutual principle. A character more dignified and exalted exists not in the empire; a mind more firmly attached to the Constitution of his country: he is, what the nation would desire in the heir of Lord Rockingham, the only compensation we could have for his loss.

An Honourable Gentleman (Mr. T. Pitt) at the other side, has used violent terms against this Bill, and the movers of it. Sir, I tell that Honourable Gentleman (looking directly in the face

face of Mr. T. Pitt) that the movers of this Bill are not to be brow-beaten by studied gesture, nor frightened by tremulous tones, solemn phrases, or hard epithets. To arguments they are ready to reply; but all the notice they can take of assertions, is to mark to the House, that they are *only* assertions. The Honourable Gentleman again repeats his favourite language of our having *seized upon the Government*; his Majesty changed his Ministry last April, in consequence of a vote of this House; his Majesty did the same twelve months before, in consequence of a vote of this House. His Majesty, in so doing, followed the example of his predecessors; and his successors will, I doubt not, follow the example of his Majesty. The votes of Parliament have always decided upon the duration of Ministry, and always will, I trust. It is the nature of our Constitution, and those who dislike it, had better attempt to alter it. The Honourable Gentleman called the change in 1782 a glorious one; this in 1783 a disgraceful one. Why? for a very obvious, though a very bad reason. The Honourable Gentleman assisted in effecting the first, and strenuously laboured to prevent the second. The first battle he fought with us; the second against us, and we vanquished him. In 1782 his friends were *out*, and would be *in*. In 1783 his friends were *in*, nor *would* go out. Thus having done without him what we once did with him, the House sees his motive. It is human nature certainly; but certainly not the better part of human nature. He says he is no party man, and he abhors a systematic opposition. I have always acknowledged myself to be a party man; I have always acted with a party in whose principles I have confidence; and if I had such an opinion of any Ministry as the Gentleman professes to have of us, I would pursue their overthrow by a systematic opposition. I have done so more than once, and I think that in succeeding I saved my country. Once the Right Honourable Gentleman, as I have said, was with me, and our conduct was fair, manly, constitutional, and honourable. The next time he was against me,

me, and our conduct was violent and unconstitutional, it was treasonable; and yet the means were in both instances the same, the means were the votes of this House.

A game of a two-fold quality is playing by the other side of the House upon this occasion, to which I hope the House, and I hope the kingdom, will attend. They are endeavouring to injure us through two channels at the same time, through a certain great quarter, and through the People. They are attempting to alarm the first, by asserting that this Bill increases the influence of Ministry *against* the Crown; and rousing the People, under an idea that it increases the influence of the Crown *against* them. That they will fail in both I doubt not. In the great quarter I trust they are well understood, and the princely mind of that high person is a security against their devices: they are running swiftly to take off whatever little imposition might have been put upon any part, even of the multitude. And I wish to rescue the character of the public understanding from the contemptuous implication, that it is capable of being gulled by such artifices. I feel for my country's honour when I say, that Englishmen, free themselves, and fond of giving freedom to others, disdain these stratagems, and are equally above the silliness of crediting the revilers of this act, as above the baseness of confederating or making common cause with those who would support a system which has dishonoured this country, and which keeps thirty millions of the human race in wretchedness. I make allowances for the hair-brained headstrong delusions of folly and ignorance, and the effects of design. To such evils every measure is liable, and every man must expect a portion of the consequence. But for the serious and grave determinations of the public judgment I have the highest value, I ever had, and ever shall have. If it be a weakness, I confess it, that to lose the good opinion of even the meanest man, gives me some pain; and whatever triumph my enemies can derive from such a frame of mind, they are welcome to. I do not, after the example of the

Honourable

Honourable Gentleman who began this debate, (Mr. Powys) hold the opinion of Constituents in disparagement. The clear and decided opinion of the more reasonable and respectable should, in my opinion, weigh the Member upon the same principle that, I think, with the voice of the nation should prevail in this House, and in every other place. But when the Representative yields to the Constituent, it should indeed be by the majority of the reasonable and respectable, and not, as we shall see in a day or two, some of the honestest men in England voting against the most popular tax was ever introduced into this House, in direct opposition to their own conviction, and *not* upon the opinion of either the more respectable or reasonable class of their Constituents.

My noble friend, (Lord John) with his characteristic spirit, has said, that *we* never sought power by cabal or intrigue, or underhand operations; and this he said in reply to an Honourable Gentleman, (Mr. T. Pitt) whose conduct demonstrates, that he thinks *those* the surest path for his friends. This bill, as a ground of contention, is farcical: this bill, if it admitted it, would be combated upon its intrinsic qualities, and not by abusing the coalition, or raising a clamour about influence; but why don't the Gentlemen speak out fairly, as we do, and then let the world judge between us? Our love and loyalty to the Sovereign are as ardent and firm as their own. Yet the broad basis of public character, upon which we received, is the principle by which we hope to retain this power; convinced that the surest road to the favour of the Prince, is by serving him with zeal and fidelity; that the safest path to popularity, is by reducing the burden, and restoring the glory of the nation. Let those (looking at Mr. Jenkinson) who aim at office by *other* means, by inscrutable and mysterious methods, speak out; or, if they will not, let the world know it is because their arts will not bear examination, and that their safety consists in their obscurity. *Our* principles are well known; and I should

should prefer to perish with them, rather than prosper with any other.

The Honourable Gentleman under the gallery (Mr. Martin) also says, he dislikes systematic opposition. Whether perpetually rising up with peevish, capricious objections to every thing proposed by us, deserve that name or not, I leave the Gentleman himself to determine, and leave the House to reflect upon that kind of conduct which condemns the theory of its own constant practice; but I meet the Gentleman directly upon the principle of the term. He dislikes systematic opposition; now I like it. A systematic opposition to a dangerous Government is, in my opinion, a noble employment for the brightest faculties; and if the Honourable Gentleman thinks our Administration a bad one, he is right to contribute to its downfall. Opposition is natural in such a political system as ours; it has subsisted in all such Governments; and perhaps it is necessary. But to those who oppose it, it is extremely essential that their manner of conducting it incur not a suspicion of their motives. If they appear to oppose from disappointment, from mortification, from pique, from whim, the people will be against them. If they oppose from public principle, from love of their country rather than hatred to Administration, from evident conviction of the badness of measures, and a full persuasion that in their resistance to men, they are aiming at the public welfare, the People will be with them. We opposed upon *these* principles, and the People were with us; if we are opposed upon *other* principles, they will not be against us. Much labour has been employed to infuse a prejudice upon the present subject; and I have the satisfaction to believe that the labour has been fruitless; (making a reasonable exception for the mistakes of the uninformed, the first impressions of novelty, and the natural result of deliberate malice) we desire to be tried by the test of this Bill, and risk our character upon the issue: confiding thoroughly in the good sense, the justice, and the spirit of Englishmen. Not lofty sounds, nor selected epithets,

thets, nor passionate declamation in this House, nor all the fordid efforts of interested men out of this House, (of men whose acts in the East have branded the British name, and whose ill-gotten opulence, working through a thousand channels to delude and debauch the public understanding) can fasten odium upon this measure, or draw an obloquy upon the authors of it. We have been tried in the cause of the public; and until we desert that cause, we are assured of public confidence and protection.

The Honourable Gentleman (Mr. Powys) has supposed for me a soliloquy, and has put into my mouth some things which I do not think are likely to be attributed to me: he insinuates that I was incited by avarice, or ambition, or party spirit. I have failings in common with every human being, beside my own peculiar faults: but of avarice I have indeed held myself guiltless. My abuse has been, for many years, even the profession of several people; it was their traffic, their livelihood; yet until this moment, I knew not that avarice was in the catalogue of the sins imputed to me. Ambition I confess I have, but not ambition upon a narrow bottom, or built upon paltry principles. If, from the devotion of my life to political objects, if from the direction of my industry to the attainment of some knowledge of the Constitution, and the true interests of the British empire, the ambition of taking no mean part in those acts that elevate nations, and make a people happy, be criminal, that ambition I acknowledge. And as to party spirit—that I feel it, that I have ever been under its impulse, and that I ever shall, is what I proclaim to the world. That I am one of a party, a party never known to sacrifice the interests, or barter the liberties of the nation for mercenary purposes, for personal emolument or honours; a party linked together upon principles which comprehend whatever is dear and most precious to free men, and essential to a free Constitution, is my pride and my boast.

The Honourable Gentleman has given me one assertion, which it is my pride to make: he says that I am connected
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with a number of the first families in the country. Yes, Sir, I have a peculiar glory that a body of men, renowned for their ancestry, important for their possessions, distinguished for their personal worth, with all that is valuable to men at stake, hereditary fortunes and hereditary honours, deem me worthy of their confidence. With such men I am something—without them, nothing. My reliance is upon their good opinion; and in that respect, perhaps, I am fortunate. Although I have a just confidence in my own integrity, yet as I am but man, perhaps it is well that I have no choice but between my own eternal disgrace and a faithful discharge of my public duty; whilst these kind of men are overseers of my conduct, whilst men, whose uprightness of heart and spotless honour are even proverbial in the country, (looking at Lord John Cavendish) are the vigils of my deeds, it is a pledge to the public for the purity and rectitude of my conduct. The prosperity and honour of the country are blended with the prosperity and honour of these illustrious persons. They have so much at stake, that if the country falls, they fall with it; and to countenance anything against its interest, would be a suicide upon themselves. The good opinion and protection of these men is a security to the nation for my behaviour, because, if I lose them, I lose my all.

Having said so much upon the extraneous subjects introduced by the Hon. Gentleman into the debate, I shall proceed to make some observations upon the business in question. When the learned Gentleman brought in his Bill last year, the House saw its frightful features with just horror; but a very good method was adopted to soften the terrors of the extravagant power that Bill vested in the Governor-General. The name of a Noble Lord (Lord Cornwallis) was sent forth at the same time, whose great character lent a grace to a proposition, which, destitute of such an advantage, could not be listened to for one moment. Now, Sir, observe how differently we have acted upon the same occasion.

Earl Fitzwilliam has been spoken of here this day in those terms of admiration with which his name is always mentioned. Take notice, however, that we did not avail ourselves of the fame of his virtue and abilities in passing this Bill through the House.

If such a thing were to have taken place as the institution of an Indian Secretaryship, (according to the suggestions of some Gentlemen) this Noble Lord would certainly have been the very person whom, for my part, I should have advised his Majesty to invest with that office. Yet, although his erect mind and spotless honour would have held forth to the public the fullest confidence of a faithful execution of its duties, the objections in regard to influence upon a removeable Officer, are tenfold in comparison with the present scheme. The House must now see, that with all the benefits we might derive from that Noble Lord's character—that although his name would have imparted a sanctity, an ornament, and an honour to the Bill, we ushered it in without that ceremony, to stand or fall by its own intrinsic merits, neither shielding it under the reputation, nor gracing it under the mantle, of any man's virtue. Our merit will be more in this, when the names of those are known whom we mean to propose to this House, to execute this commission. (Name them, said Mr. Arden, across the House.) I will not—I will not name them; the Bill shall stand or fall by its own merits, without aid or injury from their character. An Hon. Gentleman has said these Commissioners will be made up of our “adherents and creatures.” Sir, there is nothing more easy than to use disparaging terms; yet I should have thought the name of Earl Fitzwilliam would have given a fair presumption, that the colleagues we shall recommend to this House for the co-execution of this business with that Noble Lord, will not be of a description to merit these unhandsome epithets. I assure the Hon. Gentleman they are not. I assure him they are not men whose faculties of corrupting, or whose corruptibility, will give any alarm to this House, or to this country: they are men
whose

whose private and public characters stand high and untainted; who are not likely to countenance depredation, or participate the spoils of rapacity. They are not men to screen delinquency, or to pollute the service by disgraceful appointments. Would such men as Earl Fitzwilliam suffer unbecoming appointments to be made? Is Earl Fitzwilliam a man likely to do the dirty work of a Minister? If they, for instance, were to nominate a Paul Benfield to go to India in the Supreme Council, would Earl Fitzwilliam subscribe to his appointment? This is the benefit of having a commission of high honour, chary of reputation, noble and pure in their sentiments, who are superior to the little jobs and traffic of political intrigue.

But this Bill, Sir, presumes not upon the probity of the men; it looks to the future possibility of dissimilar successors, and to the morality of the present Commissioners, who are merely human, and therefore not incapable of alteration. Under all the caution of this Bill, with the responsibility it imposes, I will take upon me to say, that if the aggregate body of this Board, determined to use all its power for the purpose of corruption, this House, and the people at large, would have less to dread from them, in the way of influence, than from a few Asiatics who will probably be displaced in consequence of this arrangement; some of whom will return to this country with a million, some with seven hundred thousand, some with five, beside the three or four hundred thousand of others, who are cut off in their career by the hand of fate. An inundation of such wealth is far more dangerous, than any influence that is likely to spring from a plan of Government so constituted as this proposed—whether the operation of such a mass of wealth be considered in its probable effects, upon the principles of the Members of this House, or the manners of the people at large, more especially when a reflection that Orientalists are in general the most exemplary class of people in their morals, and in their deportment the most moderate, and corresponding with the distinction of their high birth and family, furnishes a very reasonable presumption,

tion, that the expenditure of their money will be much about as honourable as its acquirement.

I shall now, Sir, conclude my speech with a few words upon the opinion of the Right Hon. Gentleman (Mr. Pitt.) He says, " he will stake his character upon the danger of this Bill." I meet him in his own phrase, and oppose him, character to character: I risk my all upon the excellence of this Bill; I risk upon it whatever is most dear to me, whatever men most value, the character of integrity, of talents, of honour, of present reputation and future fame; these, and whatever else is precious to me, I stake upon the constitutional safety, the enlarged policy, the equity, and the wisdom of this measure; and have no fear in saying, (whatever may be the fate of its authors) that this Bill will produce to this country every blessing of commerce and revenue; and that by extending a generous and humane Government over those millions whom the inscrutable destinations of Providence have placed under us in the remotest regions of the earth, it will consecrate the name of England amongst the noblest of nations.

Mr. Fox, Dec. 1, 1783.

I HAVE ventured to consider ourselves as re-assembled this day, after the necessary adjournment of the session, under his Majesty's solemn promise, that we should not be interrupted in our deliberations on the affairs of the East-Indies, and the support of the public credit, by any prorogation or dissolution of the Parliament: for, if his Majesty's Answer to our late Address means any thing short of that, his Ministers, who have advised and perused it, have not only abused his Royal confidence, but grossly deceived and insulted this House. For the Answer in acknowledging the urgency of those objects, mentioned in the Address, as reasons against dissolving, and likewise the expediency of proceeding on them with vigilance, most undoubtedly conveys, that the House will be permitted not merely to meet, but to meet for the furtherance of those objects. On the
day

day the Answer was read in this House, there were no responsible Ministers present ; but as they are here now, the House is entitled to know, in the most explicit and unequivocal terms, previous to the discussion of any question of India, whether they are to understand, that they are met again freely, independently, and with ultimate effect to deliberate on the affairs of India, and the other great considerations that press upon them ; or whether they are only tenants at the will of the new Minister, to be sent back to their constituents as delinquents, unless they shall recede from every principle of constitutional policy, to which they are solemnly and publicly pledged, and shall agree to register any edict upon the subject which the new Treasury Bench may dictate to them, however repugnant to their former opinions ? For if that should be their system, I, for one, would not give up a moment of my time to deliberation which must be fruitless, and which could end in the final execution of no permanent system of Government in Asia or Europe ; if Ministers meet us only by way of experiment, to try our opinions with the rod of dissolution hung over our heads as the scourge of disobedience, determined, instead of retiring on a disappointment, still to distract and disturb a Government which they cannot guide, and to gain, over a future Parliament, by the arts of cabal and corruption, which the virtue of the present has resisted, it will become us to know, not from the Ministers, but from the Throne itself, whether this country is to be governed by men whom the House of Commons can confide in, or whether we, the people of England's Representatives, are to be the sport and foot-ball of any junto that may hope to rule over us by an unseen and unexplorable principle of Government, utterly unknown to the Constitution ? This is the great question to which every public-spirited Citizen of this country should direct his view. A question that goes very wide of the policy to be adopted concerning India, about which very wise and very honest men, not only might, but have and did materially differ. The total removal of all the executive servants of the Crown,

while they are in the full enjoyment of the confidence of that House, and indeed without any other visible or avowed cause of removal, than because they do enjoy that confidence, and the appointment of others in their room, without any other apparent ground of selection than because they enjoyed it not, is, in my mind, a most alarming and portentous attack on the public freedom; because, though no outward form of the Government is relaxed or violated by it, so as instantly to supply the constitutional remedy of opposition, the whole spirit and energy of the Government is annihilated by it. That the prerogative of choosing Ministers belongs to, and ought to belong to his Majesty, and let no man hope to hear from me a single expression that strikes at the just independence of the Crown; but as all its prerogatives, like our own privileges, are but trusts for the people, and as none of them can be abused but by the agency of others, I persuade myself that they will look to those, who, in an evil hour, have given the Crown the most responsible advice on the subject alluded to, by accepting of all the posts of executive power, merely as it should seem, because the voice of the people's Representatives in this House has been recently, repeatedly, and loudly lifted up against them. I ventured to express my astonishment on a former day, when the First Lord of the Treasury was not in his place, that when the affairs of India were the first and most important objects of the King's Government, he could venture to take upon him the conduct of that Government in a House of Commons, adverse to all his ideas and principles on the subject, and the majority of which he had on the same subject loaded with the most opprobrious epithets; an expression he thought himself at liberty to use, because after a great and respectable majority had assented to the Bill upon the second reading, and in the Committee, the Right Hon. Gentleman did still, on the third reading, consider the friends of it collectively as supporting a desperate faction, in an attempt to maintain themselves in power at the expence of the most sacred chartered rights of individuals, and the most valuable

able interests of the public, with many other galling expressions. My objection to this language, as I explained it when I first stated it, is not so much because it was unparliamentary or unprecedented, though I thought it sufficiently so; it was not an arraignment of the Right Hon. Gentleman for using it, since on most contested public measures the same sort of language was but too frequent from both sides of the House; but I did, as we may all remember, express my utter astonishment, which I again express, (for it grows on me every instant) that the Right Hon. Gentleman should hope to continue one day the Minister in a House of Commons, while that majority, whose principles of government he has thus so recently reprobated, continues to subsist: that was, and continues to be my observation; and I am not afraid to trust the justice and propriety of it to the good sense, the dignity, and the memory of the House. If the Right Hon. Gentleman retains his own opinions, and if the House likewise retains its own, is it not evident, that he came into office without the most distant prospect of serving the public? Is it not evident, that he has brought on a struggle between executive and legislative authority, at a time when they are pointing with equal vigour, unity, and effect, to the common interests of the nation? Is it not palpable, that instead of giving stability, dignity, and authority to the Government of his country, at a time when its affairs are falling into ruin in every part of the world from the want of them, he has crippled and enervated all its operations, stirred dangerous questions between the Prerogatives of the Crown and the Privileges of the People, and wasted the important hours of deliberation in this House, in bringing things back to the very condition they were in originally, when he stepped forth to disturb them. Can the Right Hon. Gentleman, or any body for him, explain to the House why the Crown, by its Answer to our Address, should promise not to disturb our proceedings, yet should at the same moment change the whole executive authority of Government, and place it in the hands of persons adverse to every principle

they had pledged themselves to adopt, on the very measure they were desired to proceed upon? Is it not plain to the meanest understanding, that it struck a palsy into every member of executive power, which could not, and ought not to have any energy or strength, when deprived of that vital spirit of popular government, which could only circulate life and heat through the medium of the people's Representatives in this House?

I trust, that whenever the Crown of England removes its Ministers, enjoying the full confidence of the Commons, and chuse so strange and inauspicious an hour for that removal, as when upheld by that confidence they were planning great and necessary systems of Government, and when it not only chose that season for removing them, but put into their room persons whose principles on the same objects the people's Representatives had recently rejected and condemned, I hope, whatever may be our differences on other subjects, that we shall be unanimous in considering that moment as a great and alarming crisis, in which the freedom of the Government is to be decided on for ever: and that though we should proceed like prudent and virtuous men, with foresight and moderation, taking care not to touch any of the forms of the Government, yet that we should convince the Crown by our conduct, that the wisest and ablest individual, who shall ever venture to stand upon secret influence against the confidence of this House, will find, that his abilities, whatever they may be, or whatever they may be fancied, instead of being a support and protection to him, will only be like the convulsions of a strong man in the agonies of disease, which exhaust the vital spirit faster than the fainter struggles of weakness, and bring on death the sooner.

Such, in a few hours, I trust will be the fate of the Right Hon. Gentleman at the head of the present Government: indeed he never compared, in his own mind, his first appearances in this House, when under the banners of a Right Hon. Gentleman, he supported the genuine cause of liberty, with his present melancholy ridiculous situation in it, than he was drawn
into

into an involuntary parody of the scene of Hamlet and his mother in the closet :

Look here upon this picture, and on this :
See what a grace was seated in this youth,
His father's fire—the soul of Pitt himself,
A tongue like his to soften or command,
A station like the Genius of England
New lighted on this top of Freedom's hill;
A combination and a form indeed,
Where every god did seem to set his seal
To give his country earnest of a Patriot.

Look you now what follows :

Dark, secret influence, like a mildew'd ear,
Blasting this public virtue : Has he eyes !
Could he this bright assembly leave to please,
To batten on that bench !

The Right Hon. Gentleman may profit the less from these observations, from believing that I seek them, and that I have a pleasure in making them : if he thinks so, I can assure him upon my honour, that he is mistaken ; so very much mistaken, that the inconveniencies which the country suffer at this moment, from the want of a settled Government, are greatly heightened to my feelings from the reflection, that they are increased by his unguided ambition. Our fathers were friends, and I was taught from my infancy to reverence the name of Pitt ; an original partiality, which instead of being diminished, was strongly confirmed by an acquaintance with the Right Hon. Gentleman himself, which I was cultivating with pleasure, when he was taken from his profession into a different scene. Let him not think that I am the less his friend, or the mean envier of his talents, because they have been too much the topic of panegyric here already, and both I and the public are now reaping

ing the bitter fruits of these intemperate praises. "It is good (said Jeremiah) for a man to bear the yoke in his youth;" and if the Right Hon. Gentleman had attended to this maxim, he would not at so early a period have declared against a subordinate situation, but would have lent the aid of his faculties to carry on the affairs of this country, which wanted nothing but stability to render them glorious, instead of setting up at once for himself to be the first; because he had too hastily declared against being subordinate, and doing it under circumstances, which could not but for a time at least (the spirit of the House would take care it should not be long) disturb and distract all the operations of Government, and disappoint the most solid interests of the public.

How very different has been the progress of my Hon. Friend that sits near me, who was not hatched at once into a Minister by the heat of his own ambition, but who, as it was good for him to do in the words of the Prophet, "bore the yoke in his youth," passed through the subordinate offices, and matured his talents in long and laborious oppositions; arriving, by the natural progress of his powerful mind, to a superiority of political wisdom and comprehension, which this House had long with delight and satisfaction acknowledged. To pluck such a man from the Councils of his country in the hour of her distresses, while he enjoyed the full confidence of the House, to give effect to vigorous plans for her interests, and to throw every thing into confusion by the introduction of other men, introduced, as it should seem, for no other purpose than to beget that confusion, is an evil that, if we cannot rectify, we may at least have leave to lament: these evils are, however, imputed, by the Right Hon. Gentleman and his colleagues, to another source—to the Bill for the regulation of the East Indies, from the mischiefs of which they had stepped forth to save the country—a language most indecent in this House of Commons, which thought it their duty to the public to pass it by a majority of above an hundred; but which was, however, to be taken to be destructive

and dangerous, notwithstanding that authority, because it had been disapproved by a majority of eighteen votes in the Lords, some of whom I reverence as conscientious and independent opinions; but the majority of which small majority voted upon principles, which the forms of the House will not permit me to allude to, farther than to say, that individual Noblemen are not always Gentlemen.

Mr. Erskine, Jan. 12, 1784.

AFTER the testimony of so many honourable and independent Gentlemen who have, with one voice, acknowledged, that the Resolution before you, for removing the present Ministry, is, in the present case, absolutely unwarrantable, I rise with peculiar satisfaction and peculiar advantage; and I must therefore be allowed to augur well of the event of this night's Debate. Sir, I rejoice to see the moderation and temper which has shewn itself on this day; I rejoice that we meet the question fairly, and that it is not brought forward as that was, upon which this Resolution is to be founded, and of which it is said to be nothing more than a mere corollary.—The former, important as it was, not only to the interests, but to the personal honour of his Majesty's present Ministers, was brought before us suddenly and unexpectedly at five o'clock in the morning, when every man's faculties for speaking, for hearing, and for judging properly, were exhausted by a previous Debate of more than twelve hours, and when a very considerable part of the House had departed, under the firm and very natural persuasion that no more questions of consequence were likely to be introduced. The present question, as it is brought forward at a better hour, and with a better temper, so will it be decided upon, I trust, with a better and clearer judgment; and I assure you, Sir, I shall attempt so far to follow the example of those before me, and of the Right Hon. Gentleman himself, (Mr. Fox) as to suffer nothing personal, nothing indecent, nothing heated, nothing unbecoming

becoming the critical and awful hour in which I speak, to escape out of my lips.

Sir, the first thing I have to observe is clearly and distinctly this; that allowing, for argument's sake, actual credit for every report without doors, and every insinuation that has been made here, the present resolution is nevertheless utterly without foundation.

What, Sir, is the utmost that reports have ever said? That my Lord Temple has indiscreetly, wantonly, and, if you will, unconstitutionally reported his Majesty's private opinion on the subject of the India Bill, and that in the House of Lords that Bill has been by this means thrown out. But, Sir, is my Lord Temple a Minister? Your resolution says his Majesty's present Ministers: Lords of the Bedchamber are no Ministers; whom, therefore, are those men that your resolution means to slander? I call on the Noble Lord to amend his Motion, and to name in it the names of every Minister of his Majesty, on whose character he means that this stigma should alight. Sir, I defy any man even to insinuate that any one of his Majesty's Cabinet has ever had the least share of that secret influence upon which this Motion is founded, and for which it is to turn them out of Office. Sir, they are not even accused; they have a right to be accused, and they will deny every part of the imputation. The throwing out of the India Bill was a matter previous to their appointment, in which they had no concern, and for which they can share no blame, even if I allow, for argument's sake, that blame is due any where.

His Majesty's present Ministers have, I assert, been constitutionally chosen by him who has the sole right to chuse them; and by this resolution they are by this House instantly turned out.

Sir, is it therefore for their incapacity and insufficiency that you overthrow them? (The House having cried hear! hear!) Mr. Dundas said, then, Sir, I insist that their incapacity and insufficiency shall be named in the Motion as the ground upon which

which you at once deny them your confidence. Let this House judge and know upon what ground they give their vote. Let me tell you, Sir, our Constituents will ask to know, the People of England must and will know, why Ministers named by his Majesty are instantly turned out by the House of Commons; turned out, I say, before they are tried, and condemned before they are accused.

Sir, if this resolution means any thing, it is in the nature and spirit of an address, requesting the King to appoint a whole new set of Ministers. I am forced, therefore, to view it in this light, since it is in effect pointed at his Majesty, and must, probably, be followed up by an address in the same tenor, and to the same purport.

I beg, therefore, the House will go with me in considering how the Royal mind must feel, and what sort of language his Majesty must hold to himself upon such an address.

“ You send me back the Ministers I have just chosen; have I not then the right to chuse my Ministers? Certainly yes, you say. But what crimes have they committed? What is it they have so soon perpetrated? Certainly not one act of their Administration is yet passed. Are they, therefore, without the confidence of the House of Commons? Are they men so unpopular, so incapable, so insufficient, that you will not bear with them even for a moment? Is the Minister who devotes himself to the House of Commons, particularly, so unpopular and so incapable? I had chosen him, I had singled him out as a man, of talents the most astonishing, of integrity the most uncorrupt, of a reputation the most extraordinary. I had fondly imagined him the favourite of the House of Commons; I had been taught to fancy, that in celebrating his name, all my People joined in one anthem of praise.

“ Is it for this, therefore, that the House of Commons thus instantly condemns him? Is it on account of his fair fame and unexampled reputation, that I am desired to withdraw my public confidence from such a person as this? It follows,

no

no doubt, therefore, that you wish me to substitute characters as opposite as possible to this. You wish me then to name some man or men in whom I can place no confidence; some man or men whom my People execrate, and in whom I myself, in perfect union with my People, cannot confide. If such men are to be my only choice, if unpopularity, hatred, and distrust, are to be the qualifications and the great characteristics that form a Minister in these days, it would be matter of the sincerest joy to me, if the House of Commons would permit me to wave my choice; let the House of Commons name their Minister; let them search out persons suited to their purposes, only let me not be forced to play the farce of naming to them men whom they have singled out, whom my conscience condemns on public grounds, and whom my People tell me they do not approve."—Such would be the natural answer of a King, allowing him to be a man of feeling, and a man of honour, like ourselves, on such an unheard-of Address as this; just this necessarily must be his private sentiments and soliloquy on the occasion. Therefore, says he, I would beseech the House of Commons at once to name the men in whom alone they are determined to confide. Already we know their names. Let us bring in a Bill, naming the Right Hon. Gentleman and the Noble Lord exclusive Ministers of this country for a terms of years; for that is precisely the spirit and meaning, that, Sir, is the plain English of this resolution, except indeed that by the present Motion, the House of Lords is exempted from any share in the nomination; whereas, if it was a Bill, it would not be the House of Commons alone that would name the Minister of this country.

Sir, we have been told by the Right Honourable Gentleman, that this is a great constitutional question, and not a question who shall be Minister. I meet the House on that ground, and I beg leave to request no more favour than this, viz. that every man who thinks with the Right Honourable Gentleman, that this is not a question who shall be Minister, will vote
with

with him, and I am content that all the rest should vote with me. Nay, Sir, if there is any man in this House who in his conscience does not think, that this resolution serves to name the Right Honourable Gentleman and his colleague, the Ministers and the only Ministers of this country, I am content that all such persons, to a man, should vote against me. I feel on this ground very sure of finding myself to-night in a most respectable majority indeed.

Sir, I have no personal objections or dislike to the Noble Lord or the Right Honourable Gentleman; it is upon clear constitutional grounds that I resist this vote, and I call upon the independent part of the House that they will stand forth and maintain the character, the moderation, for thus I will venture to say they will most effectually maintain the true consequence of this British House of Commons. Let the House look well to its conduct this night, for this night it is about to decide what is the Constitution of this country. The assumption of power and privileges which did not belong to it, has once proved the overthrow of this Constitution; we are verging towards the same precipice again, we are claiming to ourselves the right of appointing Ministers, we are disclaiming the nomination of his Majesty, without cause and without trial: let us consider this question, I say, without favour or affection, for we are this night deciding on the Constitution.

Mr. Henry Dundas, Jan. 16, 1784.

THERE are several persons, useful and deserving members of society, who are unfortunately, at this time, deprived of the happiness and comfort of enjoying their hereditary possessions. Those unhappy men have suffered from the active part which their ancestors or themselves have taken in a late alarming rebellion, that had convulsed the empire, and nearly overthrown the present Royal Family; but those feuds and animosities are now entirely done away, and I can with truth and justice affirm, that his present Majesty has not in his dominions a more
brave

brave and loyal people than those who possess the mountains of the north. They have frequently given the most distinguished and memorable proofs of their prowess—their affection to their country—and their loyalty to the best of Sovereigns, by expending their treasures, and often pouring forth their blood for the defence and glory of Great-Britain.

Surely, therefore, that people who have called forth their military skill for the honour of their countrymen, who have often repelled the enemy, who have often added new lustre to our former glorious achievements, merit at least some small degree of acknowledgment and gratitude from their fellow-subjects.—Their cause of former misunderstanding is now no more; and as they have made themselves illustrious in the field, they claim the protection of the British Administration in the Cabinet. I need hardly mention, that the people I allude to are those hardy sons of Britain, who inhabited the mountains in the Highlands of Scotland; a race of men to whom an illustrious Statesman, in a former war, has paid the highest tribute of applause for their military prowess.

I am proud to have been the first who called forth those resources from the bleak wilds and mountainous parts of the North, as they have been the means of restoring peace and tranquillity to our dominions, when most other resources had been applied in vain. I, like the illustrious statesman to whom I allude, am not too partial to this or that part of the country, but freely confess, that I am stimulated from motives of justice and humanity, to make a proposition, which has for its ultimate object, the restoration of property to the real proprietors, and giving peace and happiness to some individuals who merit well of society. The illustrious person to whom I allude, is the late Earl of Chatham, a name glorious in the annals of Great-Britain, and who has spoken of the hardy sons of the North in terms of the most expressive panegyric. “ I am not,” said he, “ attached to one part of the country more than to another. I am above all *local* prejudices. It

“ is

" is a matter of indifference to me, whether a man was rocked
 " in his cradle on this or on the other side of the *Tweed*. I
 " sought for *merit* where I could find it, and I found it in the
 " mountains of the *North*. Those hardy sons answered the
 " emergency of the times, and I have the honour to boast
 " of being the first who called their powers forth into action.
 " They were in a manner proscribed and forgotten, till I
 " emancipated them from their bondage, and helped to wipe
 " away the odium which was illiberally fixed upon them. No
 " sooner had they taken the field in the service of their coun-
 " try, than they turned the tide of war, and our manly ex-
 " ertions were crowned with success. They fought our
 " battles,—they bled freely in the same cause,—and gave the
 " enemy to understand, that British valour was not to be con-
 " quered without a superior degree of personal courage and
 " bravery. Their fidelity could only be equalled by their in-
 " trepidity, which has signalized their own and their country's
 " renown all over the world."

These were the sentiments of that great Minister, who had
 shaken the dominions of the French Monarch to the center.
 I confess; I am as free from national prejudices as the much-
 esteemed Earl; and adopt the present proposition from motives
 of sound policy. I am not attached to one part of the country
 more than to another, and would be happy to embrace an op-
 portunity of shewing my impartiality. The unfortunate per-
 sons, whose case I now submit to Parliament, have been de-
 prived of their estates for near forty years. I do not call to
 question the national expediency which has impelled the Le-
 gislature to enact those laws that have operated so rigidly against
 them; but if, by an alteration of the times, and an alteration
 of opinion, motives of humanity could be adopted, it would,
 I am convinced, be worthy of a British Parliament, to alleviate
 the distresses of their fellow-creatures, by restoring to them
 those possessions which they once had a right to enjoy. Their
 past atonement demands it as an act of justice: their future con-

duct, if we may judge from their past services to the state, will make it an act of national wisdom. They have already suffered sufficiently for the part they have taken in the late rebellion in 1745. They have been proscribed—they have been forced into exile—they have frequently been reduced to the most deplorable dilemma—in short, they have laboured under every species of misfortune and affliction.—Instead of comfortably enjoying their own lands and possessions—instead of passing their time in the sweet society of their wives and children—instead of enjoying those blessings which God had in a former period bestowed upon them, they are—excruciating thought!—doomed to a variety of the most complicated disasters, and forced to seek that asylum and happiness in a foreign land, which are denied them at their native homes.

I am happy to think that my proposition has been frequently in the contemplation of several Administrations. I have often mentioned it to the Noble Lord in the blue ribbon, when he was Minister of the country; and I can assure the Committee, that, to the honour of his Lordship be it said, he has often entered into the subject with the greatest warmth and tenderness; and has on all those occasions acted as a man of honour, integrity, and universal philanthropy. In justice to the late Administration, it is proper to mention, that they intended to bring forward a proposition of a similar nature. But the different Administrations of this country have of late been so fluctuating, that it has been impossible for them to prosecute any such design with effect. However, I can now congratulate the People on the occasion, when the present Ministry will have it in their power to alleviate the distresses of those unfortunate persons, by restoring to them their estates and property.

The immortal Earl of Chatham was the first man, after the late unfortunate rebellion, that called those men forth from obscurity. He intended to have rewarded them in a similar manner, as appears from the encomiums which he bestowed on them some years ago on a question relative to the Stamp-act,

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when he had an opportunity of doing justice to the merit of the Highlanders. This design, however, was frustrated; but it gives me singular felicity to think, that what was so happily begun, under the administration of that illustrious personage, will be completed under that of his son; for I am fully persuaded, that none will object to a measure which is pregnant with the most happy consequences.

Mr. Dundas, Aug. 2, 1784.

END OF VOL. I.



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